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SOF Support to Major Operations. LTC Joe Cieslo DTAC, Room 4178 684-3485. SOF Liaison/Integration to the General Purpose Force. BCT. Division. Battalion. CORPS/ CFLCC. PSYOP (MISO) 2 x LTC. PSYOP (MISO) 1 x SFC. PSYOP (MISO) 1 x LTC. Permanent members of staff. Civil Affairs
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SOF Support to Major Operations LTC Joe Cieslo DTAC, Room 4178 684-3485
SOF Liaison/Integration to the General Purpose Force BCT Division Battalion CORPS/ CFLCC PSYOP (MISO) 2 x LTC PSYOP (MISO) 1 x SFC PSYOP (MISO) 1 x LTC Permanent members of staff Civil Affairs (G-9) Civil Affairs (S-9) Civil Affairs (G-9) Special Forces Liaison Element As Required Special Operations Command & Control Element Augmented Co Staff Special Forces Liaison Element As Required Special Forces Liaison Element As Required Ranger Regiment and NAVSPECWAR LNOs as required
Special Operations Core Activities (IAW JP 3-05, April 2011) Direct Action Special Reconnaissance Counter proliferation of WMD Counterterrorism Unconventional Warfare Foreign Internal Defense Security Force Assistance Counterinsurgency Operations Information Operations Military Information Support Operations Civil Affairs Operations
Direct Action (DA) Short-duration strikes and other small scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which to employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. JP 3-05 Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. JP 3-05
Special Reconnaissance (SR) Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. JP 3-05
Counter Proliferation of WMD (CP) Those actions (e.g. detect and monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends and allies. JP 3-40 SOF provide the following capabilities for this core activity: (1) Expertise, materiel and teams to supported combatant command teams to locate, tag, and track WMD, as required. (2) Capabilities to conduct DA in limited access areas, as required. (3) Build partnership capacity for conducting CP activities. (4) Conduct IO and MISO to dissuade adversary reliance on WMD. (5) Other specialized capabilities to combat WMD. JP 3-05
Counterterrorism (CT) Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. JP 3-05
Unconventional Warfare Operations Defined: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. JP 3-05
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. JP 1-02 SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity is to assess, train, advise and assist HN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities. JP 3-05
Counterinsurgency Operations Defined: …those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02) Successful COIN operations are population-focused because of the importance of building support for the government and its programs. Likewise, the population is the center of gravity for an insurgency, and is targeted as part of an integrated COIN effort.
Information Operations IO are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. When properly coordinated, integrated, and synchronized as a part of the overall operation, IO affect the quality, content, and availability of information available to decision makers. IO also influence the perceptions and motivations of targeted key audiences with the goal of convincing them to act in a manner conducive to established objectives and desired end states. IO are conducted throughout all operational phases, across the range of military operations, and at every level of war. JP 3-05 USSOCOM plays a broader, integrating role for IO in support of SOF across the combatant commands. As directed by the Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM integrates and coordinates DOD MISO capabilities to enhance interoperability, and supports United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) with its IO responsibilities and other CCDRs with MISO planning and execution. JP 3-05
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Defined: Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals Draft Joint Pub 3-53 USSOCOM retains the preponderance of active duty MISO forces under USSOCOM Command. USSOCOM also gains Air RC MISO forces through Air Force Special Operations Command when those Air National Guard assets are mobilized. JP 3-05
Civil Affairs Operations (CA) Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. JP 3-05/JP 3-57 Civil Affairs are the designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs activities and to support Civil-Military Operations. JP 3-57
SOF and conventional forces often operate on the same battle space. SOF teams conduct operational missions in conventional AO under JSOTF CMD: Raids. Examples include— Capture of Saddam in Iraq Attempted capture of Aideed, Mogadishu Foreign Internal defense. Examples include— SOF teams (ODA) work concurrently in same battle space as conventional force under different Joint Commanders (JFLCC vs. JFSOC) TOA from SOF to conventional force or vice versa. Example: 10th Group TOA to 173d in Northern Iraq, 2004 While operating on same space, each force probably will have differing— Chains of command (JFSOCC or CFLCC) Missions and modes of operation Operational and tactical perspectives SOF and Conventional Integration How do SOF and Conventional Forces deconflict operations?
