1 / 45

EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS

EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS. Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. PEACE OPERATIONS. Examine a Model Establish the Environment Discuss Evolution in the 90s Principles and Policies Challenges and Options.

meryle
Download Presentation

EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

  2. PEACE OPERATIONS • Examine a Model • Establish the Environment • Discuss Evolution in the 90s • Principles and Policies • Challenges and Options

  3. The Complex Emergency Model

  4. Definition “A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a dramatic disruption in the political, economic and social situation, resulting from internal or external conflict or natural disaster, seriously disrupting the population’s capacity to survive and the national authorities’ capacity to respond, and which requires a consolidated multi-sectoral international response” IASC of the United Nations

  5. Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations Modern Complex Emergencies

  6. Modern Complex Emergencies Support Support Security Security Compliance Operations Range of Military Activity Combat Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

  7. Modern Complex Emergencies Support Humanitarian Mitigation Range of Civilian Activity CM Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

  8. Modern Complex Emergencies Disaster Management Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations Civil - Military Coordination

  9. PEACEKEEPING • Pragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis • For 40 + years peacekeeping was: • Based on resolution of interstate conflict • Conducted post an agreement • Separated Forces or Monitored Agreements • Classic or Traditional Peacekeeping

  10. FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING • Interstate Conflict • Governments Functioning and in Control • Government Infrastructure intact • Military and Police Structures operating • Judicial Systems in place • International Rules operable • Minimum Contact with Population • Minimum Involvement with Civilian Agencies

  11. EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES • Traditional peacekeeping • Implementation of Complex Agreements and Settlements • Preventive Deployment • Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force • Co-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping Forces • Provision of Humanitarian Aid • Peace Enforcement

  12. FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING • Intra-state Conflict • Governments ineffective or not in control • Factional Political Groupings & Leadership • State Infrastructure broken down • Judicial & Police Breakdown • Military factions & Warlords • Weapons proliferation • There are no Rules • Intermingled with Populations • Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs

  13. NEW YORK TIMES “Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ... There should be a shift back towards more limited objectives like policing cease-fires”. “UN peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It makes no sense to continue eroding it’s credibility by asking it to do what it cannot”. New York Times - 1996

  14. “Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only re-thinking the means but also the methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security Council.Secretary-General Kofi Annan 1998

  15. CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII

  16. CHAPTER VI • Peaceful settlement of disputes • The Council provides assistance at the request of the parties • Council has authority to investigate • Investigation is not normally military until accord is arranged – then military assess role a peace operation could play • A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful resolution of the dispute • PKO assists in consolidating the peace and building confidence • Forces are lightly armed for self defense

  17. CHAPTER VI • As a result there are conditions to a Chapter VI operation: • Consent of the parties is required • A cease-fire needs to be effective • A comprehensive agreement should be signed • Parties assist the deployment of the force • Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to establish the status of the forces – there is no other legal basis under Chapter VI) • Self-defense ROE are developed

  18. CHAPTER VII“The Decision to Use Enforcement Power” • Conflict is ongoing • High risk that conflict may start again • Parties are not in agreement • Rogue elements are not included (increased risk to UN forces – force protection) • Risk of external intervention • Presence of other national forces in the area • Risky internal situation – violence / human rights abuses / banditry / weapons • Self defense insufficient to protect deployed forces • A legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (SOFA cannot be agreed)

  19. CHAPTER VII“The Use of Force” • Chapter VII • does not tell you to use force actively • is not combat operation • Provides the full range of options including up to and including enforcement powers • Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to international peace and security • Non use of force options –ie sanctions • Use of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resort • Establishes the legal context for intervention and the use of force

  20. CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST Chapter VII Chapter VI PKO assists in consolidating the peace PKO enforces the will of the SC • Parties request assistance • Commit to peaceful resolution • Political will of the parties • Consent to the operation • Effective cease-fire • Comprehensive agreement • Parties assist the deployment • Signature of SOFA • Conflict is ongoing • Risk of renewed conflict high • Parties not in agreement • Risky internal situation • Rogue elements not included • Risk of external intervention • Presence of foreign forces • Self defense judged insufficient • Legal basis for intervention needed • SOFA

  21. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Chapter VII Chapter VI Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression Pacific Settlement of Disputes Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

  22. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  23. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  24. 1990 ISSUES • Wider Range of Tasks • Change in the Composition and Needs of Missions • Only the Traditional Model of Peacekeeping Available

  25. SECURITY COUNCILATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN THE 90’s • A wider application of the peacekeeping model • Development of hybrid mandates

  26. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  27. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  28. PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  29. Chapter VII Tools • Comprehensive Mandate • Clear Military Tasks • Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Trained) • Effective Command and Control Structure • Authority to Use Force Appropriately • Robust Rules of Engagement • Legal Basis for Intervention

  30. WHAT CAN THE UN DO? • Classic Peacekeeping • Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VII elements • Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations – this requires a coalition of the willing / lead nation / multi national force WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?

