Collective Action: A User s Guide

1. Collective Action: A User�s Guide WWS 521 Domestic Politics Charles Cameron Professor of Politics and Public Affairs Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University

2. What We Will Discuss Costly collective action as communication As signaling to elites & voters As �crafted talk� using the media Difficulty of mobilizing/sustaining collective action Potential solutions Special tactics for special situations

3. Communicating With Costly Collective Action

4. Starting Place: The Basic Equation of Opinion Change

5. The Equation

6. Using the Equation: 4 Factors Who is the audience? What drives their exposure probability? What is the message? What makes the message effective for the audience?

7. When MELA marches� Who is the audience? What drives their exposure probability? What is the message? What makes the message credible to the audience?

8. 1 - Who is the audience? The media To communicate images & numbers Voters Sacramento legislators Latino politicians (incl. L.A. city council) The governor Liberal activists (actors, greens) The community

9. Elites vs Mass Audience Elites Sacramento legislators Latino politicians Activists & organizations Governor Mass audience Voters The community

10. Communication Pathways

11. 2 - Exposure Probabilities Pathway 1 (Group to elites directly) Elites are high information people Exposure to media message VERY likely Real issue will be credibility Pathway 2 (Group to voters) Most voters are very low information people Exposure much more problematic Exposure a huge issue Credibility possibly an issue Pathway 3 (Voters to elites) Elites work hard to monitor (relevant) opinion change So exposure & credibility (given change) very likely

12. Pathways� For elites, key issue will be credibility of the message For masses, exposure will be a key issue AND packaging the message in a way that is accessible to low information people

13. Sidebar: Just How Low-Information Are Most Voters? The mean levels of political information in the American electorate are Unbelievably low Laughably low Scarily low However, voters often use small amounts of information very efficiently Reliance on �cues,� endorsements, and �gut rationality� Voting is a coarse decision, so these often work very well And, the variance in information levels is HIGH

14. 3 - What is the message? The prison sounded like a good idea but in fact WE know it will hurt this community very badly And, lots of us care intensely about this

15. Role of Information Asymmetries Community residents have an information advantage (relative to voters & elites) They have �private information� �Types� -- In understanding community conditions -- In knowing the intensity of local concern about the issue

16. If the message is believed � Latino politicians will oppose the prison, or lose votes & credibility) Polanco fiasco, switch by old guard (Torres) Liberal activists & donors will perceive an injustice May fund legal action (NRDC); use against Gov. Minimally, Sacramento legislators may need to offer more concessions The Governor may have to re-evaluate political costs and benefits

17. So, what makes the message credible � to elites & voters? To answer, we need a little signaling theory

18. Principle 1: The Interest Convergence Principle Communication requires some convergence of interests If our interests are too opposed, anything that helps you hurts me So, I can�t believe anything you say, as you are just trying to hurt me But complete convergence of interests is rare � so some people may have an incentive to lie about their private information (their type)

19. Principle 2: The Separation Principle (Sheep vs. Goats) �Separating� vs �Pooling� Effective communication requires knowledgeable people to act differently depending on their information (type) Then, the audience can back out the information from the actions

20. Example of Separation If the prison isn�t too bad for the community, MELA must act one way No marching, or small march If the prison is truly terrible, MELA must act another way Lots of marching, and big marches But if MELA always acts the same way (no marches, or always moderate marches), their action communicates nothing about the private information So, what facilitates separation of types?

21. Principle 3: The Pain Principle If the marginal cost of signaling, or the marginal benefit from signaling, is correlated with the private information Then the willingness to bear pain during signaling gives the message credibility In some sense, the pain is the message

22. MELA Marching, by Type Near-by residents and near-by businessmen will oppose the prison even if it isn�t too bad �fanatics� or �crazies� They always have a strong incentive to march (if the message will be believed) So their action conveys little information But people who aren�t so close will feel strongly only if the prison is really bad �Normals� They will march only if the prison is terrible Their action conveys useful information

23. Backing Out the Private Information How can elites and sophisticated voters tell if only the crazies are marching vs crazies + normal people? 1 � The SIZE of the march 2 � The IDENTITY of the marchers 3 � The CONDUCT or deportment of the marchers

