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REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Technical Committee Meeting of Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation 20 - 22 May 2009, Vienna, Austria. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE). WWR 2×1000 WWR 2×440. RIVNE NPP. WWR 2×1000. KHMELNITSKY NPP.

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REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)

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  1. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Technical Committee Meeting of Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation 20 - 22 May 2009, Vienna, Austria REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)

  2. WWR 2×1000 WWR 2×440 RIVNE NPP WWR 2×1000 KHMELNITSKY NPP SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP WWR 6×1000 WWR 3×1000 ZAPORIZHA NPP

  3. Operating reliability of I&C systems, designed by “Radiy” company There weren’t any failures of systems or sets as a whole. Comparison of all operating measures with design measures and requirements measures in specification was fulfilled for channels. Operating measures are close to design measures (e.g. design failure intensity for channel of reactor protection system is 11.6E-06, point estimation is 6.1E-06). All measures for systems satisfy the specification requirements.

  4. Analysis of violations due to I&C Level of violations according INES- 1, 0, out of scale Intensity of violation decreased in function of time ( for violations due to I&C and due to technological equipment too) Important reason of violations- events outside of I&C (ventilation system, EMC, etc) Measures how modernization improved safety Influence of SW

  5. Influence of I&C systems modernization to NPP safety

  6. Comparison of software influence to NPP violations because digital systems Agreement with B.Geddes, R.Torok Protection against the software failures is already at a “reasonable assurance level”

  7. Ukrainian Regulations Common Principles of NPP Safety Regulations of NPP Reactors Nuclear Safety IEC NP 306.2.141 NP 306.2.145 IEC 1226 IEC 61513 IAEA IEC 62340 NS-R-1 Safety Requirements to NPP Digital I&C Systems (Revision 1) NS-G-1.3 IEC 60880 IEC 62138 IEC 60987 NS-G-1.1 NP 306.5.02/ХХХ-2009 Regulations with Requirements to NPP I&C

  8. Methods of Assessment of NPP I&C Compliance with Safety Requirements Requirements of Order and State of the Actions for Safety Important NPP I&C Life Extension NP 306.2.141 NP 306.5.02/2-068 Methods of Expert Review of NPP I&C, based on FPGA (Revision 0) Regulations with methods related to NPP I&C

  9. Knowledge base for expert activity -International (IAEA, IEC,ISO) and Ukrainian standards Requirements to I&C (Comparison) Expert reviews Documentations of new systems Methodics Text (or list) of books and articles

  10. Thanks for attention

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