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Erik.ranheim@intertanko.com Safety performance of tankers Manager Research 11 September 2005. The complexity of safety. P resentations based on o bservations R egulations have basically been reactive created to l imit c onsequences rather than addressing b asic c auses of accidents
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Erik.ranheim@intertanko.com Safety performance of tankers Manager Research 11 September 2005
The complexity of safety • Presentations based on observations • Regulations have basically been reactive created to limit consequences rather than addressing basic causes of accidents • Causes of shipping accidents have been recorded for the last 100 years and it was soon recognised that every accident has a unique character with a multiple of potential causes and numerous possible combinations* • Studies show that 80%or moreof accidents are caused by operator or human error (including collective management failure) • Poor safety culture is caused by poor management not ensuring that work morale and commitment, communication, crew qualifications, training, procedures, equipment and other resources are sufficient and efficient to meet aims. *Blue-chip or sub-standard – DNV study
The complexity of safety • Zero accident tolerance has raised the safety culture • Since 1993 and $125 bnhas been invested in modern tankers 163 m dwt of SH tonnage has been removed from the market • Pollutionfrom tankers has been reduced, but • Effect of DH not yet seen to any great extent
Reported tanker incidents 9 ms 2005 - total 104 Hull & Machinery (18 engine, 2 hull, 14 others)
Accidental pollution from tankers oil spilt per tonne mile 1990 - 2005
Accidental oil spills from tankersMajor structural accidents - 000 tonnes Source: INTERTANKO/ITOPF
Tanker accidental oil spills • down 80% ts spilt ‘000 bn tonne-miles 99.9999% of the oil arrived safely Source: ITOPF
Oil pollution into the sea Maritime sources Source: GESAMP
Tanker total losses by size No 1988 – 1996: 29 CTLs 1996 – 2005: 14 CTLs Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO
Tanker and bulker total losses % Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO
Large tankers explosion before IGS requirements 1983/1985 Tanker Size dwt Year • Seatiger, 123,692 1979, 2 fatalities • Atlantic Empress 292,666 1979, 29 “ • Energy Determination 321,186 1979 , 1 “ • Albahaa B 239,410 1980, 6 “ • Mycene 238,889 1980, 6 “
Tanker Fire & explosion 2001-2005 Source: Informa/INTERTANKO
Tanker Explosion 2001-2005 25/20% 15/7% 13/24% 8/3% 8/3% Source: Informa/INTERTANKO
Tanker incidents and age development % Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO
Tanker pollution and age development Years 000 ts Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO
Tanker fleet double-hull development % Source: Fearnleys/INTERTANKO
In shipping high standards reflect the quality of the owner not the regulatory regime Erik Murdoch Director of Risk Management, The Standard P&I Club
Regulating safety Self regulation Compliance culture Bureaucracy Check list mentality stops initiative Confusion Lack of global standards Safety culture Alienation Lack of motivation and flexibility Procedures purely to meet reg. req. Unsafe - Chaos Formal regulations and controls Source: INTERTANKO
Poseidon challenge • Leading members of our community, politicians, regulators and charterers alike, appear to be digesting the fact that mere legislative or penalising measures are already reaching their limitations as a driver for further improvement. Many have even started to express their concerns that all such externally imposed controlling devises are becoming counterproductive or even harmful. Emmanuel Vordonis, Executive Director Thenamaris Ships Management, Member of iNTERTANKO’s Executive Committee
Conclusion • Strong improvement in tanker safety performance since beginning 1990s • Lack of good statistics root cause information • New safety initiatives should be based on thorough research • Balance self-regulation of overregulation • No complacency: initiatives on newbuilding standards, explosions, Poseidon challenge