240 likes | 257 Views
The LHC Beam Interlock System. J. Wenninger AB-OP-SPS for the LHC Machine Protection WG. A description of the LHC Interlock System Technical drawings : courtesy of B. Puccio (AB-CO). Stored Energy. The amount of energy stored in the LHC is unprecedented :
E N D
The LHC Beam Interlock System J. Wenninger AB-OP-SPS for the LHC Machine Protection WG A description of the LHC Interlock System Technical drawings : courtesy of B. Puccio (AB-CO) J. Wenninger / LEADE
Stored Energy • The amount of energy stored in the LHC is unprecedented : • 10 GJ are stored in the magnets at 7 TeV • Need a sophisticated powering interlock system. • 350 MJ are stored in each beam at 7 TeV • Need a performant beam interlocking scheme in the LHC. • 2 MJ are stored in the beams that are extracted from the SPS • Need interlocking and passive protection systems for the transfer lines and the first turn in the LHC. • The existing SPS ring interlock system will be (gradually) replaced by the same system that is used for the LHC. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Stored Beam Energy… … in the LHC exceeds by 2 orders of magnitude that of existing machines. • Already at the SPS we manage to damage vacuum chambers ! J. Wenninger / LEADE
Machine protection • The LHC will be protected against accidental ‘release’ of the beam energy by : • Absorbers and collimators (! collimators not ‘optimized’ for protection !) • Define the aperture. • Protect against ‘single-turn’ failures due to injection and kicker errors. • Protection systems • Equipment surveillance : powering, quench protection, vacuum, RF … • Beam surveillance : beam loss, beam position… • In case of a critical failure the beams must be dumped. The beam interlock system is the ‘glue’ that links together the protection systems (clients), the beam dumping system and the injectors (mainly SPS). J. Wenninger / LEADE
The LHC Beam Dumping System The beam dumping system itself has already a tight internal intelock system since any malfunction can have very severe consequences for the LHC machine. Septum magnets (V deflection) Beam 1 H-V kickers to paint the beam Q5L Beam Dump Block Q4L ~ 700 m 15 kicker magnets (H deflection) Q4R ~ 500m Q5R IR6 Beam 2 J. Wenninger / LEADE
Dump Block The dump block is the only element of the LHC able to absorb the full 7 TeV beam ! beam absorber (graphite) 7 m concrete shielding J. Wenninger / LEADE
Beam Interlock System : Aims and Objectives • Two roles: 1) Allow injection when all client systems are ready for beam. 2) Transmit any beam dump request from clients systems to the Beam Dumping system. • Additional objectives: • Protect the beam • Faulty trigger signals should be avoided. • Provide post-mortem information • For multiple alarms: identify the initial failure. • Give time sequence of Beam Dump requests J. Wenninger / LEADE
LHC protection systems USER_PERMIT SIGNALS BEAM_PERMIT STATUS SIGNALS User System #10 User System #8 User System #1 User System#16 User System #9 User System #2 LHC Injection System for beam 1 BEAM1_PERMIT Beam Dumping System for beam 1 UNMASKABLE INPUTS SPS Extraction System for beam 1 PM event Trigger Timing System LHC Injection System BEAM INTERLOCK SYSTEM for beam 2 BEAM2_PERMIT Beam Dumping System MASKABLE INPUTS for beam 2 SPS Extraction System for beam 2 to User Systems Mask Settings Safe Beam Flag Principle of the Beam Interlock System J. Wenninger / LEADE
LHC Layout J. Wenninger / LEADE next
Distributed Architecture J. Wenninger / LEADE
Individual Permit Signals • Every User System must provide a USER_PERMIT signal. • Beam operation is only allowed when ALL un-masked or unmaskable User Systems deliver their USER_PERMIT. • USER_PERMIT : • TRUE • User System is ready for beam and beam operation is possible. • FALSE • User System is not ready for beam or has detected a failure. • The USER_PERMITs are gathered via hardware links. J. Wenninger / LEADE
LHC Systems connectedto the Beam Interlock System J. Wenninger / LEADE
Beam Permit Status Signal • The BEAM_PERMIT can be: • TRUE(beam operation is permitted) • Injection of beam is allowed. • Beam operation continues. • FALSE(beam operation is NOT permitted) • Beam injection and SPS extraction are blocked. • If beam is circulating and the BEAM_PERMIT changes from TRUEto FALSE, then the beam will be extracted to the dump. • There is one BEAM_PERMIT for each beam. • Distribution via hardware links to: • Beam Dumping System • LHC injection kickers • SPS Extraction systems • Beam interlock user systems. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Masking User Signals • Depending on intensity, energy and other parameters, it is possible to mask (disable) some User Signals without risk of damage to LHC components. Such a possibility is useful during commissioning phases, problems during certain OP phases… • Masking must only be possible if the beam is “safe” : a beam loss must not result in damage. • To allow for some flexibility while maintaining safety, the User Systems are classified in two families: • MASKABLE signals • The USER_PERMIT can be temporary ignored if the beam is “safe”. • Mask set by the operator USER_PERMIT is not taken into account . • NOT MASKABLE signals • The USER_PERMIT is NEVERignored to produce the BEAM_PERMIT. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Safe ‘Masking’ • The central issue of masking interlocks is to ensure that : • Masks can only be set when the beam is ‘safe’. • Masks are AUTOMATICALLY removed (i.e. the corresponding interlock is re-enabled) when the beams becomes unsafe: • More beam is injected. • The energy is increased. • The idea to provide an automatic mechanism to ensure safe masking was proposed for the new SPS interlock system and discussed at the last Chamonix in January 2004 (presentation by … myself !). • This lead to the concept of ‘Safe Beam Parameters’ (SLPs) : • Critical parameters that are measured with high reliability : essentially energy and intensity. • SLPs are distributed over hardware links to the clients (includes the interlock system). J. Wenninger / LEADE
