13 th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation

1. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National LinkagesWednesday, April 19th (4:30-5:45pm)

2. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National Linkages Anti-Corruption In The Transportation Trade In ChinaBingxian Chen

3. Complexity, Causes and Strategies Anti-Corruption in China’s Highway Construction By Bingxian Chen

4. Introduction • Corruption Issues in China A major social and political issues; Second greatest public concern (behind unemployment) • Corruption Situation in Highway Construction 17 directors form nine provinces investigated Disaster area of corruption Extremely fragile

5. Uniqueness and Complexity • Huge investment 1999-2004, 213Billion USD, Outspent 40 years 10,000-34,000 Kilometers within 6 years • Lots of participants, complex contractual structure Owner—contractors—sub-contractors -- sub-sub-contractor • Diversities Varied standards in Qualification, integrity, oversight • Many phases Planning, design, pre-qualification, tendering, project execution, operation and maintenance

6. What Sparked Off the Corruption? • Firstly,lack of independence Ministry of Supervision Ministry of Transportation Department of Supervision (Local) Department of Transportation (Local)

7. Secondly, monopolySelf-contained style Top-down structure, sub-system Trinity: Financing, constructing and operatingThirdly, faults in bidding systemLags, immature, loopholesLast, lack of skillful officialsComplex and sophisticated Upgrade, tactics, networks Political character vs. capability

8. Consequences of Corruption • Poor quality • Competition in bribery • Reputation and image • Culture of illegality • Market inefficiencies

9. Recommendations • Reorganization Revoke supervision delegation branch Enhance independence, clarify responsibility Cut off connections • Eradicate monopoly practices Opening up market Redistribute main functions Introduce new mechanisms • Revise bidding system Identify corruption-prone points Plug loopholes • Training

10. Conclusion • No one-time cure. • No one-fits-all • Need fundamental reform • Need a enlightened government • Need a strong civil society

11. THANK YOU Bingxian Chen chenbingxian007@hotmail.com

12. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National Linkages Putting Pressure On The President: TANS And Their Impact On Anti-Corruption In NigeriaJonathan Allen

13. Putting Pressure on the President TANs and the Corruption War In Nigeria Jonathan Allen

14. FACTS • March 22, 2005: 28 minute address to the nation • Denounces Corruption Activities • Dares his people to publish any corruption activities against him or his family • Promises: “Then, the world will take us seriously.”

15. Issues • What motivated the President to act in such a way? • Was this simply rhetoric, or did he mean what he said? • Any underlying Intentions? New elections? Tool against political enemies? • What impact did TANs have on the President’s behavior, and on the corruption war in general?

16. Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) • “Relevant actors working internationally on an issue bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink). • Issues: Clear ideas about right and wrong • Bodily harm • Legal Equality of Opportunity • Networks: strong, many actors, and reliable information flows • State Actors: Vulnerable to pressure; discrepancies between policy commitments and practices

17. Anti-Corruption Network Regional/Local • Anti-Corruption Internet Database (ACID) • Anatomy of Corruption Advocacy Campaign International • Transparency International • Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Center • UNCAC, UNDP, World Bank, US, and EU

18. Corruption in Nigeria • Long history of Corruption • New democracy • Amenable to incentives/sanctions from international community • Discrepancies between promises and practices • However, the culture of corruption is not susceptible to change

19. Pressuring the President • 1999 Elections: President promises to stamp out corruption • TI and the Network: From watchdog to bulldog • President Obasanjo Starts to Care • March 2005 Address and aftermath • Anti-Corruption Network: Not enough • What’s next? Local governments?

20. Implications TANs and their strategic approach: • Frame issue within the democracy; • Bring the issue to the forefront of election debates • Secure promises from elected leaders • Place external pressure on governments to fulfill their promises

21. Implications Drawbacks • Differing Conceptions of Corruption • Structural Issues: Incentives may still be too strong and officials will continue corrupted practices • What about non-democratic governments? • Witch Hunt Problems

22. THANK YOU Any Questions?

23. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National Linkages Oil Development In Chad: The World Bank’s Intention And RealityKenichi Yamada

24. The Resource Curse Not Overcome: Intention and Reality in Chad Kenichi Yamada

25. Outline • Introduction of the project • What is exceptional in the project? • Negative outcomes • Problem 1: Loopholes and weaknesses • Problem 2: Absence of preconditions • The latest resource curse • Recommendations

27. Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Development Project • Oil for poverty reduction with remedies • $2 billion oil revenue over 25 years • $130 million per year • $3.5 billion project • Oil consortium (ExxonMobil, Petronas, Chevron): 60 to 70% • World Bank Group: $260 million loan • Commercial Banks: remaining

28. Law 001 • All direct oil revenue to CitiBank account in London • 10% for Future Generation Fund • 72% for priority sectors • 4.5% for oil producing regions • 13.5% for treasury balance • Establishment of the Petroleum Oversight and Control Committee

29. Negative Outcomes • Delay of first transfer of oil revenue • Signs of nepotism • President Déby’s attempt to break Law 001 • WB’s suspension of loan, and frozen bank account • Chad threatening the halt of oil flow • Chad demanding $100 million

30. Loopholes and Weaknesses of the Project (1) • Secrete in the agreement between the government and the oil consortium • Unrestricted indirect revenue • Ignorance of other fields • Government’s incapability to monitor the oil production • Dispute over calculation of the revenue

31. Loopholes and Weaknesses of the Project (2) • Two speed nature of the project • Oil consortium wants to finish the job as quickly as possible • Chadian government not prepared to manage the oil revenue • Long delayed capacity building despite warnings • Monitoring problem • Recommendations not taken into account

32. Absence of Precondition in Chad • Fragile political ground • Poor and corrupt • Political instability • Weak judicial system • Oversight does not function • Sign of nepotism • Difficult to reform • Chad was and is far from ready

33. The Latest Resource Curse Project failure + Fragile political ground =Potential resource curse

34. Resource Curse in Chad • Natural resource dependence • Slower economic growth • Corruption • Dismal social indicators • Newest cases in Sun-Saharan Africa • Success story not applicable

35. Legitimacy of the Project in Question • Suggested remedies • Transparency of money flow • Future generation fund • Modification in contract • Remedies not worked • Watchdogs not functioning • Lack of democratic institutions • Expectations of Law 001 not worked

36. Recommendations in Chad • Slowing the production of oil • Strengthening civil society • More accountable World Bank • No compromise with the government • Engage in non-oil sector development • Regular examination of the project • Donors • No compromise with the government

37. Recommendations for Future Projects • World Bank should: • Do more research prior to the project approval • Set minimum governance standards • Mandate capacity building before the revenue flow • Examine the project regularly • Contribute to non-oil sector development • Assist strengthening civil society

38. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National Linkages International Organizations Competency IndexAmir Farmanesh

39. 13th Symposium on Development and Social Transformation Panel 6: Building Public Sector Accountability: International-National Linkages Wednesday, April 19th (4:30-5:45pm)