1 / 15

Selective Play

Au, W. T., Law, Y. K., & Lee, Y. H. (2009, August). Effect of information display on cooperation in a public goods dilemma under a selective-play protocol. Paper presented at The 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, Japan. Selective Play.

makala
Download Presentation

Selective Play

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Au, W. T., Law, Y. K., & Lee, Y. H. (2009, August). Effect of information display on cooperation in a public goods dilemma under a selective-play protocol. Paper presented at The 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, Japan.

  2. Selective Play • An option for leaving the relationship and choosing a new partner (Hayashi & Yamagishi, 1998; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Tesfatsion, 1995) • “Choice to exit” A trinary-choice game in a PDG (Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984; Hauk, 2003) • “Fully-fledged selective play” (Yamagishi, Hayashi, & Jin, 1994; Yamagishi and Hayashi, 1996) • Switch among groups (Ehrhart & Keser, 1999) • Bid for partners (Coricelli, Fehr, & Fellner, 2004) • Rank partners (Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2002) • Hypothesis: Freedom to choose partners enhances cooperation Yamagishi& Hayashi (1996)

  3. Display of Endowment Information • Endowment heterogeneity increases cooperation (e.g., Chan, Mestelman, Moir, & Muller, 1996; Bergstrom, Blume, &Varian,1986) • … decreases (e.g., Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren, 2005; Ledyard, 1995) • … does not change (e.g., Warr, 1983; ) • Rich contributes more… • More efficacious, critical or efficient (e.g., Van Dijk & Wilke, 1994; Rapoport, 1988; Diekmann, Przepiorka, & Wehrli, 2009) • Altruistic (Becker, 1974) • Inequality aversion (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) • … less … • Fair share (e.g., Buckley & Cronson, 2006; Kroll, Cherry & Shogren, 2007) • Anticipatory reciprocity (e.g., Cherry, Kroll & Shogren, 2005) • Group identification [reduced when inequality justified] (Smith, Jackson, & Sparks, 2003) • Hypothesis: Display of endowment information affects cooperation

  4. Display of Cooperation Information • Visual anonymity • Anonymity of a person • Identifiability(Kerr, 1999; Cress & Kimmerle, 2008) • Anonymity of a person’s behavior or decision • Hypothesis: Display of [individualized] cooperation information enhances cooperation (e.g., Sell & Wilson, 1991; Cress & Kimmerle, 2008; Vuolevi & Van Lange, 2009; Weisel & Bornstein, 2009)

  5. Experiment • Task • Students allocating time between group project [cooperation] vs. individual examination [defection] • Voluntary contribution mechanism • Linear payoff • Endowment size • Randomized across trials • 6 hours per week • 9 • 12 • Display of cooperation information • Yes • No • Display of endowment information • Yes • No [cooperation] [defection]

  6. 120 seconds to select members D D: 9 hrs. D: (38%) D: 9 hrs. (38%) No info Endowment info Cooperation info Full info

  7. Experiment • Task • Students allocating time between group project [cooperation] vs. individual examination [defection] • Voluntary contribution mechanism • Linear payoff • Endowment size • Randomized across trials • 6 hours per week • 9 • 12 • Display of cooperation information • Yes • No • Display of endowment information • Yes • No • Protocols of play • Self-selected • Forced-play Self-selected play • 303 participants • 13-24 participants in an one-hour session • 10 games • HK$50 (￥620) show-up fee + • Bonus HK$40 - $102 (average $73) • ￥500 - ￥1500 (average ￥ 900) • Two randomly selected participants Forced-play • 303 participants • Yoked to the same groupings of self-selected play

  8. Select group members Make contribution decision 10 trials Receive feedback

  9. Results of Trial 2 Group Project Hours Individual Exam Hours Group Project Score Individual Exam Scores Total Hours Total Scores Total Payoffs

  10. Coop Info x Endow Info Display Coop info enhanced cooperation

  11. Coop Info x Endow Info Display Hiding endow info enhanced cooperation

  12. Coop Info x Endow Info Display Effect of coop info most prominent in the absence of endow info

  13. Endowment x Coop Info x Endow Info When cooperation information was present, absence of endowment information affected low and medium endowment players the most

  14. Endowment x Coop Info x Protocol Low and medium endowment players most affected by possibility to choose partners when cooperation information was displayed

  15. Allow selection of players • Hide endowment info and • Display cooperation info • Most effective for less rich people

More Related