Workshop on the World Bank National University of Singapore September 18, 2006

1. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the recent argentine crisis. Better together or separated? Workshop on the World Bank National University of Singapore September 18, 2006 Pablo Nemiña (FLACSO – CONICET)

2. Turnaround of US Financial Policy Meltzer Report (2000) Refocus Mandate and Reform IFI´s • IMF: • Quasi-lender of last resort. Short terms and low amount loans for liquidity crises. • Collect and publish both economic and financial data. • Provide recommendations about the economic policies to the members (Article IV). • Reduce Conditionalities attached in programs and replace it with prior actions.

3. Turnaround of US Financial Policy (cont.) Meltzer Report (2000) Refocus Mandate and Reform IFI´s • World Bank and Regional Banks: • From intensive capital loaners to: • Technical assistance • Provide public goods • Facilitate cash flows of private capitals to development areas, and make sure that its use were transparent. • Limit assistance to poor countries with no access to the financial market.

4. New Guidelines on Conditionality • Three main areas: • Simplifying conditionality Less is more: Only “critical” for the program • Increase recipient-country ownership Flexibility: Conditionality + Ownership • Strengthen IMF-World Bank relations Adaptability: Lead Agency + Work together

5. But in 2002 Argentine crisis… • Prior Actions + Less Financing • Much Conditionality Integral Program • IN Flexibility Prior actions • Auto-protection oriented Collaboration WB: Passive. No disbursements IMF: Active. No disbursements

6. World Bank Crisis responsibility: Argentina Financing: Low, subject to IMF agreement. Conditionality: IMF-designed IMF Crisis responsibility: Argentina Financing: None Conditionality: Prior actions IMF, World Bank and IADB in 2002 Argentine crisis • IADB Crisis responsibility: • Shared Financing: • Yes Conditionality: • Mixed Consultative Cross-Conditionality (Feinberg, 1988)

7. Net Financial Flows from IMF to Argentina 1998 - IQ2006

8. Net Financial Flows from World Bank and IADB to Argentina 1998 - IQ2006

9. Particular Aspects “Argentine case” Anticipated crisis Spreading out contention Reduced strategic importance General Aspects Dissimilar influence of US financial policy on IFI´s Role and types of credits of each institution IMF, World Bank and IADB financial performance in Argentina crisis and post crisis period

10. World Bank Financing: Low (middle income country) Outstanding Credit: Slow decrease (long term credits) IMF Financing: None (solvency crisis + debt reestructuring) Outstanding Credit: Quick “exit” IMF, World Bank and IADB financial performance in Argentina crisis and post crisis period • IADB Financing: • Stable (regional agency) Outstanding Credit: • Stable

11. Argentina: Credit Outstanding with IMF, World Bank and IADB

12. Argentina: Credit Outstanding with IMF, World Bank and IADB TENDENCY

13. IMF, World Bank and IADB: Total Credit Outstanding TENDENCY

14. Thank You