Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections

Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections

Chapter 12 – Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments – Due Process – Classification, Transfers, Personal Injuries, and Property Loss • Introduction: Chapter looks at cases in which inmates raise due process claims • Because of loss of property; also • Some non-discipline cases where inmates claim a loss of liberty by the actions of prison officials

Chapter Outline • The Nature of Classification • Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes • McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper • Olim v. Wakinekona • Howe v. Smith

Chapter Outline: cont’d • Vitek v. Jones • Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane • Farmer v. Brennan • International Transfers • Loss of Property and Personal Injuries • Use of Excessive Force

The Nature of Classification • One of the most important functions in running prisons, involves • Where offender should serve her sentence • Where offender should be assigned, in that setting, for housing, for special programs, and for work • Specially trained staff, and written policies

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Classification procedures looks at many factors: • Age and sex of the offender • Criminal sophistication • Geographical concerns (such as home, location of family, and visiting)

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Special needs (such as medical or psychiatric, educational and vocational training) • Special security problems (such as need for separation, and escape risk) • Special factors (such as court recommendation(s))

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Availability of space in appropriate facilities • Facilities classified according to security level; types of inmates received; programs offered • Broad classifications – minimum, medium, and maximum security; for males and for females • Also classified according to programs offered, such as medical, psychiatric, vocational, educational, and for inmates with higher security needs (protection, disciplinary housing)

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Basic (desirable) rule – inmate will be sent to an institution as close to his home as possible - appropriate for his security level and other needs

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Classification determination is based on various reports • Pre-sentence investigation • Law enforcement and court reports • Considerations from prior confinement periods • Diagnostic/reception center process (where exists), including face-to-face interviews

The Nature of Classification: cont’d • Reclassification – can occur later in stay, based on factors that appear after inmate is in service of sentence

Meachum v. Fano (1976); Montanye v. Haymes (1976) • Meachum v. Fano involved the transfer of Fano and five other inmates from a medium to maximum security prison (where living conditions were less favorable)

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d • Transfer based on information inmates were involved in criminal conduct • None of the inmates punished by loss of good time or disciplinary segregation • Question involved whether inmates were entitled to a due process hearing prior to transfer to a prison with less favorable conditions

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d • Supreme Court in Meachum held there were no due process entitlements • Prison officials have the discretion to transfer inmates for any number of reasons • Constitution does not guarantee the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison • Conviction has “sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest” to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons”

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d • In Montanye v. Haymes, inmate Haymes was transferred from one maximum security prison to a second prison of the same security • Inmate alleged transfer was done for disciplinary reasons, due to his circulating a petition among inmates complaining of his removal as an inmate clerk in the law library

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d • The Court in Montanye held that as long as the conditions or degree of confinement are within the sentence imposed upon the inmate and are not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight • “As long as” language anticipates the standards for due process entitlements adopted in Sandin

McKune v. Lile (2002); Young v. Harper (1997) • In McKune v. Lile, an inmate refused to participate in prison’s mandatory Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP)

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • SATP required inmate to sign “Admission of Responsibility” form • Accepting all responsibility for crimes for which sentenced • And required inmate to detail all prior sexual activities, even those not charged – no legal immunity provided

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • Failure to comply would result in reduction of prison privileges and transfer to another potentially more dangerous prison • Inmate sued for injunctive relief, claiming Fifth Amendment violation (right against self-incrimination)

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • Court upheld state, seeing Meachum as controlling authority • Transfer was incidental to state’s legitimate penological reason for transfer: limited space • By moving inmate out, room is made for other inmates to move in and take part in the program

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • In Young v. Harper, aninmate was removed from a preparole program • The state’s Preparole Program became effective whenever state prisons exceeded 95% of capacity

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • Program authorized the release by administrative action of inmates prior to sentence expiration – referred to as conditional release • Inmate was released after serving 15 years of a life sentence for two murders • He spent five months in the community

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • Governor under authority granted to him by the Program, subsequently denied the inmate parole and the inmate was returned to prison • Inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming deprivation of liberty without due process

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • State argued Meachum was controlling, that reincarceration of a preparolee was only a transfer to a higher degree of confinement

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d • Court disagreed with the state; Court affirmed appeals court holding that • Preparole “more closely resembles parole or probation than even the most permissive forms of institutional confinement” • Due process requires that program participants receive procedural protections

Olim v. Wakinekona (1983) • Inmate in Hawaii prison was identified as a serious troublemaker • Inmate was transferred to a prison in California • Inmate filed a Section 1983 action against state officials, claiming a denial of procedural due process because he did not receive a hearing prior to transfer

Olim v. Wakinekona: cont’d • Court held that reasoning of Meachum and Montanye apply, and that an inmate may be transferred out of state without a hearing • Such transfer does not “deprive inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”

Howe v. Smith (1981) • State inmate serving life sentence for murder was transferred to a federal prison pursuant to a federal statute (18 USC § 5003) allowing for such transfers • State was planning to close its high security prison

Howe v. Smith: cont’d • Inmate provided hearing within state • Hearing officer recommended inmate’s transfer • Based on dangerousness • Not suitable for a community-based program (all that state would have) • Inmate seen as an escape risk • And as requiring long-term maximum-security supervision

Howe v. Smith: cont’d • Supreme Court upheld validity of transfer, principally on the federal statutory language, and not on constitutional protections • “[P]lain language, the legislative history, and the longstanding administrative interpretation of [Sec.] 5003(a) clearly demonstrate that the provision is a broad charter authorizing the transfer of state prisoners to federal custody.”

