Job Recruit Simulation

1. Job Recruit Simulation

2. Job Recruit Simulation • General instructions • Take it seriously (you learn and enjoy it more that way) • Do as well for yourself as you can • Don’t cheat! Play by the rules • Specific instructions for Job Recruit simulation • Count off for role assignments • Keep your confidential information secret (but play your role!) • Review your role assignment (prepare, prepare, prepare!) • Negotiate

3. Job Recruit Deliverables • Negotiators • Completed and signed contract (Recruiter has “standard contract” for completion) • Or statement(s) on impasse (you need not agree) • Role assignment instructions • Due by 3:15 today • Observers: NEW & Improved! • Provide five (5) short phrases or sentences that sum up the “Top Five Most Notable Aspects” of the negotiation you observe (focus on process, not outcomes, and see old written instructions) • Due by 3PM tomorrow

4. Ready, Set, ... Count Off!

5. Job Recruit Simulation Debriefing • Déjà vu? Underlying structure is the same as in a previous simulation we’ve done • 2 integrative issues, 6 distributive issues • Context and types of issues differ • Relative point values same (x10) • Implications (just like previous simulation) • Try to discover where both want the same outcome • Try to discover how different priorities (point values) can make logrolling useful to both

6. Observations on Results • Widely varying solutions • Points of reference: • “Hindsight solution” -- Best both sides can do w/o imbalance (6600-6600) • “Compromise solution” -- Split the difference on each issue and optimize on integrative issues (where both want same) (4800-4800) • Average score around 4526 (5218 for Recruiter, 4735 for Candidate) • Some very one-sided “solutions” (e.g., 5900-700) • Some very balanced solutions (e.g., 6600-6600) • Wide variance in “total value” (e.g., from 6600 to 13200) • Integrative issues still missed (both want exact same outcome) • 5 pairs missed that both wanted the job in Division A • 3 pairs missed that both wanted the job in San Francisco • 2 pairs missed both they both wanted Division A and San Francisco • Some settled on Divisions D and E, the worst choices for both!

7. Simulation Scoring • Negotiatiors: Recruiter and Candidate • 5000+ simulation points: 25 class points • 4000-4900 24 • 3000-3900 23 • 2000-2900 22 • 1000-1900 21 • 0-900 20 • Observers • Up to 25 points, based on instructor evaluation of reports relative to instructions, including completeness in identifying participants, group numbers, and clarity

8. Observer Comments • Observer comments are often not good outcome predictors • It’s hard to know what’s really going on based on observed interaction without knowledge of underlying situation • Equifinality: There are different paths to the same end • Also, the same path can yield different ends, depending on what the other party does • Next two slides show Recruiter Score, Candidate Score, Total Points, and selected observer comments

9. #: (Recruiter-Candidate-Total) 1a: (7000-2000-9000) Seemed to enjoy roles. Spent much time tallying point totals in early going. 1b: (3300-3900-7200) Might have been too open with private info at first. Seemed to be describing theirs to the other. Not much use of questions. 2: (5000-4600-9600) Started with lesser issues. R made it look like she needed C more than C needed R. R was flexible, accommodating. Both used active listening. 3: (6400-3800-10200) Went straight to salary issue. R took control. Both used IN tactics, compromised. R seemed to have upper hand. 4: (5100-4500-9600) R used IN tactics, C used DB tactics. R clearly spelled out options. R had all the power; C was firm but then gave in. R used active listening, C used passive. 5: (3600-4200-7800) Both stressed positions, not interests. Used active listening. Logrolled across issues. 6: (2400-6000-8400) Focused on interests later on. Could have used questions more. 7: (5900-700-6600) Started with money issues. C complained about being stripped naked. C’s pleas for sympathy didn’t seem to work. Neither party was happy with outcome. 8: (6100-3500-9600) C gave facts and reasons, stressed interests. R played hardball, lowballed, stressed positions. Approaches clashed. C switched to DB tactics near end. Observer Comments

10. 9: (5000-5800-10800) C highballed, R stressed info seeking and IN approach. 10: (7900-4100-12000) R did well in playing off C’s wants and preferences. They tended to package issues, not issue-by-issue. 11: (6200-5200-11400) Both took IN approach. Logrolled. Both used active listening. Asked lots of questions. C was more aggressive. R kept her cool and refused to be intimidated. 12: (6600-6600-13200) Both took IN approach, traded issues, asked probing questions to understand each other’s perspectives. 13: (6300-6900-13200) Started with money issues, but also used starting date. Used IN approach. R did most of talking, C seemed unwillinging to give info, but opened up more later as trust built. 14:(2200-6200-8400) R wasn’t firm. If C said no, R said OK. Used package with salary, bonus, and start date. 15: (5200-3800-9000) IN all the way, good communications, effort to see other’s position. 16: (4500-8700-13200) Prioritized, IN, prepared to make tradeoffs, kept things tentative until all issues addressed. Questions used to probe interests. Observer Comments, Cont’d.

11. Job Recruit Lessons? • Stress interests, not positions • Discover common objectives (e.g., job and location) • Discover possibilities for trades across distributive issues, and how doing that transforms a win-lose situation (when considered one issue at a time) to a win-win situation (both gain by trading issues -- “logrolling”) • Some parties seemed too focused on scoring game points, rather than playing their roles • “Kwal-Mart?” contamination? That is, people may have recognized the similarity • Grade pressures?

12. Job Recruit Lessons and Cautions • The payoff matrix is important, the “underlying structure” • Strategic interaction is important. Whether a DB or IN approach works and specific tactics work, depends in part on what they do • Some issues are distributive, some are integrative, and in reality, many are mixed (none in this exercise) • Even distributive issues might be transformed to an IN situation with multiple issues and differing priorities • Dilemmas of trust and honesty: There are incentives to conceal • Most negotiations are not so well-structured • Subjectivity and uncertainty about importance of issues (not clear point values) • Number of issues may be variable. Or, what’s negotiable is itself negotiable • On-going relations are important in many instances