Debating Development: The Strategic Social Construction of the World Bank s Gender and Governance Anticorruption Agend

1. Debating Development: The Strategic Social Construction of the World Bank�s Gender and Governance & Anticorruption Agendas Kate Weaver Assistant Professor, Political Science University of Kansas Presentation to the Second Annual Conference of the International Political Economy Society Stanford University, 9 November 2007

2. The Puzzle Social constructivist theory asserts that international financial institutions produce ideas, norms and practices that �frame the world� and become the �common sense� that govern many aspects of the world economy. Q: Where do these organizational ideas, norms and practices come from? Prior to any critical evaluation, how can we explain the �social construction� and substance of these organizational products?

3. Central Objectives Investigate the dynamics of norm emergence, contestation and diffusion within IOs, with attention to the neglected influence of internal agenda advocates and the essential role of debate within IOs. Examine the distinct organizational battles over ideas and resources that ultimately shape the substance and prominence of development ideas and the manner and extent to which these ideas are �mainstreamed� into organizational practices. Bridge the rationalist-constructivist divide by illuminating the strategic social construction of IO discourse and practice Further the norm dynamics literature by applying concepts to the microcosm of the World Bank The first point address two observed gaps or problems in the current IO literature. One is the tendency to focus on the external drivers of IO change (either by examining states in PA analysis or INGOs in TAN analysis). Prior empirical work in the Bank reveals that this literature neglects much of the internal impetus for change in development ideas, norms, and practices. Second, the literature (particularly works that are quite critical of the IFIs) tends to portray these organizations as monolithic entities, overlooking the degree of quite vibrant dissent and debate with these organizations. The second objective here reveals my frustration with critical studies that are quick to attach the perceived flaws or biases of organizational ideas and policies or assign blame for �mainstreaming failures� without much attempt to explain why we observe these outcomes. This refocuses attention on the agency or and within IOs which, I think, can explain a lot more about elements of IO behavior and change. In simple terms, this is not merely a call to treat IOs more seriously as actors, but to treat more seriously the actors within IOs. In doing so, IOs are seen less as the proverbial billiard balls and perhaps (to be perfectly cheesy here) more like Mexican jumping beans: environmental constraints matter (you need to warm up the Mexican jumping beans and sometimes give them a nudge), but ultimately they move by internal force. The first point address two observed gaps or problems in the current IO literature. One is the tendency to focus on the external drivers of IO change (either by examining states in PA analysis or INGOs in TAN analysis). Prior empirical work in the Bank reveals that this literature neglects much of the internal impetus for change in development ideas, norms, and practices. Second, the literature (particularly works that are quite critical of the IFIs) tends to portray these organizations as monolithic entities, overlooking the degree of quite vibrant dissent and debate with these organizations. The second objective here reveals my frustration with critical studies that are quick to attach the perceived flaws or biases of organizational ideas and policies or assign blame for �mainstreaming failures� without much attempt to explain why we observe these outcomes. This refocuses attention on the agency or and within IOs which, I think, can explain a lot more about elements of IO behavior and change. In simple terms, this is not merely a call to treat IOs more seriously as actors, but to treat more seriously the actors within IOs. In doing so, IOs are seen less as the proverbial billiard balls and perhaps (to be perfectly cheesy here) more like Mexican jumping beans: environmental constraints matter (you need to warm up the Mexican jumping beans and sometimes give them a nudge), but ultimately they move by internal force.

4. First Order Questions What tactics do internal advocates employ to gain entry and traction for new development agendas? How does the choice of tactics reflect the particular opportunities and constraints posed by the cultural and political environment in which organizational staff work? When are advocacy tactics effective?