24. MELA & Separation of Types A BIG march By traditionally dressed MOTHERS Who behave PEACEFULLY, carrying candles -- Conveys �knowledgeable normals oppose the prison� PLUS: The images are highly media-genic so exposure becomes more likely

25. Some References Suzanne Lohman, �A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action,� American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 319-333. ----, �Information Aggregation Through Costly Political Action,� American Economic Review 84 (1994): 519-530. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Special Interest Politics Chapter 5 Jeffrey Banks, Signaling Models of Politics

26. What Happens If the Pain Principle Fails? �Costless� signaling There may be costs of signaling But, marginal costs or benefits not tied to type In this case, communication depends critically on source credibility

27. Credible Sources Knowledgeable neutral parties Goo-goo types: League of Women Voters �Objective� news media Knowledgeable people who share my values Ex: Most people support clean environment � and will believe responsible environmentalists when they protest Editorialists who usually share my views Knowledgeable people who usually oppose my values -- but say the unexpected Nixon goes to China Conservatives opposed to Bush, liberals opposed to Kerry

28. Cues, Source Credibility, and Gut Rationality Elites can easily do the mental calculations to �invert� signals and back out private information But this can be too much work for voters So they often rely on cues, source credibility & �gut rationality� But MELA�s messages work both ways �Crafted Talk�: Taking advantage of gut rationality

29. More on Public Opinion � In a few minutes �

30. Organizing for Collective Action

31. Collective Action � The Threshold Game Two elements Cooperation is valuable Cooperation is problematic

32. Collective Action is Valuable If k people participate in: A boycott against a company, the boycott succeeds in changing the company�s market behavior A march or demonstration, voters & politicians believe there is a problem, and the latter changes policy A riot or mass violence, a government falls A fund raising drive, the public radio station stays on the air Voting on one side of an issue/candidate, that side wins

33. Collective Action is Problematic

34. Rational Calculation

35. Two Equilibria in the Game (Assuming B > c) Exactly k people (who know who they are) participate, no others do Mixed strategy: some people participate, some don�t Collective action can fail With population uncertainty Everyone participates if group is small But collective action can fail if group is large

36. How to Resolve? First, note that in almost all cases of successful collective action, there are 2 classes of actors: a small group of activists/entrepreneurs a large group of potential participants Their problems are different

37. Activists Value B highly May have ideological or moral commitments that out-weigh a strict cost-benefit calculus But even if not, because the number of activists is SMALL, p is LARGE

38. Job of the Activists Find a way to alter the c/b calculations of the potential participants If this is not possible, collective action will fail

39. Methods of Altering C/B Calculations: 1 Charasmatic Leadership So people don�t think in c/b terms, or systematically mis-estimate p Can work in the short run But NOT in the long run Typically, organizations formed by charismatic leaders, the org. faces crisis when leader goes Successful organizations find a way to resolve the crisis; others collapse

40. Methods of Altering C/B Calculations: 2 Make participation mandatory, e.g., by using government as an enforcer Closed shop Gov�t enforced standards across an industry

41. Methods: 3 Supplement collective benefit B, with a private benefit whose receipt is contingent on participation Discount rental cars, magazine subscriptions, tote bags Rioting for fun & profit Marching as a dating service/social activity Variation: Turn c into a b Australian voting rules

42. Methods: 4 Lower c Rent vans Use telephone networks to ease communication Take advantage of holidays and good weather

43. Methods: 5 Rely on existing social networks and on-going social or other relationship Lowers c Allows possibility of retaliation in on-going context for failure to participate in the new one Example: role of church in East L.A., civil rights movement

44. Methods: 6 Organizational Solutions Institute a hierarchy, with supervision, rewards, and penalties Break one large group into many small ones So small group logic kicks in Revolutionary cells/cadres

45. Methods: 7 Increase the likelihood of success from a given level of participation In essence, lower k, esp through better �crafted talk� Enhance media coverage Stunts, gimmicks to make events �newsworthy� Improve the quality of the images & message White shawls, candle light etc

46. Special Situations

47. Riots Rioters face a coordination problem The job of the activists is to solve the coordination problem Focal points Over-whelm police presence at a key point Collusion by police/incompetence helps

48. Boycotts