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Vigilant State 3

Explore the complex dynamics of intelligence analysis, from political pressures to bureaucratic challenges and deceptive tactics. Discover strategies for overcoming these obstacles through insightful lectures and seminars.

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Vigilant State 3

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  1. Vigilant State 3 INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

  2. Vigilant State 3 • 2 Types of Problems for Analysts • Bureaucratic Pathologies • Psychological Dissonance Lecture will deal with bureaucracy and seminar will deal with psychology

  3. 1. Politics of Intelligence Analysis

  4. Vigilant State 3 1. Politics of Intelligence Analysis common forms - • Interest Groups e.g. agencies fight for budget share and influence • Bargaining Systems e.g. compromise for producing national estimates • Political Interference e.g. called for to support entrenched policies • Procurement & Industry e.g. employed to justify large defence spends

  5. 2. Democracies and Autocracies

  6. Vigilant State 3 2. Democracies and Autocracies • In autocracies - ideological problems and power problems • But politicisation no less strong in democracy ? • social choice over budget • government and opposition – the infamous gap debates • public opinion and mass media in fp making - ISC's question – our own project • prone to investigation – e.g. Franks Report, FAC, Butler

  7. 3. Responses to Political Pressure Sherman Kent

  8. Vigilant State 3 • 3. Responses – • A) IDEALISM OR PUSH – O.N.E. • Sherman Kent, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Ray Cline - more recently S.R. Ward • insulate/distance from unethical pressures - set the agenda

  9. Vigilant State 3 • B) REALISM OR PULL – D.I.A. • to survive ‘go with the flow’ - agency competition will deliver objectivity • Carmen Medina serve the customer’s requirements + new IT • must have own policy as input • e.g. Nixon and China – not told

  10. China? Nixon and DCI Richard Helms

  11. 4. Politicising Questions

  12. Vigilant State 3 4. Problem of Politicising Questions Politicisation is easy because – • Competing agencies provide alternative answers • Because no-one knows what the right question is • e.g Iraqi missile numbers ? range ? production ? or aircraft ? • Secrecy prevents investigation • Example of Johnson and Vietnam • CBS vs. General Abrams - Sam Adams – War of Numbers • Remit of Butler Enquiry

  13. 5. Bureaucratic Politics

  14. Vigilant State 3 • 5. Bureaucratic Politics • No real DCI/DNI even with Mike McConnell • NIE process = bland /coaltions • A Team / B Team each change introduces new pathologies • Committee process is very slow • Each Bureau grows its own - 14 in Saigon • Even struggles within intelligence orgs • Iran SI vs. SO Vietnam SI vs. SO

  15. The UK Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman (Cabinet Office) Chief of the Assessments Staff (Cabinet Office) Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator (Cabinet Office) Analysis PM’s Foreign Policy Advisor (Hd OD) CDI (Ministry of Defence) DUS(Defence & Intelligence) and Whitehall Liaison Department Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Committee Director GCHQ Policy Policy Director Ministry of Defence ‘C’ (SIS) DG Org & Int Crime Directorate Home Office Collection Director HM Treasury Director General Security Service Director of Export Control & Non-Proliferation Department of Trade & Industry DFID

  16. 6. Role of the Individual

  17. Vigilant State 3 • 6. Role of the Individual • Military values • Loyalty – Tenacity - Speed of decision - Wisdom resides with rank/experience • Academic values • Flat hierarchy - Unorthodox thinking – Reflective - Disrespectful • Civilianize? Non-career ? • Osmosis/Strategic Culture • Individuals rarely have to be told about values • Analogies - the weight of the shadow of the past

  18. 7. Intelligence at the Top John Scarlett Chair of JIC 2003

  19. Vigilant State 3 • 7. Intelligence at the Top • Personality key at the top - Interface with • decision-makers • Must have credibility • Must be able to inspire action • Hitler’s entourage clearly impossible • Churchill, Johnson, Nixon also difficult • Blair's Ministerial Committee on Intelligence • How pressurised was the UK JIC in 2003?

  20. 8. The Problem of Deception

  21. Vigilant State 3 • 8. Problem of Deception • 2 forms of deception • A) Counter-intelligence deception • Paralyse by creating security problems • James Jesus Angleton • Spycatcher & Roger Hollis

  22. Vigilant State 3 B) Strategic Deception • Need to monitor the bait • Exploit the enemy good intell system • Exploit the enemy presumptions • Reinforce what they want to believe - eg Iraqi WMD

  23. Vigilant State 3 • Q. How do analysts guard against these problems bureaucratic problems? • A. Endless re-designing of machinery • Q. How do analysts deal with psychological problems? • A. Endless training to think outside the box • Q. So why does it still fail? • A. I will explain next week!!!

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