5. Second Order Questions 1. During advocacy, what happens to the underlying ideas and norms? 2. To what extent can we observe �localization� or �cooptation� of new ideas or norms as a result of chosen advocacy tactics? 3. Is there an implicit �Faustian Bargain� at play here as internal advocates adopt tactics to �speak to power�? If so, what are the consequences? Localization as an unintended product is norm diffusion is a concept articulated by Amitav Archarya. Cooptation is a term utilized by advocates of the social capital agenda in the World Bank, who were referring to the �co-opting� of sociological ideas by dominant economists in the World Bank. On the Faustian Bargain: direct observation of Anthony Bebbington, Michael Woolcock and others in their explanation of what happened to the social capital agenda once internal advocates adopted the language and theories of economics in order to gain intellectual entry to social capital ideas. Localization as an unintended product is norm diffusion is a concept articulated by Amitav Archarya. Cooptation is a term utilized by advocates of the social capital agenda in the World Bank, who were referring to the �co-opting� of sociological ideas by dominant economists in the World Bank. On the Faustian Bargain: direct observation of Anthony Bebbington, Michael Woolcock and others in their explanation of what happened to the social capital agenda once internal advocates adopted the language and theories of economics in order to gain intellectual entry to social capital ideas.

6. Empirical Study Two prominent agendas of the World Bank: Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Gender and Development (GAD)

7. Empirical Methodology Analysis of extensive primary texts (e.g. Action Plans, Implementation Updates, internal evaluation reports) Interviews with internal advocates and �norm recipients� within World Bank, as well as internal evaluation units (e.g. IEG, QAG, INT) (>30) Interviews with external actors in relevant issue areas (INGOs, Executive Directors, Congressional Aides)

8. GAC and GAD Agendas: Similarities Similar timeline in terms of critical �entry� and launch of major mainstreaming efforts (1996) Emergence of agendas facilitated, but not primarily driven by external factors. Both have issued series of �action plans� and �strategic frameworks,� with subsequent evaluations indicating progress and shortfalls in mainstreaming efforts. Newest actions plans for both agendas released in 2006. Similar hurdles in terms of perceived borrower resistance and incompatibility with Bank�s intellectual and operational culture. Both have garnered significant external criticism with respect to the chosen approach to the agenda. Brief over of 1996: Wolfowitz�s major cancer of corruption speech; response to 1995 Beijing Conference. In both cases, we do not see in 1996 a focused external effort (by either states or NGOs) to push this agenda on the Bank. This lends itself well to a comparative study, because there is 10 years of relatively solid data on this. Notably, each time a new action plan is released, it gives a fairly detailed history of the agenda and an analysis of why mainstreaming remains incomplete. These reports also articulate explicit tactics for mainstreaming and benchmarks for measuring progress. This detailed a lot more in paper�. In particular, in GAC agenda: lots of controversy over the manner in which the Bank has pursued its anticorruption agenda� In GAD: concern over narrow, �efficiency� focus on the agenda. Seen to neglect fundamental issues of equity and human rights that are central to other organizational approaches to gender and development. Brief over of 1996: Wolfowitz�s major cancer of corruption speech; response to 1995 Beijing Conference. In both cases, we do not see in 1996 a focused external effort (by either states or NGOs) to push this agenda on the Bank. This lends itself well to a comparative study, because there is 10 years of relatively solid data on this. Notably, each time a new action plan is released, it gives a fairly detailed history of the agenda and an analysis of why mainstreaming remains incomplete. These reports also articulate explicit tactics for mainstreaming and benchmarks for measuring progress. This detailed a lot more in paper�. In particular, in GAC agenda: lots of controversy over the manner in which the Bank has pursued its anticorruption agenda� In GAD: concern over narrow, �efficiency� focus on the agenda. Seen to neglect fundamental issues of equity and human rights that are central to other organizational approaches to gender and development.

