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Bargaining and Intra-Household Allocation of Resources. Dev Nathan Institute for Human Development, New Delhi a nd Duke University, USA. Intra-household Allocation. Depends upon Bargaining power I n turn depends upon Extra-household position (fallback/breakdown) Income Assets
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Bargaining and Intra-Household Allocation of Resources Dev Nathan Institute for Human Development, New Delhi and Duke University, USA
Intra-household Allocation Depends upon • Bargaining power In turn depends upon • Extra-household position (fallback/breakdown) • Income • Assets • Public entitlements • Social networks
Income Comparative incomes and Types of work • Compensatory gender display (McClintock) • “I am the sun outside, and the moon at home.” (Chinese factory manager) • Outsourcing housework
Voice and Exit • Translating endowments into capabilities • ‘Feminist content’ as gendered persons (Katz) • Power and information asymmetries • Institutional features
Voice, Exit and Norms • Voice – bargaining capacity • Information asymmetry • Exit – power asymmetries • Norms –institutional, not legal, rules of access • “Good women don’t own land.” (Nitya Rao)
Norms • Bourdieu’s doxa – that which is taken for granted • Short-term exogenous, and long-term endogenous (Bina Agarwal) • How do norms change?
Norm Changes E.g. women as income earners in Bangladesh • Economically superior practice • Groups and importance of large numbers • Social movements (e.g. women’s education)
Conclusion Bringing non-material aspects • Voice (Information) • Exit (Power) • Norms Into intra-household resource allocation