ADB FINESSE Training Course on Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency for Poverty Reduction

1. ADB FINESSE Training Course on Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency for Poverty Reduction 19th – 23rd June 2006 Nairobi, Kenya

2. Module 9:Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Delivery Models Maxwell Mapako CSIR Pretoria, South Africa

3. Structure of presentation Focus on dissemination mechanisms: • Free • Subsidized • Fee for service • Private commercial There are components of these dissemination mechanisms that are critical for success. Examples from case studies highlighting outcomes and lessons

4. Critical dissemination components The critical dissemination components from a five-country study (Botswana, Zambia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe) were: • appropriate financing mechanisms • training and capacity building • maintenance, and • conducive institutional arrangements.

5. Project dissemination mechanisms: Zimbabwe

6. South Africa grid Includes households Govt subsidy for h/holds Plans not easily available Primary focus on household use South Africa off-grid PV Predominantly fee for service in concession areas Also sales Zimbabwe grid Focus: rural centres/institutions Levy on tariff for rural electrif Plans, criteria are public info Specific measures to support productive end uses Zimbabwe off-grid PV Predominantly sales outside any projects Also fee for service & donation Rural electrification approaches in South Africa and Zimbabwe

7. Major solar PV dissem. initiatives in Zimbabwe

8. Operational status: BUN/JICA/DoE Survey

9. Electrification & the poor:Zimbabwe • High income households dominate the grid and solar electrified categories. Poor unable to satisfy project screening criteria • Poor households show the opposite trend, being mostly unelectrified

10. South African Solar Concessions Six concessions providing rural populations with SHS using a capital subsidy of R3500, covering 80% of the costs of installing each system. The South African concessions are based on a fee-for-service model. Customers in the Eastern Cape were paying the full R58 per month. Other areas were already benefiting from a nationally-funded operational subsidy of R40 per customer, paid for by the local authority.

11. SA Success Factors (dissemination) • Good infrastructure in an advanced national economy • High levels of technical competence in the concessionaires • Local (national level) design and manufacturing capability • Supportive and consistent government policy

12. South Africa: Key issues • The provision of a SHS is on the basis of a means test that excludes the poorer rural household. Solar systems were removed from households unable to pay • Customers are still not adequately represented by an independent body or organisation. The NER has this function but remains unknown to most rural consumers. • Customers need to be better informed about subsidies available, and future grid plans among other things. • 52% of households in Eastern Cape were found to own mains electrical appliances they could not use with a SHS.

13. SA (Limpopo): Main fuels used by grid-electrified rural households Grid elect used predominantly for lighting, radio, TV Thermal needs still met with wood (71% for cooking) Other fuels insignificant

14. Main cooking energy source:Rural Zimbabwe • Grid-electrified rural households generally use electricity for cooking* • The non-electrified (poorer) households use wood for cooking *Note contrast with SA because of policy difference

15. Experiences: Solar home systems • Solar home systems were not accessed by the poor • The power capacity of solar home systems renders them unable to contribute significantly to most productive activities/poverty alleviation • Maintenance often becomes the major challenge after end of projects – localised maintenance capacity essential • Clustering of installations will facilitate maintenance & fee collection • Need for capacity building for local manufacturers - local components were less reliable • Use local components as far as possible (especially BOS) – long term availability of imported components may not be guaranteed • Shortage of correct components will lead to substitution with any available equivalents eg. car batteries and incandescent lights – solar home systems severely compromised • Flexibility is needed since rural population is heterogeneous - one size fits all approach in fee for service projects led to client frustration • Have clear contracts - revision of ESCO fees problematic

16. Comparative lessons. ProBEC improved stoves • Accessible to the poor, cost of labour $1-$2, barter deals encountered e.g.. bar of soap paid for basic moulding • Flexible power range capable of meeting thermal needs of smaller productive activities • Local maintenance possible, user can do most of the maintenance • Clustered around areas with trained builders who travel on foot • No complex or imported parts, except the requirement for good clay, not available in some areas • Flexible stove positioning possibilities to suit user preferences (outside, inside, high or low cooking positions) • No complex long-term contracts

17. Stove limitation on pot size Situation where stove is unable to handle all pot sizes. Note half height kitchen walls for hot climate This is a fully finished stove, labour ~$2

18. Biogas water pumping: Botswana Botswana had unique experience in the region with biogas water pumping with large digesters up to 110m3 Most digesters built for free by the Rural Industries Innovation Centre (RIIC) for village cooperatives (‘syndicates’) Intention was to pump water for villagers and their livestock. Botswana is mostly arid.

19. Botswana outcomes and lessons Financing mechanisms and equity in payment for free water. • The construction of community biogas plants was not paid for by the beneficiaries. The value of the digester to them was therefore low, as was their interest • There was competition with free diesel pumps; for biogas, people had to contribute dung in exchange for water

20. Botswana outcomes and lessons Operation and maintenance related problems: • water pumping biogas plants relied on community organisation for their operation and maintenance. This was not pre-existing • the dung for the digesters had to be collected over large areas and this, and handling cowdung proved unpopular; • the few biogas digesters which seem to have fared better were family-owned. Eventual failure was usually due to normal long-term changes in household composition

21. In Conclusion • Have we learned the lessons of other countries in Africa and elsewhere? • For example Tanzania may now have the largest number of biogas units in Africa – what are the factors that have contributed to this? What are the types, operational status, and safety record of these digesters?

22. Asante sana!