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This chapter explores what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in regards to inmate living conditions.
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Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections
Chapter 15 – Eighth Amendment: Conditions of Confinement – Cruel and Unusual Punishment Introduction: This chapter examines the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” with respect to the conditions under which inmates are held
Chapter Outline • Conditions in Prison • Opening the Gates • Crowding in Prisons and Jails • Effect of the Prison Litigation Reform Act • Bell v. Wolfish • Rhodes v. Chapman
Chapter Outline: cont’d • Whitley v. Albers • Wilson v. Seiter • Hudson v. McMillian • Farmer v. Brennan • Helling v. McKinney • Qualified Immunity
Conditions in Prison • Historically, the courts had a “hands-off” attitude towards prisons • Gave no constitutional guidelines for the management of prisons • Constitution was not seen as providing the courts the keys to unlock the doors and to look into prison conditions • This view changed beginning in the 1960s
Opening the Gates • Wright v. McMann (1967) – Inmate in Clinton State Prison in New York filed suit, without assistance of counsel, under Section 1983, claiming prison conditions in solitary confinement were deplorable • Said he was in this cell for 33 days, beginning in February 1965, and another 21 days in 1966
Opening the Gates: cont’d • A few of the claims • Cell was dirty, with no means to clean • Toilet and sink encrusted with slime and human excrement • Left nude for several days, and later given only a pair of underwear
Opening the Gates: cont’d • No hygiene items • Windows in his cell were left open, causing exposure to the cold winter air during subfreezing temperatures • Had to sleep on the cold concrete floor without bedding
Opening the Gates: cont’d • Appeals court in Wright gave brief overview of the history of the Eighth Amendment, referencing the Supreme Court’s holding in Weems (1910) • “[The Constitution]. . . may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice” • The concept of “cruel and unusual punishment” is found in an ever-changing state of public opinion – the views of American society
Opening the Gates: cont’d • In Wright, the appeals court said the alleged conditions if established would be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment • “The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so foul, so inhuman, and so violative of basic concepts of decency”
Opening the Gates: cont’d • The appeals court in Wright returned the case to the trial court for a hearing on the truthfulness of the charges • If proved, Wright would be entitled to relief under Section 1983 • A judge concurring in this holding, warned that this would open the courts to a flood of complaints under Section 1983
Crowding in Prisons and Jails • Many prisons are crowded beyond their desirable capacity • Such crowding can lead to other problems - budgetary, program dilution, tensions within prison
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Term “overcrowding” seen as inappropriate – as making a judgment on what level of prison population is bad • Prisons and jails can be effectively run at a population above capacity – adequate funding and resources are two factors that contribute to this • Better way to describe, absent a population that has reached a truly unmanageable level, is “crowding”
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Crowding in prisons has led to many lawsuits, most under § 1983 • Many suits have led to court orders or consent decrees requiring corrective actions • At least 40 states have been under such orders or decrees
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Consent decrees are agreements by the parties and approved by the court that certain actions will occur to improve conditions • Some defendant–administrators have signed such agreements because they agreed with the provisions and wanted to see the changes
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Consent decrees also have significant drawbacks: • The duration of the consent decree – can be an albatross passed from one administrator to the next • The requirement for adherence to the agreement regardless of subsequent occurrences – failure to adhere could place prison officials in contempt
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Interesting question – what right does an administrator have to sign an agreement that requires the government to spend large sums of taxpayer money for programs or changes he feels are desirable • What right exists to bind future legislators or governors to that course of expensive changes • Short answer – no such right or authority - the power to raise money for the government and to decide where it is spent is with the legislative branch
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • Some court decisions involving conditions of prisons or jails led to court-appointed masters to assist the court in the administration of the granted relief
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • The appointed masters were to be assistants to the judges • However, provided wide authority by appointing judges, masters, at times, became involved in day-to-day prison management or were authorized to look over the shoulders of administrators in many different aspects of their job
Crowding in Prisons and Jails: cont’d • The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides prison officials with some relief regarding consent decrees and masters
Effect of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) • While does not change inmate’s substantive rights, does establish guidelines (such as requiring “exhaustion”) • The PLRA reflects congressional intent to limit judicial management of prisons
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Consent decrees – PLRA defines as relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties; does not include private settlements • Relief – refers to all relief that may be granted or approved by the federal court and includes consent decrees
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions may be granted or approved by the federal court only upon: • Finding that the relief is narrowly drawn • Extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Is the least intrusive means necessary to correct that violation • The court must also give substantial weight to any adverse impact the proposed relief has on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • On existing consent decrees, the PLRA provides: • For termination of a decree, upon motion of any party or intervener, no later than two years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief • One year after the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief; or • For orders issued prior to the PLRA’s enactment date, two years from the date of the PLRA’s enactment
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • A different section of the PLRA places limitations on special masters, including a ban on them making findings or ex parte communications
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Miller v. French (2000) – dates back to 1975 and an inmate class action suit on conditions of confinement • Constitutional violations found and lower courts ordered injunctive relief, remaining in effect through current litigation • Last modification occurred in 1988
