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Foreign Approaches to Gray Zone Conflicts

Foreign Approaches to Gray Zone Conflicts. Defining “Gray Zone” Conflicts.

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Foreign Approaches to Gray Zone Conflicts

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  1. Foreign Approaches to Gray Zone Conflicts

  2. Defining “Gray Zone” Conflicts • The purposeful application of multiple elements of power—information, economic, military, political—to achieve objectives in ways that exceed the threshold for normal competition yet fall below the level of major interstate war. • “Gray Zone cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything.”(1) • “Gray Zone” conflicts are not synonymous with “Hybrid War.” “irregular War” or “MOOTW.” • Intent, not the means, primarily distinguishes “Gray Zone” conflicts from other types of conflict. “Probable Russian troops in Crimea” (Reuters)

  3. Why Conduct “Gray Zone” Conflicts? • Avoid major power war and costly penalties • Hinder an effective response by intentionally blurring peacetime and wartime operations. • Control Escalation

  4. Russia • Increasing importance of “non-military means” in conflicts. • In 21st Century conflicts, “tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.”(2) • Inflict damage on opposing state “without formally crossing the border between war and peace.” (3) • “Controlled Chaos” (4) Source: a. Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen, and Gudrun Persson (eds.), “A Rude Awakening –Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine.” Swedish Defence Research Agency,Stockholm, June 2014, p. 33 (available at http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3892.pdf, accessed April 21, 2015).

  5. China • “Three Warfares” –media, legal, psychological (5,6,7,) • Use of nonmilitary assets to coerce, assert control (8) • Indirect use of military power (e.g. ADIZ) • Ability to control escalation through a selection of actions raging from “full peace” to “full war.” (9)

  6. Iran • “Soft Warfare” (10) • Cyber and media operations (11) • Proxies, subversion, and terrorism (12)

  7. North Korea • In 2013, South Korea's defense chief said North Korea is likely plotting a next generation of warfare against the South. • Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin said Pyongyang, together with pro-North Korea groups in the South, is thought to be coming up with so-called "fourth generation warfare," to cause chaos in South Korean society. • This would take the form of a cyber attack, media warfare or a terror attack.(13)

  8. Notional “Gray Zone” Actions • Using influence campaigns to shape domestic and international opinion – e.g. psychological, legal, and media warfare. • Employing “non-military” assets, such as Coast Guard and civilian maritime vessels, to enforce position. • Taking indirect military action, such as establishing air defense identification zones. • Creating “facts on the ground” through incremental gains that stay below the threshold of war. • Fomenting protests and internal resistance in a target country using proxies. • Employing economic warfare. • Conducting military exercises, weapon tests, and mobilization to intimidate and deter. • Conducting cyber operations. • Infiltrating undeclared military and security personnel in a target country to create disruption. • Employing information campaign to deny and sow doubt about involvement. • Deterring foreign military intervention by threatening escalation.

  9. Issues to Consider • Readjusting Western thinking about the distinctions between war and peace. • “The US conception that war and peace are distinctive conditions is not held by other cultures” -- Nadia Schadlow, Army War College. • Understanding an adversary’s ultimate goal when ambiguity is a feature of “Gray Zone” conflicts. (14) • Preventing an adversary from defining the conflict in ways that inhibit preferred responses. • Responding to an exclusive use of “non-military” means. • Avoiding miscalculation about thresholds and “red lines” and preventing escalation of “gray Zone” conflicts into full-scale wars. • Ensuring “Gray Zone” conflicts do not lead to an undermining of international norms.

  10. Sources • http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/; Paradoxes of the Gray Zone, Hal Brands. FPRI. February 2016 • https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-010447-Final.pdf • Russia: Strategies of Destruction and Attrition: A New Version Moscow Military Thought in English 01 Jan 14 - 31 Mar 14 • https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-010447-Final.pdf • China's Three Warfares; Delex System Inc., January 2012. • Pentagon: China's 'Three Warfares' Seek to Drive US From Asiahttp://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/China-Pentagon-Three-Warfares/2014/03/26/id/561937/#ixzz3w6NUqejd, March 2014 • PLA Political Work and the “Three Warfares”: A Preliminary Exploration, Malia K. Du Mont and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Center for Naval Analysis, November 2006 • The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives, By Leszek Buszynski, Christopher B. Roberts • 2013 Science of Military Strategy. Beijing Military Science Publishing House • http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36482#.VtDI6TZf38M • Ibid • http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/; Paradoxes of the Gray Zone, Hal Brands. FPRI. February 2016 • http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_Print.asp?type=news&nseq=151300 • Russia’s “Ambiguous Warfare” and Implications for the US Marine Corps; CNA’s Center for Stability and Development, May 2015

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