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LECTURE 4 SPINOZA & BRADLEY TWO KINDS OF MONISM . INDIVIDUALITY. WHAT IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING? NOT: MODIFICATIONS OF THINGS NOT: MERE COLLECTIONS OF THINGS NOT: EVENTS NOT: STUFFS NOT: UNIVERSALS (OR “ACCIDENTS”). MONISM.
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LECTURE 4 SPINOZA & BRADLEY TWO KINDS OF MONISM
INDIVIDUALITY WHAT IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING? NOT: MODIFICATIONS OF THINGS NOT: MERE COLLECTIONS OF THINGS NOT: EVENTS NOT: STUFFS NOT: UNIVERSALS (OR “ACCIDENTS”)
MONISM THERE IS ONLY ONE SUBSTANTIAL THING (“THE ONE”, “THE ABSOLUTE”, “THE ABSOLUTE MIND”, “THE ABSOLUTE IDEA”, “GOD”,…) TWO WESTERN MONISTS: BARUCH SPINOZA F. H. BRADLEY SOME WESTERN AND EASTERN MYSTICS
VAN INWAGEN’S CHARACTERIZATION OF MONISM • “THERE IS A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL THING AND THAT THING COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY CO-EXISTED WITH ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL THING.”
TWO FORMS OF MONISM • ORDINARY “THINGS” DO NOT EXIST IN THEIR OWN RIGHT – THEY ARE MODES, MODIFICATIONS, OR ACCIDENTS OF THEONE. (SPINOZA) • ORDINARY “THINGS” HAVE NO KIND OF BEING AT ALL – NOT EVEN AS MODIFICATIONS. THE BELIEF THAT THERE ARE MANY (i.E. MORE THAN ONE) ENTITIES IS A COMPLETE ILLUSION. (F. H. BRADLEY & THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS)
THE OTHER RATIONALISTS RENE DESCARTES 1596-1650
SPINOZA’S ACTUAL ARGUMENT IS VERY COMPLICATED SPINOZA’S MASTERPIECE, ETHICS, IS PRESENTED AS A DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM – WITH DEFINITIONS, AXIOMS, AND PROOFS. WE WILL NOT TAKE THE TIME TO PRESENT IT IN DETAIL. [SOME OF HIS PROOFS ARE NOT VALID AND NOT ALL OF HIS AXIOMS SEEM SELF-EVIDENT.] FOR HIS PROOF THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE THING (“SUBSTANCE”, “NATURE”, “GOD”), THE CRUCIAL PREMISE IS:
SPINOZA’S CRUCIAL PREMISE “IF A THING IS NOT ABSOLUTELYINDEPENDENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE, THEN IT MUST BE A MERE MODIFICATION OF SOMETHING ABSOLUTELYINDEPENDENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE.”
VAN INWAGEN’S QUESTION WHY SHOULD WE BELIEVE THIS? IT IS NOT OBVIOUS, OR EVEN PLAUSIBLE, AND SPINOZA GIVES NO INDEPENDENT ARGUMENT FOR IT. (IT IS NOT GOOD PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD TO QUESTION A PREMISE JUST BECAUSE IT IS A PREMISE. BUT HERE WE HAVE SOMETHING THAT NEEDS FURTHER JUSTIFICATION.)
F. H. BRADLEY’S ARGUMENT AGAINST “THE MANY” • (VAN INWAGEN’S RECONSTRUCTION) OVERALL ARGUMENT: (1) IF THERE ARE TWO OR MORE THINGS, THEN THERE ARE EXTERNAL RELATIONS. (2) ALL RELATIONS ARE INTERNAL. __________________________ (3) THERE ARE NOT TWO OR MORE THINGS.
INTRINSIC VS. RELATIONAL ATTRIBUTES • AN ATTRIBUTEA IS RELATIONALIF AND ONLY IF ANYTHING X’S HAVING A IMPLIES THE EXISTENCE OF SOMETHING OTHER THAN X (AND ITS PARTS). • BEING AN UNCLE • BEING 10 MILES FROM CHICAGO • BEING TALLER THAN SOMEONE
INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES AN ATTRIBUTE IS INTRINSICIF AND ONLY IF IT IS NOT RELATIONAL. SOME TESTS: (a) IF SOMETHING ACQUIRES AN ATTRIBUTE BUT DOES NOT REALLY CHANGE, THEN THE ATTRIBUTE IS RELATIONAL (NOT INTRINSIC). (b) IF AN EXACT DUPLICATE OF SOMETHING WOULD ALSO HAVE A CERTAIN ATTRIBUTE, THEN THE ATTRIBUTE IS INTRINSIC.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS • A RELATION R HOLDING BETWEEN THINGS X AND Y IS INTERNALIF ITS’ HOLDING IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED BY THE INTRINSICATTRIBUTES OF X AND Y. • A RELATION R IS EXTERNALIF AND ONLY IF IT IS NOTINTERNAL.