If Func(Ibeam1, Energy) < Threshold1 then SFB1 = TRUE else SFB1 = FALSE If Func(Ibeam2, Energy) < Threshold2 then SFB2 = TRUE else SFB2 = FALSE Safe Beam Flags • The Safe Beam Flag is derived from the LHC energy and beam intensity (for each beam) : • Energy value coming from ‘Beam Energy Meter’s in IR6. • Intensity of beam 1 and beam 2 measured by BCTs. • SAFE BEAM FLAG can be: • TRUE (for example, if a low intensity beam is circulating at 450 GeV) • Masking of USER_PERMITs is taken in account. • If one of the masked signals is indicating FALSE ignored beam operation continues. • FALSE(for example, if the beam is accelerated and becomes unsafe due to increasing stored energy) • The mask is not longer taken in account. • If one USER_PERMIT = FALSE BEAM_PERMIT changes to FALSEbeam will be dumped. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Maskable / Not Maskable Partition Please note that this partition is not finalized ! J. Wenninger / LEADE
USER_PERMIT signal changes from TRUE to FALSE a failure has been detected… User System process Signals send to LBDS Beam Interlock system process Kicker fired all bunches have been extracted ~70μs max. ~ 89μs > 10μs t1 t2 t4 Achievable response time ranges between 100 s and 270 s (between the detection of a beam dump request and the completion of a beam dump) Time between a Request to a Beam Dump beam dump request Beam Dumping System waiting for beam gap 89μs max time t3 J. Wenninger / LEADE
Beam Interlock Controller a BIC is composed of: 1) User Interface 2) Patching and Interface modules 3) Core modules 4) Optical Interface modules It consists of 2 sets of modules (one per beam) therefore: 2 x Patching and Interface modules, 2 x Core modules and 2 x Optical Interface modules. J. Wenninger / LEADE Return to Architecture slide
IRn From/to previous BIC in IRn-1 To/from next BIC in IRn+1 BIC-Ln BIC-Rn loop B loop A USER_PERMIT signals USER_PERMIT signals Beam Permit Loops • Two “Beam Permit Loops”: loop A and loop B PER BEAM. • The signals (10 MHz) are generated in one of the BICs and send to the next BIC. • When the conditions for beam operation are fulfilled, the signals are transmitted to the following BIC. If NOT signals are interrupted. J. Wenninger / LEADE back
to Beam Interlock Crate From User System Beam Interlock User Interface • Receives the USER_PERMIT from a given LHC system. • Transmits the USER_PERMIT to the BIC crate. • Some User Systems will always provide the USER_PERMIT for both beams. If failure both beams will be dumped. • Some User Systems will dump either Beam 1 or Beam 2. • The BEAM_PERMIT status for each beam is provided to theUser System. J. Wenninger / LEADE
LHC Experiments • Each LHC experiment can provide one user input signal to the beam interlock system : • Different detector signals should be merged into a unique signal to the beam interlock system. • We have to define what is considered to be an ‘experiment’ : should TOTEM / CMS have 2 independent signals ?... • The experiment user signal can be used to : • Inhibit injection if the detector is not ready for beam. • Request a beam dump if radiation levels, rates… are so high that the detector may be damaged. • Note that this signal must not be used to stop beams when backgrounds are high… • A user interface module will be provided to each experiment. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Conclusion / 1 • The LHC Beam Interlock System is a distributed system. The Beam Interlock Controllers are spread around the ring and are linked by Beam Permit Loops. The Beam Permit Loops are connected to the Beam Dumping System, to the LHC injection kickers and to the SPS fast extraction system. • The expected response time ranges from 100 to 300 ms (time until the last proton has left the ring). • All Beam Interlock System components are already used sucessfully for the extraction from SPS to LHC ring 2. • Each experiment will be able to provide an interlock signal to inhibit injection and dump the beam in case of emergency. If more than one detector is involved in the protection of an experiment, the signals should be merged into a single one. • A standard user signal interface will be provided for the connection to the Beam Interlock System. J. Wenninger / LEADE
Conclusion / 2 • Details concerning the signals and the interlocking will be addressed in the near future by the LHC Machine Protection WG : • TOTEM / CMS splitting. • Maskable or unmaskable experiments signals ? • Interlocking of movable devices : TOTEM roman pots, LHCb VELO… • Any other issue… J. Wenninger / LEADE