  31. CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENTOPERATIONAL PROBLEMS • UN has no Combat Operations Capability • Logistics • no combat logistics system • contractor based support • Authority over National Forces • authority uncertain • inadequate command & control stucture • nations reaction to forces under threat • Different Cultures • military cultures • leadership & managerial backgrounds • training standards

  32. OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES • The UN may authorize a region / coalition to conduct the mission • To a regional organization • A coalition of the willing (MNF) • A framework / lead nation in a coalition • To a Nation capable of executing the mission • The UN may decide to mange the mission • Form a UN multi-national force • Designate a framework / lead nation concept

  33. WHY AUTHORIZE • The operation has a high risk of combat operations taking place • UN missions take a long time to deploy and deployment time is critical • Support for funding cannot be generated • A region or coalition offers forces

  34. UN MANDATED OPERATIONS • COALITION OF THE WILLING / MNF • UN mandate authorizes the mission • Lead nation generates the forces • Lead Nation appoints Force commander • Participating Nations pay all costs • Lead Nation coordinates & provides day to day political direction • Lead Nation coordinates & provides ROE • UN FORCE • UN sponsored mission • UN generates the forces • UN appoints Force Commander • Mission paid by assessed contributions • Political direction by UN (through DPKO) • UN ROE

  35. TYPICAL COALITION / MNF MANDATE PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  36. TYPICAL UN PKO FORCE MANDATE PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

  37. CHANGING PRECEPTS • Revision of principles • Sovereignty • Consent • Impartial status • Broader range of tasks • Time constraints • Limitations on • Resources • Political effort • Military sacrifice • Humanitarian Basis • for Intervention

  38. CONSENTWho Gives Consent? • International Bodies • UN Security Council • UN General Assembly • TCNs • Third Parties • Parties to the Conflict • Military Organizations • Military Factions • Local Commanders • Warlords Provides Legitimacy Strategic Level Environment Operational & Tactical Level Environment

  39. NO MILITARY SOLUTION • End state can only be political, economic and social in nature • Expensive tool • Military can • temporize • maintain situation • reduce levels of violence • induce compliance • Blunt instrument of political power

  40. MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT OPERATIONS POLITICAL LIFE SAVING LIFE SUPPORT ECONOMIC & SOCIAL OPERATIONAL PHASES MILITARY CRISIS STABILISATION CIVILIAN 5 to 10 years?

  41. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE National Authorities UN SG SRSG Human Rights Component Deputy SRSG Humanitarian Component Military Force Police Component Observer Force Administrative component Election Component

  42. COALITION OR LEAD NATION PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE SRSG Human Rights Component Deputy SRSG Humanitarian Component Police Component Administrative component Election Component Observer Force Coalition NCAs UN SG Military Force Component Component Component Component

  43. Military Role in Peace Operations SRSG Manage the mandate Coordinate effort of components Deputy Provide unity of effort Military Force CIVPOL Humanitarians Elections Development Human Rights Reconstruction Primary military mission security training support security / protection / transport emergency medical security on sites / protection / transport / medical assistance to the election process secure environment / engineering /transport / materiel assistance to the reconstruction process assistance to long term development

  44. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION • Legitimacy • Consent -at key levels • Legal Basis • Credibility • Credible Force • Achievable Mandate and Military Plan • Operating Environment • Signed Agreement • End State with achievable goals • Integration of Effort with other Components

  45. SUMMARY OF CHANGES • Chapter VII Operations will be the norm • Multi-dimensional, Multi-national Operations • Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and Social Solutions • Integration of Tasks under One Mandate • Full Range of Civilian Intervention • New Coordination Mechanism • Broader Range of Military Tasks • Complementary Roles for Components

More Related