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AMISOM and G5 Sahel Joint Force: Enhancing Peace Efforts in Africa

Explore the background, current security situations, force deployment strengths, key observations, and the way forward for AMISOM and G5 Sahel Joint Force in Africa.

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AMISOM and G5 Sahel Joint Force: Enhancing Peace Efforts in Africa

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  1. Current AU Peace Support Operations Efforts

  2. AMISOM • Background; • Current Security Situation; • Force Deployment And Strength; • Key observations; • Way Forward.

  3. BACKGROUND • PSC COM 69TH OF 19th JAN 2007: Authorizing the deployment of AMISOM. • PSC COM 782 OF 27TH JUNE 2018 mandated AMISOM to: • Expand its political and stabilization role into all sectors; • Ensuring IHL and human rights compliance and accountability; • Progressive training and mentoring of Somali national army; • Somali police forces and Darwish forces required to successfully implement the STP.

  4. BACKGROUND • UNSCR 2431: Mandated the following: • Degrade Al‑Shabaab and other AOG; • Enable the gradual handing-over of security; • Assist the Somali Security Forces. • PSC/PR/COMM(DCCCXXVII) Adopted at 827th meeting held on 13 February 2019. Endorsed the AMISOM CONOPS 2018-2021.

  5. BACKGROUND ‘’Cont’’ END STATE A significantly degraded military and related capacities of Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in Somalia, leading to a stable, federal, sovereign, and united Somalia whose citizens enjoy access to justice and the rule of law, with Somali own institutions assuming full responsibilities.

  6. BACKGROUND ‘’Cont’’ • STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR AMISOM: • Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSF; • Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; • Assist the SSF to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization.

  7. CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION OVERVIEW • Al Shabaab continue to recruit in the AoR: 4,000 to 7,000 combatants; • Al-Shabaab will continue to conduct asymmetric attacks against AMISOM/SSF, Federal Government and Civilian by the use of IEDs and VBIEDs; • Involvement of foreign fighters as well as Islamic State/Daesh in Somalia; • Slow progress between Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on issues related to security and resources.

  8. AMISOM STRENGTH 21,626 UNSCR 2431: 20626 SECTOR 4 BELETWEYNE SECTOR 3 BAIDOA SECTOR 5 JOWAHAR SECTOR 1 MOGADISHU SECTOR 6 KISMAYO SECTOR 2 DHOBLEY AMISOM TROOPS DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH

  9. KEY CIMIC ACTIVITIES • Refugee returnee convoy movement coordination • Convoy identification and passes-facilitating freedom of movement for HROs. • Dispute resolution(Land, accidents involving AMISOM troops, compensation claims) • Rapid needs assessment for QIPs • Civil resilience(flooding/drought)& response • Defectors reception • Support to election security • IDPs camps identification and security

  10. KEYS OBSERVATIONS • Generation of force Enablers/ Multipliers and Somali Security Forces; • Deployment of Somali security forces on the ground ; • Need of funding the mission by the AU; • Dealing with complex ATKs as well as IED/VBIED ATKs.

  11. WAY FORWARD • Implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP) • Short-term: • Reconfigure to secure MSR and Pop centres; hand-hover priority locations; • SNP to secure pop centres and Institutions. • Medium-term • Secure MSR; Shabble River Valley and Juba Valley. • Long-term • SSF lead in all sectors IOT to exit.

  12. JOINT FORCE G5 SAHEL

  13. SCOPE • Background; • Security situation; • Force deployment and strength; • Keys observations; • Way forward.

  14. BACKGROUND • Convention for the creation of the G5 Sahel signed on 19 December 2014 ; • Declaration of the extraordinary summit of heads of state and government of the member states of the G5 Sahel, held in Bamako, February 6, 2017; • Communiqué of 679th meeting of the PSC; • UNSCR 2359 and 2391.

  15. BACKGROUND ‘’CONT’’ • Through 679th PSC communiqué (art 11), the force is mandated to: • Combat terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking; • Contributing as necessary to the restoration of state authority and the return of displaced persons and refugees; • Facilitate humanitarian operations; • Contribute to the implementation of development actions.

  16. SECURITY SITUATION IN THE G5 SAHEL AoR • North of Mali remains of Concerns; • Lipta-Gourma most dangerous area; • Inter-communal conflicts; • About 800 schools closed due to insecurity; • 125,000 IDPs recorded (50% from Mopti Region).