Special Operations Command & Control Element (SOCCE) SOCCE (Defined) A special operations element that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces activities. Also called SOCCE. (JP 3-05, April 2011, approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) • SOCCE; From SOF to Conventional Force • Established by SOF CDR to perform Command & Control and/or liaison, maintain situational awareness on CF OPNs for FUTOPS • SOF rep to JTF, Army Corps, or MEF to synchronize SOF with CF maritime and land operations, “SOF Focal Point” • Collocates with the command post of supported force • Receives and shares SOF reports with conventional forces • Remains under OPCON of the JFSOCC or JSOTF • Deployed when circumstances on the battlefield warrant; SOF within close proximity to CF, potential link-up, facilitate supporting commander’s responsibilities to GFC, integrate SOF assets within the CF IOT synchronize and deconflict
Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE) SFLE is an SF element that conducts liaison between SF, U.S. conventional forces, and HN or multinational forces. It is formed only as needed. SFLEs conduct these functions when conventional forces or host or multinational forces have not practiced interoperability before the operation, when the forces do not share common operational procedures or communications equipment, or when a significant language or cultural barrier exists. • SFLE; Special Forces Liaison Element • Established by SOF CDR to perform liaison between SF, Conventional Force, HN and Multinational forces. • Formed only as needed. • SFLEs conduct these functions when: • Conventional forces or host or MN forces have not practiced interoperability before the operation, • When the forces do not share common operational procedures or communications equipment, or when a significant language or cultural barrier exists.
Special Operations Forces LNOs SOF LNOs report to the SOF commander or SOF component commander and are dispatched to applicable conventional JTF components to ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support information to aid mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of intelligence sources. • SF LNOs; From SOF to Conventional Force or Multi-National Forces • SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, MISO, CAO, and other operational issues based on current and future SO missions. • Efforts are crucial to the JFC’s unity of effort, tempo, and coordination of limited resources and assets.
At CFLCC, Corps, and Division echelons: Conventional and SOF missions coordinated & deconflicted through SOCCE Normally a JFSOCC and JFLCC are given JOINT command support relationships (usually supported and supporting relationships) in the campaign plan or OPORD At BCT and below: Joint CMD relationships (i.e. supported/supporting) may not be communicated to the BCT via higher Army orders Doctrinally there is no SOCCE (nor SOF LNO team) required to interface with a BCT Coordination and cooperation are often done directly between the BCT/BN and a SF BN, a SF company, or a SF detachment via— BCT LNO team liaison with SOF representatives Conventional BCT/BN commander to SOF unit commander Conventional staff to SOF staff How Do SOF and Conventional Forces Deconflict Operations? What can SOF and Conventional forces operating in the same battle space expect from each other??
Conventional Forces and SOF Spheres of Influence (SOI) • Planning and execution requires understanding each other’s SOI, capabilities and limitations • Convergence of SOI must be synergistic • CF & SOF CDR must work out the parameters of this convergence SOIs Converge SOF/OGA asset targeting abilities encompass all HVT tiers Mutual Target SOF Sphere of Influence Conventional Force Sphere of Influence CDR personal relationship necessary at BCT and BN TF level Tier 1 HVTs Political Military Economic Social Information Infrastructure Physical ENV Time Extremist Foreign Influence Armed Militias PIR for CF CDR Tier 3 HVTs Tier 2 HVTs Tier 4 HVTs Tier 5 HVTs CF supporting with combat power SOF supporting with assets • To enhance their effectiveness in the JOA commanders must: • Leveraging CF/SOF capabilities CDRs can capitalize on FSO and influence all PMESII LOOs • Form good working relationship and continual cross-coordination (formal or informal) by CDRs of both CF and SOF Units enhance their effectiveness in the JOA.