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • In 1997, the state, citing the PLRA, filed a motion to end the prospective relief • Inmates opposed action – saying the PLRA’s automatic stay provision (temporary suspension of the court-ordered injunctive relief) violated the separation of powers doctrine • Supreme Court held for government – saying that the stay “merely reflects the changed legal circumstances”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Court held prospective relief under the existing decree is no longer enforceable, and that it remains unenforceable unless and until the court makes the required findings that • prospective relief continues to be necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the federal right • it extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right • and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn, and • the least intrusive means to correct the violation
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Gilmore v. People of the State of California (2000) – state officials, pursuant to the PLRA, filed for termination of court orders dating back to 1972 and consent decrees dating back to 1980 • Appeals court noted that no circuit court has found the PLRA to violate due process or the Equal Protection clause; the court said it declined “to stray from these precedents”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse (1997) – dated back to 1971, primarily involving double-bunking of pretrial detainees • 1979 consent decree ratified plan for new facility with single occupancy cells, and phasing out old jail • For various reasons, wasn’t until mid-1990s when new facility was done • Difficulty encountered in adhering to single occupancy
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Consent decree modifications in 1985, 1990 and 1994 • Following passage of PLRA, state filed suit to terminate the decree • Appeals court ordered termination of the consent decree • Found the PLRA legislation to be rational • Withdrawal of prospective relief does not diminish the right of access • PLRA does not impair a fundamental right
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Imprisoned Citizens v. Ridge (1999) – appeals court held that while the PLRA’s provision for immediate termination of prospective relief singles out certain prisoner rights cases for special treatment, it does so only to advance unquestionably legitimate purposes • “to minimize prison micro-management by federal courts and to conserve judicial resources”
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Benjamin v. Fraser (2001) – suit first brought in 1975, alleging conditions in New York City jails violated pretrial detainees’ constitutional rights • Original consent decrees dated to 1978-79 • State, under PLRA, attempted to terminate operation of the decrees
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Lower courts refused to terminate decree provisions involving attorney visitation • Family were allowed to visit during “count”; attorneys were not – no justification for distinction was provided • No rationale provided as to why the process of bringing detainees to the counsel rooms could not begin upon the attorney’s arrival at the prison, rather than his arrival at the visiting area • The district court had found that attorneys were forced to wait 45 minutes to two hours or longer, after arriving
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • No reasons provided why a space reservation policy could not be used in those institutions with limited visiting areas • Appeals court found measures ordered by earlier consent decrees to be reasonable • To safeguard the detainees’ constitutional rights at minimal cost to the department and • The safeguards did not impair institutional concerns
Effect of the PLRA: cont’d • Appeals court affirmed the “continuing need for prospective relief to correct an ongoing denial of a federal right, and that the relief ordered was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the requirements of the PLRA”
Bell v. Wolfish (1979) • First Supreme Court case dealing with conditions of confinement, and interpreting the Eighth Amendment • Discussed previously with respect to the publishers-only rule for incoming publications and the inspection of personal packages in Chapter 7 (First Amendment), and the issue of searches in Chapter 10 (Fourth Amendment)
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d • Eighth Amendment also a focus in the case • Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New York had a planned capacity of 449 inmates • Primarily single occupancy rooms • Increased confinement numbers led to double-bunking • Issue - is it a constitutional violation to “overcrowd” – that is to place two or more inmates in a space planned or designed for one
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d • Because the inmates were pretrial detainees, inmates could not be punished at all; issue was one of due process • Under the due process clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law • Court focus was to look at whether the conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention amounted to punishment of the detainees
Bell v. Wolfish:cont’d • Court held that if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to “punishment” • But, if a restriction or condition is arbitrary or purposeless – a court could permissibly infer that the purpose of the governmental action was punishment
Bell v. Wolfish:cont’d • Court held in Wolfish that as a matter of law, the double-bunking as done at the MCC did not amount to punishment and thus did not violate inmates’ rights under the due process clause • Court held the government must be able to take steps to maintain institution security and order
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d • The Wolfish ruling is important on two points • It provided the standard for measuring the constitutionality of conditions for pretrial detainees, and • It ruled that double-bunking is not per se unconstitutional
Bell v. Wolfish: cont’d • The Wolfish decision has allowed jails to be double-bunked and otherwise crowded, so long as the conditions do not become “genuine privations and hardships over an extended period of time”
Rhodes v. Chapman (1981) • In Rhodes v. Chapman, the issue was whether the housing of two inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments • Inmates brought the Section 1983 action, claiming that double-celling resulted in inmates living too closely together, and that the crowding strained the prison’s facilities and staff
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d • This maximum security prison opened in the early 1970s • It had 1,620 cells, each 63 square feet • At the time of the lawsuit, the prison had 2,300 inmates, most doing long-term sentences • Most inmates had to spend 25% of their time in their cells
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d • Court noted that conditions could not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting confinement • This is the current “standard of decency” to measure whether conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment
Rhodes v. Chapman: cont’d • Court, using this standard, found no cruel and unusual punishment in double bunking per se, or on the conditions that prevailed at the prison, saying • “(T)he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons”
Whitley v. Albers (1986) • Whitley v. Albers focused on the use of force • Inmates at the Oregon State Penitentiary took control of a two-tiered cellblock • Inmate Albers lived in the cellblock • An officer was taken hostage, and was being held on the upper tier
Whitley v. Albers: cont’d • Officers formed an assault squad to regain control of the cellblock • Captain Whitley was going to go to the second tier in an effort to free the hostage • Three officers were told to shoot low at any inmates trying to climb the stairs to the second tier – because they would be a threat to Captain Whitley or the hostage • Inmate Albers started up the stairs after Whitley had run up; Albers was shot in the left knee • Hostage was rescued and cellblock retaken