Current Status of Japanese Government PKI Systems

1. Current Status of Japanese Government PKI Systems Yasuo Miyakawa*+, Takashi Kurokawa*, Akihiro Yamamura* and Yasushi Matsumoto+ * National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan+ Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan

2. Background • There are many e-Government projects around the world • Also in Japan • As the main system, Government PKI system was constructed • In about 2000 • There may have been similar projects in other countries in those days

3. Abstract • 2 characteristics: • I. Bridge Model • II. Signature & non-repudiation centric • Current Status

4. Overview 2000 2008 Current Status Efforts on Interoperability I. Bridge Model 1. Optimization 2. + Entity Authentication 2. Signature & non-repudiation centric * Level of Assurance * CP (domain policy) * Smart card data format CRYPTREC:“e-Government Recommended Ciphers List” 3. Movement in Cryptographic analysis research 4. Revise Signature Law 5. Migration Plan

5. Our Standpoint • We have not assumed the responsibility about the design of Government PKI systems - very complicated systems • But, we had been consulted by the contractors, system integrators, and ministries • Although it was managed to operate up to now… • It will not be easy to cope with …

6. I. Before talking about Bridge CA Model • Vertically Divided Administration • Ministries should have dealt equally • No superior • Ministries wished to have flexibility Ministry A Ministry B Our PKI system Our PKI System

7. I. Trust Model of Government PKI Systems in Japan

8. PKI System Owners

9. Vertically Divided Administration again • Prefectures should be treated equally • No superior • Bridge Model is adopted • Actually, identical CPSs and CPs

10. Our efforts regarding Bridge Model • In 2002 • There was not Trust Status List • Test-suite for Japanese government PKI software • Testing datum for path validation over Bridge CA • IPA’s Contractor • http://www.jnsa.org/mpki/index.html

11. Our efforts regarding Bridge Model • IETF Internet-Draft: Guidance • “Memorandum for multi-domain Public Key Infrastructure Interoperability” • Already cleared – RFC will be published soon • http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-13.txt • Practical factors • e.g.: ‘Domain Policy Object Identifier’ • Certificate Policy as Domain Policy

12. II. Signature & non-repudiation centric • The majority of certificates are for Non-repudiation • keyUsage bit: set in US style • CP: not well utilized, no confusion ? • ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS (2001) • http://www.moj.go.jp/ONLINE/CERTIFICATION/ • With 2 Ministerial Ordinance • Discussion has started to revise these legislation • To be explained later

13. FYI: CRYPTREC • Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees • http://www.cryptrec.jp/english/index.html • Cryptographic Technique Monitoring Subcommittee • “e-Government Recommended Ciphers List”

14. Recent Undertakings • Optimizing GPKI System • Concerns for Entity Authentication • Estimating the Improvement of Factoring Power • Revising ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS and its Ministerial Ordinance • Migration Plan about Cryptography which is used in PKI Systems

15. 1. Optimizing GPKI System • Conducted by MIC Administrative Management Bureau • Planed in March, 2005 • To be completed in FY 2008 • From economic point of view • Duplication in issuing function • Managing operational practices may be centralized • Centralized CA for GPKI • CAs: 14 -> 1 • RAs will remain • Several exceptions: • commercial register system’s CA

16. 2. Concern for Entity Authentication • Level of Assurance • Developing Guideline documents • Citizen’s Smart Cards Format • Multiple credentials • Open specification is expected • Certificate Policy (PKI domain Policy) • Risk to confuse: • Signature non-repudiation • Other purpose • Written in RFC 5280 • MUST be distinguished

17. 3. Movement in Cryptographic analysis research Estimating GNFS sieving steps

18. 3. Movement in Cryptographic analysis research Estimating collision of SHA-1

19. 4. Revising ACT ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND CERTIFICATION BUSINESS and its Ministerial Ordinance • Under discussion • We are supporting Technical issues • Technical issues are not dealt widely yet CA’s business issue Promotion etc. Technical issues Spend most of the time on Cryptographic issue Dealt independently Administrative Scheme issue Certifying procedure：heavy !

20. 4. Status of the discussion • Technical issue • Based on certifying conforming CAs • As a requirement for certified CA: cryptographic issue is included • Although it was the main topic in the first stage… • There are many other technical issues • Need to get understood by lawyers

21. 4. To be discussed • Preventing misrecognition on Section 10 • Often considered as Prohibition of other business • Serious effect on CA’s business • Can be solved by CP description • Confusion: signature on certificates vs. signature on digital documents • different level of Risks • Actually, Not well utilized • Signature is for Authority person and Professionals

22. 5. Migration Plan about Cryptography which is used in PKI Systems • RSA-1024 and SHA-1 • May be Internationally common issue • How we can deal this issue? • Application level discussion may be different from Primitive level discussion • Multi level of risks • Roadmap / Procedure

23. Conclusion • Bridge Model may be the typical trust model for national level PKI systems • Efforts to keep interoperability is required • Additional system requirements • Which have not supposed before 2000 • Not only Signature & non-repudiation • Should be put into design consistently Thank you