INPUT OUTPUT • CDR’S INITIAL GUIDANCE • RESTATED MISSION • INITIAL CDR’S INTENT AND PLANNING GUIDANCE • INITIAL CCIR • UPDATED RUNNING ESTIMATES • INITIAL IPB PRODUCTS • INITIAL ISR PLAN • PRELIMINARY MOVEMENT • UPDATED RUNNING ESTIMATES AND PRODUCTS • COA STATEMENTS & SKETCHES • REFINED CDR’S INTENT & PLANNING GUIDANCE • WAR-GAME RESULTS • DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATES • TASK ORGANIZATION • MISSION TO SUBORDINATE UNITS • RECOMMENDED CCIR • DECISION MATRIX • APPROVED COA • REFINED CDR’S INTENT • REFINED CCIR • HIGH PAY-OFF TARGET LIST • OPLAN/OPORD WARNO 1 WARNO 2 COA DEVELOPMENT COA COMPARISON WARNO 3 SOF input to the Corps/DIV/BCT in the MDMP RECEIPT OF MISSION Provide current status and condition of SOF and how their missions relate to current mission • MISSION REC’D FROM HIGHER HQ's OR DEDUCED BY THE CDR/STAFF. • HIGHER HQ's OPORD/PLAN • RUNNING ESTIMATES • HIGHER HQs IPB • RESTATED MISSION • INITIAL CDR’S INTENT, PLANNING GUIDANCE AND CCIR • UPDATED RUNNING ESTIMATES • INITIAL IPB PRODUCTS • REFINED CDR’S INTENT AND PLANNING GUIDANCE • ENEMY COAs • COA STATEMENTS AND SKETCHES • WAR-GAME RESULTS • CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON • DECISION MATRIX • APPROVED COA • REFINED CDR’S INTENT AND GUIDANCE • REFINED CCIR MISSION ANALYSIS Provide options for employment of SOF lethal and non-lethal fires, and R&S capabilities. Confirm SOF tasks to capabilities, C2, targeting priorities, decision points and R&S taskings, and support requirements COA ANALYSIS (WAR GAME) Ensure any recommendations for SOF employment are fully coordinated with SOF Component CDR COA APPROVAL ORDERS PRODUCTION Ensure SOF operations are reflected in the OPORD, Appendix 4 to Annex C.
Selected “actionable” intelligence HUMINT on local situation Targeting coordination Integration of indigenous forces thereby placing host nation face on operations Potential access to joint operational fire systems via SOF comm systems Training for SOF missions the conventional force may need to conduct (e.g., FID and training of indigenous forces) What a Division / BCT can expect from an ODA What the ODA may expect from the Division / BCT • Quick Reaction Force (QRF) • Lift Aviation • Attack Aviation • Fire support/ counterfire • Common logistics/maintenance • Security and convoy security assistance • CASEVAC / Medical assistance • Engineering assets (horizontal, vertical or obstacle removal)
Question……..??Are Special Operations Forces ever placed—Assigned, Attached, or OPCON to conventional forces? Answer: “YES!” SOCOM has designed and is fielding Tactical Civil Affairs and MISO units that will be Assigned, Attached, & OPCON’d to conventional forces
Question……..??Are Conventional Forces ever placed—Assigned, Attached, or OPCON to Special Operations Forces? Answer: “YES!” Conventional Forces are OPCON to select SOF units in Afghanistan
Notional Joint Task Force Organization Combatant Commander Theater Component Commands Army Commander Navy Commander Commander Joint Task Force Air Force Commander Marine Commander Special Operations Forces Commander TSOC SOF TACON Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Joint Force Land Component Commander Joint Force Air Component Commander Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander SOF Functional Task Forces Combat Units Combat Units Combat Units Combat Units Tactical CA Co & MISO to BCT’s Joint Military Information Support Operations Task Force Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Tactical MISO and CA assets from SOCOM to support BCTs Operational Control Admin / Logistics
Operational CMO/CA Integration Coordinate air ops for CF & SOF Operational DA, Spec Recon, UW, etc. Operational CA Operational MISO Tactical and Operational SOF in a JTF JTF CDR CMOC Tactical MISO and CA assets from SOCOM to support BCTs CFLCC JFMCC Tactical CA Co & MISO to BCT’s SOF Infil/ Staging JFACC JFSOCC JMISOTF JCMOTF
Civil Affairs Command Relationships Support to Conventional Forces (CF) Support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) (A) TSOC JFSOCC JSOTF (A) (A) RGR BN SOTF
Corps or JTF CA Support • CA Brigade Provides: • One Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) • One Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) with: • Up to two Civil Liaison Teams (CLTs) • One Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell • One Functional Specialty Cell (FX SP) CA
Division CA Support • CA Battalion Provides: • One Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) • One Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) with: • One Civil Liaison Team (CLT) • One Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell • One Functional Specialty Cell (FX SP) CA
SF Group and JSOTF CA Support • CA Battalion (A) Provides: • Concept of CA augmentation to the JSOTF assumes a CA battalion (minus.) Functional specialist support is requested from higher. • The CAPT is collocated with the JSOTF HQ to assist in CMO planning within the joint special operations area (JSOA). • One CA Company HQ will be collocated with each SOTF, providing a CMOC as directed. • A CAT is designated to support each SF advanced operational base, as directed. CA (A) (-)
CA Tactical Civil Affairs Company Civil Affairs Activities: Those activities planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces to enhance civil military operations (CMO) or other US objectives. FM 3-05.40 NOTE: RC CA which generally supports the BCT is no longer considered SOF.
