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Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will: The hidden premise problem

Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will: The hidden premise problem. Sophie Stammers King’s College London sophie.stammers@kcl.ac.uk. The Libet timeline. adapted from Libet et al. (1999). The Method. From Haggard, 2008. The illusionist interpretation.

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Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will: The hidden premise problem

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  1. Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will: The hidden premise problem Sophie StammersKing’s College Londonsophie.stammers@kcl.ac.uk

  2. The Libet timeline adapted from Libet et al. (1999)

  3. The Method From Haggard, 2008.

  4. The illusionist interpretation “the brain evidently 'decides' to initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate the act at a time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place,” (Libet et al., 1983: 640). “subjective experience of freedom is no more than an illusion and ... our actions are initiated by unconscious mental processes long before we become aware of our intention to act,” (Soon et al., 2008: 543).

  5. Criticism of the methodology Dennett: What if timing the ‘conscious wish’ itself takes time? (1991) Roskies: Libet movements are “at best degenerate examples of free will.” (2011) Mele: What if RP activity is present even when the subject does not act? (2009) RP might be necessary, but not sufficient. Possible experimental evidence for this from Schurger et al. (2012)

  6. Illusionist argument 1 (IA1) Experimental premise ‘Kornhuber and Deecke’ (K&D): The RP is the sufficient cause of the action. Experimental premise ‘Libet’: The conscious wish occurs significantly after the onset of the RP. C: Free will does not obtain (or is illusory).

  7. ‘Flathe’?

  8. ‘Flathe’?

  9. Illusionist argument 1 (IA1) Experimental premise ‘Kornhuber and Deecke’ (K&D): The RP is the sufficient cause of the action. Experimental premise ‘Libet’: The conscious wish occurs significantly after the onset of the RP. C: Free will does not obtain (or is illusory).

  10. A hidden premise? Hidden premise: If free will obtains then conditions x and y. Experimental premise K&D: The RP is the sufficient cause of the action. (¬x) Experimental premise Libet: The conscious wish occurs significantly after the onset of the RP. (¬y) C: Free will does not obtain (or is illusory).

  11. Illusionist argument 2 (IA2) Hidden premise 1 (HP1): If an action is free then the conscious wish is the sufficient cause of the action. K&D: The RP is the sufficient cause of the action. Libet: The conscious wish occurs significantly after the onset of the RP. C: Free will does not obtain (or is illusory).

  12. KD + Libet does not yield ¬FW from HP1

  13. If KD + Libet does not yield ¬FW from HP1… HP2: If an action is free then the conscious wish is the sufficient cause of the action and nothing is the sufficient cause of the conscious wish.

  14. If KD + Libet does not yield ¬FW from HP1… HP2: If an action is free then (C1) the conscious wish is the sufficient cause of the action and (C2) nothing is the sufficient cause of the conscious wish.

  15. Illusionist argument 3 (IA3) HP2: If an action is free, then (C1) the conscious wish is the sufficient cause of the action and (C2) nothing is the sufficient cause of the conscious wish. K&D: The RP is the sufficient cause of the action. Libet: The conscious wish occurs significantly after the onset of the RP. C: Free will does not obtain (or is illusory).

  16. The first horn The chance objection

  17. The first horn The problem of chance = HP2 is highly problematic, and so the conclusion of IA3 is highly problematic. Even if we allow that the illusionist has ruled out this sort of free will, it’s hardly a sort that’s worth wanting!

  18. The second horn Adopt some special metaphysical powers and chance is no longer a problem…

  19. The second horn Solution to chance: on account of special metaphysical powers, agents are not determined by the operation of event causes. But: this screens off the problem from Libet, which is precisely a problem of determination by event causes… No illusionist conclusion.

  20. Why is it important to get it right?

  21. Why is it important to get it right? royalsociety.org/policy/projects/brain-waves

  22. Why is it important to get it right?

  23. Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will… We’re committed to incompatibilism – but then: Chance objection, and the only free will we lose is one we didn’t want anyway. by solving chance, the metaphysical resources committed to disarm the illusionist threat from Libet or Libet-Illusionism fails:

  24. Why cognitive science alone cannot eliminate free will: The hidden premise problemThanks for listening Sophie StammersKing’s College Londonsophie.stammers@kcl.ac.uk

  25. References Chivers, T. (2010). “Neuroscience, free will and determinism,” The Telegraph. Accessed online on 29/07/2013. URL: www.telegraph.co.uk/science/8058541/Neuroscience-free-will-and-determinism-Im-just-a-machine.html. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin Books. Frankfurt, H. (1969). ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ Journal of Philosophy, 66:23, 829-39. Ginet, C. (1990). On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kornhuber, H. and L. Deecke. (1965). ‘HirnpotentialanerungenbeiWilkurbewegungen und passivenBewegungen des Menschen: Bereitachaftspotential und reafferentePotentiale’, Pflugerr Arch GesamtePhysiolMenschenTiere, 248, 1-17. Libet, B. (2011). ‘Do We Have Free Will?’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and L. Nadel (eds.) Conscious Will and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 1-10. Libet, B. (1999). ‘Do We Have Free Will?’ in B. Libet, A. Freeman and K. Sutherland (eds.) The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic, 47-58. Libet, B. (1985). ‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 89, 529-566. Libet, B., C. A . Gleason, E. W. Wright and D. K. Pearl. (1983). ‘Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act’, Brain, 106, 623-642.

  26. References Macintosh, N. (2011). ‘Brain Waves Module 4: Neuroscience and the Law’, Royal Society Report, Accessed online on 29/07/13. URL: http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-waves/Brain-Waves-4.pdf McCann, H. J. (2012). ‘Making Decisions.’ Philosophical Issues, 22: 246–63. Mele. A. (2009). Effective intentions: The Power of the Conscious Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schurger, A., J. D. Sitt and S. Dehaene. (2012). ‘An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement’, PNAS, 1-10. Soon, C. S., M Brass, H-J Heinze and J-D Haynes. (2008). ‘Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain’, Nature Neuroscience, 11:5, 543-545. Steward, H. (2011) The Metaphysics of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson P.F. (1962). “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 187–211. Wegner, D. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press. van Inwagen, P. (2002). ‘Free will remains a mystery’. in R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 158-177. Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom Within Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  27. Alt Theory 1 | Hidden premise = FW requires non-brain processes 1) If FW, then actions are caused by non-brain processes 2) Libet shows: actions are caused by brain processes C) Therefore, no FW Problem 1 - Interaction Problem 2 - if FW requires that the non-brain processes that cause free actions are not themselves caused by anything (even other non-brain processes) then same dilemma arises as when hidden premises are incompatibilist

  28. Alt Theory 2 | Hidden premise = FW requires conscious processes 1) If FW, then the conscious process which causes action is not preceded by a non-conscious process which causes the action 2) Libet shows: the conscious process which causes action is preceded by a non-conscious process which causes the action C) Therefore, no FW

  29. Alt Theory 2 | Hidden premise = FW requires conscious processes Problem 1 - if FW requires that the conscious process which causes action is itself not caused by anything then the same dilemma arises as when the hidden premises are incompatibilist Reply to block dilemma? Perhaps FW only requires that actions are caused by conscious processes which are themselves not caused by non-conscious processes (even though they may be caused by other conscious processes). Flanagan/Mele - Why not say then say that the subject’s flex is brought about by the conscious decision to participate? = Libet actions are free actions and illusionism fails. Also, Reply looks false for some putatively free actions.

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