9. GAC and GAD Agendas: Differences World Bank was the �first mover� in GAC and the �last mover� in GAD. GAC agenda in last seven years has had much more leverage from influential external actors (US and NGOs). GAD agenda less successful in attaining �powerful patrons� and ensuing financial and staffing resources. GAC agenda perceived to be mainstreaming more quickly than GAD, although with visible �growing pains.� GAD mainstreaming perceived as �slow and uneven.�

10. Goals/Effects of Agenda Advocacy Change in Organizational Rhetoric 2. Change in Organizational Policies/Mandates and Resource Allocation Change in Organizational Behavior / Re-socialization and full �mainstreaming� to the extent that new norms and policies are deeply internalized and taken-for-granted Largely a result of tactics used to gain intellectual entry into official organizational discourse Largely a result of tactics used to gain intellectual entry into official organizational discourse

11. Highlights of Preliminary Findings Semantics Matter: Strategic Linguistic Framing GAC: - �apolitical� language of governance and explicit economic rationale. - theoretical and methodological framing within institutional economics GAD: - �Gender,� not �Women� - �Gender Equality as Smart Economics� (2006 Strategy) - Rationale: economic efficiency, not equity or human rights

12. Highlights of Preliminary Findings:Faustian Bargain of Linguistic Framing Evidence of cooptation or problematic localization of new agendas: GAC: Depoliticized concepts intended to placate clients and gain intellectual traction with Bank economists hindered resource/staff reallocation and other aspects of operationalization. GAD: Narrowing of agenda to �smart economics�/ efficiency rationale deemed necessary to gain entry and traction in important areas of Bank operations to resolve �uneven mainstreaming,� but at loss of desired equity focus and alienation of natural interlocutors outside of Bank.

13. Highlights of Preliminary Findings:Engaging the Logic of Consequence versus Appropriateness GAC: Staff behavioral change sought through formal mandates and oversight mechanisms to change instrumental rationality Communicative rationality limited: GAC research did not produce country-specific reports and toolkits desired by operational staff. Results: Evidence of Type I norm internalization GAD: Explicit avoidance of �unfunded mandates� (advocates leery of shallow internalization effects) Greater focus on normative suasion and communicative rationality to change �logic of appropriateness� of key operational gatekeepers (Country Directors/Regional VPs) Result: Slower, uneven, but deeper and more sustainable (Type II) norm internalization. In GAC: this is what you would expect to see: advocates seeking formal incentive structures (both rewards and sanctions) to get new ideas and policies enforced. Since 2001, mandates regarding treatment of GAC issues in CAS, with implementation monitored by Sector Strategy Implementation Updates and internal evaluation groups (IEG, QAG). Post-hoc evaluations indicates shallow internalization effect In GAD: -evidence of org learning with respect to prior environmental advocacy and effect of EIAs. Gender advocates: need to persuade CDs of merits of GAD agendas. This accomplished not through mandates but rather through �hard evidence�. This, of course, presents a Catch-22, in the sense that they could not produce hard evidence and good research without resources. So they actively lobbied Trust Funds to get the finances to run pilot projects, conduct new research, draft strategy plans and implementation updates. Key here: Norwegian and German support (but notably little US support, particularly since Jan Percy left as ED and Carole Brookins took over). In GAC: this is what you would expect to see: advocates seeking formal incentive structures (both rewards and sanctions) to get new ideas and policies enforced. Since 2001, mandates regarding treatment of GAC issues in CAS, with implementation monitored by Sector Strategy Implementation Updates and internal evaluation groups (IEG, QAG). Post-hoc evaluations indicates shallow internalization effect In GAD: -evidence of org learning with respect to prior environmental advocacy and effect of EIAs. Gender advocates: need to persuade CDs of merits of GAD agendas. This accomplished not through mandates but rather through �hard evidence�. This, of course, presents a Catch-22, in the sense that they could not produce hard evidence and good research without resources. So they actively lobbied Trust Funds to get the finances to run pilot projects, conduct new research, draft strategy plans and implementation updates. Key here: Norwegian and German support (but notably little US support, particularly since Jan Percy left as ED and Carole Brookins took over).

14. Research Agenda Complete comparative study of GAC and GAD agendas, and analyze in context of advocacy efforts in other World Bank agendas (e.g. environment, social capital, participatory development, private sector development) 2. Extend comparison to similar IOs (e.g. GAD in the IDB; GAC in the ADB). Are there similar patterns of internal advocacy and norm dynamics? Do differences in the external or internal characteristics of these IOs lead to variation in the presence, tactics and effects of internal advocacy?