CA assets organic in the BCT S9 Section - 1 MAJ 38A Civil Affairs Officer who serves as the S9 - 1 SFC 38A Civil Affairs NCO who serves as the S9 NCOIC CA Assets task organized to the BCT - 1 CA Company (usually from USAR) can deploy in support of BCT operations NOTE: CA company should be identified 1 year prior to deployment during the ARFORGEN process GOAL: Get the CA CO to all CPXs and CTC Rotation prior to deployment Organic vs. “Provided” Civil Affairs Assets at BCT Level
Capabilities Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) CA Planning Team (CAPT) Civil Liaison Team (CLT) Civil Info Management Cell (CIMC) Civil Affairs Teams - 1 Captain and 3 NCOs x 5 teams Limitations Functional Specialist Cell CA Company by MTOE has 1 Public Safety Specialist 1 Infrastructure Specialist Work out of the CMOC CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY CA CO Capabilities/Limitations CA CO (32) CO HQ CMOC CA Tm CA Company has limited Functional Specialists
Governance Rule of Law Health & Welfare Public Administration Cultural Affairs Civilian Supply International Law Public Safety Environmental Management Public Health • Education & • Public Information Infrastructure Economic Stability Public Transportation Public Works & Utilities Public Communication Public Education Civil Information Economic Development Food & Agriculture CA Functional Specialties Functional Specialist capabilities will need to be requested from higher echelons of CA assets when needed 6 Core Functional Areas
Civil-Military Operations Center • A standing capability formed by all CA units from the company level to the CACOM level. • Serves as the primary coordination interface for the U.S. Armed Forces and IPI, humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, HN government agencies, and other civilian agencies of the USG. • Facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CAO from local levels to international levels within a given AO, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the COP. • Provides operations and support element of the CA unit as well as a mechanism for the coordination of CMO.
The CMOC is the supported CDR’s ‘store front’ to access non-military partners, providing— Civil Information / Civil Common Operating Picture (COP) situational awareness/understanding based on— Key leader engagement Project coordination Civil reconnaissance Enabling government functions Developing indigenous capabilities and capacities Link to IPIs/local influencers Key leader engagement = face to face (FTF) ‘Capacity building’ focus on civil component Synchronized and integrated with supported Commander and Operations NOTE: Inter-Agency (IA) may collocate with you and work out of the CMOC Example: USAID or State Department representatives CMOC
Locations Inside the wire: hostile/uncertain environment Outside the wire: uncertain/permissive environment Mobile: all environments Combination: all environments Command and Control Military: (immature environment) Supporting Civil Affairs Unit (CA Co and above) Supported Maneuver Unit Non-Military: (mature environment) IO/NGO USG Agency (I.e. USAID/DoS C/RS) Partner Nation Government Information Offices (GICs’ in Baghdad) NOTE: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in OEF are defacto standing CMOCs CMOC LOCATIONS / MC
TACTICAL MIS DETACHMENT (MISD) Organization This chart needs replacing • The MISD analyzes the division OPORD and its MISO Appendix (or Tab) to determine specified and implied MISO tasks. These tasks are then incorporated into the BCT’s MISO plan. They also focus specifically on how they will support the scheme of maneuver. • The MIS commander works under the BCT S3 and normally recommends that he retain the Tactical MISO Teams under MISD control or allocate them to subordinate units as missions dictate
Support to Combat Operations - Surrender appeals - Non-interference appeals - Directing HN populations “Attention, Attention Everyone in the building, you have 5 minutes to lay down your weapons and come out with your hands on your head. We intend to destroy the entire building and kill all of you in it, unless you do as you are told. You can’t escape. The building is surrounded. Don’t die when you don’t have to.…your 5 minutes have started.” -MISO Loudspeaker broadcast, Operation JUST CAUSE MIST assisting cordon & search operations in Iraq
Support to Stability Operations STABILITY OPERATIONS MISO conduct— - Face-to-face communication - Dissemination of handbills, newspapers, and other printed material - Post-testing and area and media assessments - Civic-action programs (CAPs) - Dissemination of pertinent information to the civilian populace MISO provide the commander the ability to communicate directly and indirectly with combatants and hostile or potentially hostile non-combatants, ensuring they take actions that support the maneuver commander’s intent. MIST conducts face to face communications with key leaders in Iraq MISO soldiers conducting post-testing in Iraq