Vitek v. Jones (1980) • Transfer case made outside the range of conditions ordinarily to be expected by one serving a sentence of confinement • Inmate Jones serving 3-9 year sentence in state prison • He was placed in prison hospital, for psychiatric and behavioral problems • Two days later placed in solitary confinement • There, he set his mattress on fire

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d • Based on reports he was suffering from a mental illness or defect, and a finding he could not receive proper treatment in prison, he was sent to a state mental hospital • Jones and other inmates challenged the transfer process, claiming denial of due process protections when transferred from the prison complex to the mental hospital

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d • Supreme Court agreed • Such a transfer involves a protected liberty interest and requires a hearing • A criminal conviction and prison sentence removes an inmate’s right to freedom from confinement for service of his sentence

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d • But does not allow the state to classify the inmate as mentally ill and subject the inmate to involuntary psychiatric treatment without providing additional due process protections • The due process required: • Advance written notice to the inmate that a transfer was being considered • A hearing, with disclosure of the evidence relied on, plus an opportunity for the inmate to be heard and to present documentary evidence

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d • Opportunity at the hearing to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine witnesses (absent a finding of good reason not to allow) • An independent decision maker • A written decision by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on, and the reasons for the recommended action • Assistance by someone at the hearing • Effective and timely notice of these hearing rights

Kansas v. Hendricks ( 1997); Kansas v. Crane (2002) • Cases deal with state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act • Act set procedures for civilly committing persons who due to a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” are likely to become involved in “predatory acts of sexual violence”

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • In Kansas v. Hendricks, Hendricks had a long history of sexually molesting children • After serving 10 years for taking “indecent liberties” with two 13-year old boys, he was due for release • State filed a petition seeking his confinement under the new law

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • Inmate challenged the law, alleging a lack of due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto statutory punishment • Inmate did not, at his hearing, dispute the diagnosis that he suffered from pedophilia

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • Supreme Court upheld the Act, likening it to state civil commitment procedures for mental patients that the Court had previously approved

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • Precommitment requirement of “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is consistent with the requirements of other statutes upheld by the Court in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are not able to control their dangerousness • Court also rejected double jeopardy and ex post facto, holding that the Act is nonpunitive thus removing “an essential prerequisite” for both claims

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • In Kansas v. Crane, the Court looked at the question of whether the Act required a finding that person is completely unable to control his dangerous behavior • Court held that Hendricks did not require a total or complete lack of control, but disagreed with the state position that Hendricks allowed commitment without any determination at all of lack of control

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d • Court held there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior, and that this, when viewed in light of such features as the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality, must be sufficient “to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender, whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case”

Farmer v. Brennan (1994) • Case raised serious questions about the proper classification of an inmate

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d • Farmer was a transsexual, medically identified as a male because he possessed male sex organs • Inmate’s status presented difficult questions on how best he could be placed and treated within the prison • Prison officials must take steps to protect inmates, particularly when on notice a risk is posed by an inmate’s particular behavior

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d • Two possible types of liabilities in such circumstances • Common law tort liability • Applies if officials are negligent in taking protective steps, when they have received some notice of danger to the inmate and the inmate is then assaulted because of officials’ inaction

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d • Could also be liability for violating an inmate’s constitutional rights • Applies if an official knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid it

International Transfers • Treaty procedures exist for transfer of inmates between the United States and other countries • Requires that both the holding and the receiving country agree to the offender’s transfer • The offender also has to agree to the transfer

International Transfers: cont’d • The procedure has been upheld in federal courts against claims that criminal proceedings in the foreign country violated due process standards • The leading case considering challenges to the treaty process and the authority to hold prisoners under sentences imposed in another country is Rosado v. Civiletti (1980)

International Transfers: cont’d • Rosado and three other inmates made numerous allegations regarding the circumstances of their convictions in Mexico for drug offenses • They challenged the constitutionality of their detention by habeas corpus action

International Transfers: cont’d • The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the U.S. Constitution only applied to actions taken in the U.S., or to actions taken by U.S. agents working in a foreign country • Bill of Rights does not protect U.S. citizens against any actions that might be taken by a foreign nation’s officials

Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections