“ Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem: Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future ”

1. “Reconceptualizing the Cyprus Problem: Looking beyond deadlock into a cooperative future” Ted Grant

2. Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 • Turkey invaded the island in 1974 • Resulted in North-South divide between Turkish and Greek populations • Development of two states in the 1980s: • Republic of Cyprus (Greek) - South • Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Turkish) - North

3. Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 • Through the 1990s, each state viewed the other as a long-term threat to its national security • In 1997 the EU opened accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus • On April 16, 2003, the Republic signed the EU Treaty of Accession

4. Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 • Between 2002 and April, 2004, Kofi Annan repeatedly tried and failed to negotiate a compromise settlement between the two states • One last effort was made in April, 2004 • The Annan plan was submitted to the Cypriot populations via referendum • Favored by majority of Turkish Cypriots in the North, but rejected by Greek Cypriots in the South

5. Cyprus: 1974 - 2007 (cont.) • Result: Republic of Cyprus entered the EU without the consent of the TRNC • Cyprus remains divided today

6. Yesilada and Sozen (2002) • Argue that T>P>R>S payoff ordering defines the preferences of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots • Predicted outcome: Deadlock • Obviously, will hold over repeated games

7. Yesilada and Sozen (2002) Outdated • Three developments make this game theoretical analysis no longer correct: • The EU’s announcement that it would commence accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 (late 2002) • The EU’s announcement that resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession (2003) • Accession of Greek Cyprus to EU (2004)

8. New Model • I propose to model the current situation with a new 2 x 2 social dilemma game: • Same set of strategies: C or D • New ordering of payoffs: • Republic of Cyprus - T>R>P=S • TRNC - R>T>S>P

9. New Variables • V/2 is the value to both sides of cooperating split equally between them • T is the intangible cost to the Greek side of Turkey’s accession to the EU • t is the intangible benefit to the Turkish side of Turkey’s accession to the EU • P is the political and emotional benefit gained by playing D against a cooperative enemy

10. New Model

11. New Model • Note: I assume resolution of the Cyprus problem is a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession. • The outcome of this game is DC, which differs from the DD outcome predicted by Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

12. Hypothetical Case • What if CC were no longer a necessary condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU? • My claim: This would create opportunity for cooperation in the near future, perhaps even before Turkey enters the EU.

13. Important (Debatable) Assumptions • The EU actually wants Turkey to join its supranational federation • Should the Cyprus condition be lifted, Turkey would eventually be granted EU membership • Should Turkey be granted EU membership, Cypriots, Turks and Europeans would make the assumption that the Cyprus problem will be resolved either before or after accession

14. New Variables • L is the additional negotiating leverage held by Turkish Cypriots post-accession because of their parent country’s membership in the EU - is therefore also included as a cost to the Greek side •  is defined as a bureaucratic cost to completing the accession process in the second period, once Turkey is part of the EU • Note: In the CC outcome, Turkish Cypriots receive L b/c this is the maximum the Greeks are willing to concede before the accession to avoid a non-CC outcome

15. Hypothetical Model

16. Prediction • I argue that a CC outcome is marginally preferred given this set of payoffs: • Both sides would prefer to compromise before Turkey’s accession