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Who Has the Power in the EU?

Who Has the Power in the EU?. Jason M. Barr Department of Economics Rutgers University, Newark March 15, 2004. Outline of Talk. EU Government structure EU member and acceding countries Theory of Voting Power Measuring power in the EU EU 15 EU 27 ‘Post-nice’ EU 27 ‘Giscard’

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Who Has the Power in the EU?

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  1. Who Has the Power in the EU? Jason M. Barr Department of Economics Rutgers University, Newark March 15, 2004

  2. Outline of Talk • EU Government structure • EU member and acceding countries • Theory of Voting Power • Measuring power in the EU • EU 15 • EU 27 ‘Post-nice’ • EU 27 ‘Giscard’ • Why Spain and Poland oppose Giscard’s Proposal

  3. The EU Government • European Parliament • MEPs Directly Elected by citizens • Legislative Branch • EU Council • Ministers from member governments • Legislative Branch • EU Commission • Appointed commissioners • Agenda Setter

  4. EU Council • EU’s main decision making body • Represents member governments • Members are one minister from each member’s national government • Rotating presidency every 6 months • Most issues passed by qualified majority

  5. EU Commission • Represents EU as a whole • Proposes legislation (sets legislative agenda) and enforces EU laws • Currently 20 members, after May 1, 1 one commissioner per country.

  6. EU Meetings Highlights • Nice Summit, Dec. 2000 • Treaty of Nice: voting weights for Council for EU 27 • Laeken Summit, Dec. 2001 • Launched Constitutional convention for needed institutional reforms • Constitutional Convention, July 2003 • Created draft for ratification by nations • Chaired by Valery Giscard d’Estaing • ICG in Brussels, Dec. 2003 • Failed to research Constitutional agreement

  7. Austria Belgium Denmark France Finland Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom Bulgaria (2007) Cyprus (5/1/04) Czech Rep. (5/1/04) Estonia (5/1/04) Hungary (5/1/04) Latvia (5/1/04) Lithuania (5/1/04) Malta (5/1/04) Poland (5/1/04) Romania (2007) Slovakia (5/1/04) Slovenia (5/1/04) Turkey (na) EU Nations Current Members Acceding Countries (date of membership)

  8. Research Question How do • number of votes per country • majority threshold levels • preferences affect power of countries within the Council?

  9. “The aim of the new EU constitution is to produce a lasting settlement which could endure up to 50 years, as opposed to the three years of the Nice treaty. Academics have been poring over the new voting solutions being proposed to see who will be the winners, and who the losers, in any deal.” -George Parker, journalist, www.FinancialTimes.com, 11/19/03

  10. Theory of Voting Power • Views countries as ‘players’ in a cooperative game. • Views legislature as a type of abstract system: players form coalitions to pass a bill. • Power is a function of a country’s likelihood of being ‘pivotal’ member of a coalition.

  11. Measures of Power without preferences • Shapley Value (SV) • SV(i)= (# times i is pivotal) (# orderings of voters) • Banzhaf Index (BI) • BI(i)= (# of times i is pivotalwhere order before i not relevant) (#coalitions with i) • Normalized Banzhaf Index (NBI) • BI adjusted so sum of BI’s=1.

  12. Example 1: Power without preferences • Three players • Player 1 has 49% of votes. • Player 2 has 48% of votes. • Player 3 has 3% of votes. • 51% majority needed to pass. Who has the most power?

  13. Answer They have equal power. Since nothing can pass without at least two players joining together.  Having only 3% of the votes is not indicative of actual power.

  14. Example 2: Power without preferences • 3 countries: 4, 2, 1 votes • 5 votes needed to pass • Possible combinations: • {4,2,1}, {4,1,2} • {2,1,4}, {2,4,1} • {1,2,4}, {1,4,2} • Shapley Values:{4/6,1/6,1/6}

  15. Example cont. • Winning coalitions: • {1,4}, {2,4},{_,_,4} • {4,2} • {4,1} • Banzhaf Values: {3/4,1/4,1/4} • NBIs: {3/5,1/5,1/5}

  16. Shapley-Owen Spatial Value • If preferences are known we can use them to help calculate likelihood of joining coalitions. • Shapley Owen (SO) Spatial Value is the probability of a country being pivotal, given preferences.

  17. Intuition • Simple majority: indifferent countries most powerful, cet. par. • Unanimity: Most ‘con’ country is most powerful.

  18. Another Example • 5 countries • Every country has 1 vote • 3 votes needed to pass a bill Who has the power?

  19. Now Preferences Matter • Let’s say 5 countries can be ranked from 1 to 5: • 1 is most con • 3 is neutral • 5 is most pro • Most likely coalition: {5,4,3} •  3 is most powerful

  20. EU15 Votes – “PreNice”Until May 1, 2004 Qualified Majority = 62 votes

  21. EU 15: Votes and Population

  22. EU 27 Votes - ‘Post Nice’

  23. EU 27: Votes and Population Spain, Poland

  24. EU 27 Qualified Majority • 255 votes out of 345=74% • A majority of member states approve • Any member state can ask for confirmation that the decision represents 62% of EU’s total population

  25. Giscard’s Proposal • Nice agreement viewed as too ‘decentralized’ • Small countries have more power to block bills they don’t like • Giscard’s plan attempts: • Centralize power in hands of big 4 • Preserve democratic foundations • Simplify rules

  26. EU 27 – ‘Giscard’ Scenario

  27. ‘Giscard’ Qualified Majority At least 14 out of 27 countries vote yes and 60% of population (289,840 votes) votes yes

  28. Defense Protecting Environment Currency Humanitarian Aid Health and Social Welfare Rules for media Fighting poverty Fighting unemployment Agriculture Policy Economic aid Education Science research EU info. dissemination Non-EU foreign policy Cultural policy Immigration Rules for political asylum Fighting organized crime Accepting refugees Police Justice Juvenile crime prevention Urban crime prevention Fighting drugs Fighting human exploitation Fighting terrorism Eurobarometer''For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the EU?''

  29. EU 15 Preferences

  30. EU 27: Preferences

  31. EU 15 Pre-Nice: Measures of Power

  32. EU 27 ‘Post-Nice’

  33. EU 27 Post Nice cont

  34. With Presences: Votes are Poor Measures of Power Post Nice EU 27

  35. EU 27 – ‘Giscard’

  36. EU 27 – ‘Giscard’ cont

  37. Votes and Power: Again little relationshipGiscard EU 27

  38. Question Why has Spain and Poland Opposed Giscard’s Proposal?

  39. Answer • Nice assigns them ‘big boy’ status • Gives them more ‘blocking power’ But… How does S-O power change?

  40. Power Comparisons for Spain and Poland

  41. Conclusions • France-German power axis due to similarity of preferences and population size. • ‘Euroskeptics’ and ‘Euroenthusiasts’ lose out. • Nice arrangement probably not a good idea for EU.

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