1 / 30

Institutional Arrangements and the Control of Public Expenditure in OECD Member countries

Institutional Arrangements and the Control of Public Expenditure in OECD Member countries Santiago, Chile 29 November 2001 Michael Ruffner Administrator Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. From Deficits to Surplus to??. Strong Economic Growth, until 2000

martinmsmith
Download Presentation

Institutional Arrangements and the Control of Public Expenditure in OECD Member countries

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Institutional Arrangements and the Control of Public Expenditure in OECD Member countries Santiago, Chile 29 November 2001 Michael Ruffner Administrator Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

  2. From Deficits to Surplus to?? Strong Economic Growth, until 2000 Political Commitment to Fiscal Discipline Institutional Arrangements for Budgeting Determine Whether Countries are Successful in Controlling Public Expenditures

  3. Agenda • Budgeting in Context • Fiscal Frameworks • Major Budget Trends • Control Regimes

  4. The Budget • The Budget is Important • Comprehensive state where policy objectives are reconciled and implemented in concrete terms • Budget should be Comprehensive

  5. Good Governance • Accountability • Transparency • Social Cohesion • Rule of law -- Integrity

  6. Schick´s Functions of Budget • Control of the Aggregates • Technical Efficiency • Allocative Efficiency • Hierarchical

  7. Institutional Arrangements-Key Reforms- Requirements for Fiscal Responsibility Multi-Year Budget Frameworks Top-Down Budgeting Techniques Relaxation of Input Controls Market-Type Mechanisms Accrual Accounting and Budgeting Focus on Results

  8. Requirements for Fiscal Responsibility Explicitly Defined Goals for Budget Policy: Maastricht Criteria (Euro) Expenditure “caps” (USA) Constitutional Amendments (Switzerland) General Frameworks (Australia/New Zealand)

  9. Requirements for Fiscal Responsibility = Norms • General Thoughts • Can not separate Fiscal Framework from system • Budget reforms have implications for frameworks • All focus on control of aggregates: short term or long term • What happens to norms in times of fiscal stress

  10. Maastricht Treaty • International agreement on 3% Deficit Target • Target includes all levels of government spending • Path to deficit target left up to Members • Variety of approaches • Unclear enforcement mechanism • What will happen when economy sours?

  11. Switzerland • Constitutional Balanced Budget Requirement • Switzerland is a confederation, weak central authority • Problem of enforcement of rules • In practice, much like Maastricht treaty fixed deficit target • Does not necessarily include canton/local spending • Focus on annual deficit, but need long term path to maintain discipline • Key feature is relatively generous exception for emergencies and other unforeseen events

  12. The United States • Political debate on Deficit, Statutory limit on Debt • Tried annual fiscal targets, did not work • Strong Congress -- tie their own hands • Replaced by fiscal rules, no relation to deficit • Discretionary Spending Caps • Annually appropriated spending (1/3 total) • Pay-As-You-Go • Mandatory/Entitlement spending (2/3 total) • Statutory Debt Limit

  13. General Frameworks • New Zealand and Australia: Radically different from any other country • Based on “New Public Management” • No input controls • Performance budget based on outcomes/outputs • Budget based on accruals • Annual deficit irrelevant to budget expenditures… Politically relevant, however • Long term accrued position is relevant • Assets must equal Liabilities

  14. Multi-YearOrientation New “Culture” for Budgeting Good from All Perspectives Macro: Lends Credibility and Stability to Fiscal Policy Micro: Ministries/Agencies Can Plan Better Ends “Budgeting Games“ Carry-Overs; Year-End No Long a “Cut Off” Warning: Economic Assumptions!

  15. Top-Down Budget Process (1/) Old: Ministries Send Detailed Requests and Negotiate with MOF Time Consuming; Game-Playing Bias for Increased Expenditure Hard to Reflect Political Priorities

  16. Top-Down Budget Process (/2) New: Total Expenditures Agreed and Divided Among Ministries Pre-Set Spending Limit for Each Ministry Reflects Political Prioritization Pre-Set Limits Hamper “Auto” Increases Better Decisions -Information Asymmetry, Easier to Reallocate, Ownership

  17. Managerial Flexibility “Deregulation” in the Public Sector Level of Detail of Budget Appropriations Salary, travel, etc. Central Management Rules Staff hiring, offices, etc. Heads of ministry/agency in best position to manage resources effectively & efficiently

  18. Market-Type Mechanisms Contracting Out 20% Savings Are Typical User Charging Discipline Demand Vouchers Swedish Schools Private-Public Partnerships United Kingdom

  19. Accrual Accounting and Budgeting Cash Basis vs. Accrual Basis Makes The True Cost of Government Services Transparent Civil Service Pension Expenses Depreciation of Buildings and Equipment

  20. Accruals, Main Implications Cash Managers constrained by “input” of cash Accruals Managers must maintain “assets” Managers focus on liabilities -- know what the obligation is prior to the cash transaction Long term sustainability

  21. Accruals, Challenges • Operating balance fluctuations • Difficult for managers to deal with factors outside their control • Difficult for Parliaments to understand and communicate to public • “Cooking the Books” is an accrual term • Cash based budgeting is cheap, reliable and straightforward • Power to Tax not recognised in accrual • More difficult to use with Fiscal Policy

  22. Focus on Results “Quid Pro Quo” for Increased Flexibility Outcomes vs. Outputs Very Difficult in Practice OECD Guidelines Move to Performance does not Depend on Fiscal Framework or Governance Structure

  23. Elements of control Outcomes Outputs Process Inputs Costs

  24. Relations of control Outcomes Outputs Process Inputs Costs Effective- ness Value for money Efficiency Economy

  25. Strengths and weaknesses of control regimes

  26. An outcome focus to budgeting and management - Main motives • Orientation of Public Sector Production • Public Awareness • Reallocation • Coherence

  27. An outcome focus to budgeting and management - Main implications • Linking costs, inputs, outputs and outcomes • Increasing the use of policy evaluation • Restructuring budget processes

  28. Challenges • Expectations • Resistance • Measurement • Information - a double edged sword • Costing • Co-ordination/coherence • Information overload • Incentives • Being of use to politicians • Limits on capacity

  29. Conclusion All OECD Member countries are moving in this same direction But from Different Starting Positions & at Different Speeds It will take longer in countries with entrenched traditions The benefits are significant

  30. OECD Internet Site www.oecd.org/puma/budget The OECD Journal on Budgeting michael.ruffner@oecd.org

More Related