  17. FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH • 5,000 troops to be deployed in the mission Area; • Force HQs at Bamako.

  18. KEY OBSERVATIONS • Very large and difficult AoR; • UNSCR 2391 support limited to Malian territory; • Strengthening the G5 Sahel Joint Force; • Coordinate the G5 Sahel efforts with the entire region of the Sahel; • Focus on development activities to deal with conflict sources; • Over employment of some MS Defense Forces; • Implementation of the Mali APR.

  19. WAY FORWARD • AU Support and International community mobilization for funding the Force; • FHQs to be operationalized on as well as sector HQs; • Coordinating Cell.

  20. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DIVISIONBrief on MNJTF against Boko Haram

  21. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Background– Boko Haram • Actual name of Boko Haram is ‘Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal-Jihad’ meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad".In the local dialect, Boko Haram means ‘Western education is forbidden’ • It was created by Mohamed Yusuf, an extremist preacher, in 2002 in Maiduguri, North Eastern Nigeria AU-RESTRICTED

  22. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Background– Boko Haram • Since the demise of its founder in 2009, the group’s leadership is split between AbubakarShekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi • Boko Haram was designated by the US as a terrorist group in November 2013 • In March 2015, BH swore allegiance to ISIS AU-RESTRICTED

  23. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Background– Boko Haram • A regional threat • Evolved from conducting sporadic raids and bombings to taking and holding territories • Expanded its AOO to Niger, Cameroon and Chad • Now conducts attacks against military and civilian targets including using, IEDs and suicide attacks AU-RESTRICTED

  24. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Regional and AU Response to Boko Haram • Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram formed on 20 January 2015 by LCBC Member States and Benin • MNJTF authorized by the 484th meeting of the AU PSC, held on 29 January 2015. • The AU PSC called on the AU and the International Community to support LCBC MS and Benin, with financial, logistical assistance, equipment, and timely intelligence AU-RESTRICTED

  25. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Strength and Operations • The 489th meeting of the PSC held in March 2015 endorsed the MNJTF Strategic CONOPs. MNJTF strength increased up to 10,000 uniformed personnel • The current strength of the MNJTF stands at 10,772 and supported by AU Mission Support Team of 27 personnel AU-RESTRICTED

  26. MNJTF AREA OF OPERATION N BOSSO BAGASOLA SECTOR 1 DIFFA BAGA SECTOR 2 GAMBARU SECTOR 3 N’DJAMENA MAIDUGURI SECTOR 4 MORA MAROUA

  27. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Support to MNJTF • Following this, the AU established a SSC at the AU Hqs and MST at MNJTF Hqs to coordinate and manage the AU additional support to the MNJTF • AU signed a MoU and SIA with the LCBC and the MNJTF TCCs on 29 January 2016 to streamline the extension and accountability of the additional support to the MNJTF • The 816th meeting of the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF until January 2020 AU-RESTRICTED

  28. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE Regional and AU Response-Support to MNJTF • The AU has provided additional support (Human Resource, equipment, services and works) to MNJTF from its own resources and from funds contributed by the AU Partners • Partners include: UK, EU and Turkey AU-RESTRICTED

  29. AU ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO MNJTF • Stabilisation and Protection of Civilian Strategies • The AU, coordinating with LCBC, local and international partners, drafted a Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Lake Chad Basin • The strategy will support an effective transition from stabilization to early recovery • The strategy was adopted by LCBC on 30 August 2018 and endorsed by the AU PSC on 5 December 2018 AU-RESTRICTED

  30. CHALLENGES • The major challenges faced by the MNJTF include: • Appropriate handling of BH surrendering combatants across IBs • Interoperability of equipment in joint ops • Lack of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) equipment. • Lack of Funds for Quick Impact and Peace Strengthening Projects • Need for Robust maritime capabilities to enhance MNJTF operations in and around the Lake Chad AU-RESTRICTED

  31. CONCLUSION • Although degraded, Boko Haram continues to pose a threat to Peace and Stability in the Lake Chad Basin region • The AU continues to support the LCBC/MNJTF through: Political support; Diplomatic advocacy; administration, logistic and services support; financial and logistic resources mobilization; and provision of expertise • With pledged allegiance to ISIS, BH continued existence now poses a global security threat that needs global response AU-RESTRICTED

  32. END AU-RESTRICTED

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