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THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY. JUNE 4-5, 1942. EARLY 1942 EVENTS. THE DOOLITTLE RAID: WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS WHO? U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS U.S. NAVY Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O 16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN)
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THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY JUNE 4-5, 1942
EARLY 1942 EVENTS • THE DOOLITTLE RAID: • WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 • WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS • WHO? • U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS • U.S. NAVY • Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O • 16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN) • WHY? • RETALIATION FOR PEARL HARBOR ATTACK • TO BOOST U.S. MILITARY & PUBLIC MORALE • PROBLEM? • HOW TO GET AIR GROUP CLOSE ENOUGH TO JAPAN W/OUT DETECTION • HOW TO GET CREWS / PLANES TO SAFETY • RESULTS? • TOKYO BOMBED W/LITTLE DAMAGE • CASUALTIES: • U.S. – 3 KIA, 8 POW (4 DIE IN CAPTIVITY – 3 EXECUTED, 1 OF DISEASE), 15 B-25 BOMBERS • JAPAN – 50 DEAD, 400 WOUNDED • STRATEGIC RESULTS: • JAPAN WITHDRAWS CARRIER GROUP FROM INDIAN OCEAN TO DEFEND JAPAN • JAPAN DECIDES TO ATTACK MIDWAY ISLAND
THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA • WHEN? MAY 4-8, 1942 • WHERE? CORAL SEA, S.PACIFIC (near Australia) • WHO? • IJN COMBINED FLEET (carriers & battleships) • USN – 2 CARRIER TASK FORCES (define) • AUSTRALIA – DESTROYER FORCES • WHY? • JAPAN ATTEMPTING TO… • STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN S. PACIFIC • OCCUPY PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) • EXTEND CONTROL IN SOLOMON ISLANDS • SO WHAT? DIRECT THREAT TO AUSTRALIA • RESULTS? • FIRST BATTLE TO EMPLOY LARGE-SCALE CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS • HEAVY FIGHTING / LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES • CASUALTIES: • JAPAN – 1 CARRIER SUNK, 1 DAMAGED, 966 KIA • U.S. – 1 CARRIER SCUTTLED, 1 HEAVILY DAMAGED, 656 KIA • STRATEGIC EFFECT? • JAPAN CANNOT OCCUPY PORT MORESBY • 2 JAPANESE CARRIERS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT MIDWAY • U.S. & ALLIES NOW HAVE TIME TO PREPARE NEW GUINEA INVASION
REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPRUANCE,COMMANDING OFFICER,TASK FORCE 16,BATTLE OF MIDWAY
VICE ADMIRALWILLIAM HALSEY,U.S. NAVY,ORIGINAL C/O,TASK FORCE 16
REAR ADMIRAL FRANK JACK FLETCHER,COMMANDING OFFICER,TASK FORCE 17,BATTLE OF MIDWAY
LCDR JOSEPH ROCHEFORT,U.S. NAVY,NAVAL INTELLIGENCE &CRYPTOLOGY DIVISION
ADMIRAL ISORUKU YAMAMOTO,COMMANDING OFFICER,IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMOCOMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE CARRIER FLEET, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
MIDWAY: PREPARING FOR BATTLE • JAPANESE GOALS: • ELIMINATE U.S. STRATEGIC POWER IN PACIFIC • ALLOW JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN / TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT CONQUESTS • WOULD ENSURE NO REPEAT OF DOOLITTLE RAID • HOW? / WHAT WAS THE STRATEGY? • LURE U.S.NAVY CARRIERS INTO TRAP & ELIMINATE THEM • A THREAT TO HAWAII WOULD FORCE U.S. TO RESPOND W/ CARRIER FORCES • ATTACK & OCCUPY MIDWAY ISLAND
MIDWAY: ORDER OF BATTLE • JAPANESE FORCES*: • 4 CARRIERS • 2 BATTLESHIPS • 15 SUPPORT SHIPS • 248 AIRCRAFT • U.S. FORCES: • 3 CARRIERS • 25 SUPPORT SHIPS • 233 CARRIER-BASED PLANES • 127 LAND-BASED (Midway Island) PLANES • *THESE FIGURES ONLY INCLUDE FORCES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN COMBAT AT MIDWAY
COMPARING FORCES • JAPAN: ADVANTAGES • LARGER NAVAL FORCE • MOST IMPORTANTLY – MORE CARRIERS • MORE EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWS • MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS • CONFIDENCE • MOMENTUM • JAPAN: DISADVANTAGES • FEW, IF ANY • NAVAL CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY WAS INFERIOR TO U.S. • BATTLE PLAN IS COMPLICATED: • JAPANESE FORCES CANNOT SUPPORT EACH OTHER • WHY? THEY ARE DISPERSED OVER LARGE AREA • OVERCONFIDENCE – UNDERESTIMATION OF U.S. CAPABILITIES (at that time)
COMPARING FORCES(cont’d.) • U.S.: ADVANTAGES • CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY • U.S.: DISADVANTAGES • LESS EXPERIENCED CREWS • FEWER SHIPS, esp. CARRIERS • INFERIOR TORPEDO PLANES • INFERIOR FIGHTER PLANES • U.S. CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE CARRIERS • WHAT ROLE DO U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CODEBREAKERS PLAY IN THE BATTLE? • IJN NAVAL CODE (IJN-25) WAS BROKEN BY THE U.S. • CODES PROVED MIDWAY WAS JAPAN’s PRIMARY TARGET
U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE 16CARRIERS, BATTLE OF MIDWAYU.S.S. HORNET (above)U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (right)