Japanese Development in the Use of Operating Experience

1. Japanese Development in the Use of Operating Experience Session1 Operational Experience Feedback: Actual Experiences Michio Ishikawa President Japan Nuclear Technology Institute May 2006

2. Establishment of JANTI • Established on April 13, 2005 • Members…113 companies electric utilities, manufacturers, subcontractors, etc. • Purpose 1)On the model of INPO, support the industrial initiatives for safer operation. 2)Improve the regulation practices agree with nuclear technology.

3. Japan Nuclear Technology Institute Operating Experience Analysis Division Codes and Standards Division Nuclear Safety Network Division General Affairs Division Nuclear Industry Regulatory Bodies Academic Societies (Standards Development) Public Promote safety culture and best practice Request the scientific and rational rule based on operating experience Assist development of Codes and Standards Show third party evaluation and accountability Base on Nuclear Engineering and Technology with Expertise and Sustainability Function and Organization of JANTI

4. Why JANTI was established • Reinforcement of safety regulation after JCO accident and TEPCO scandal. • It put heavy burden on utilities and exhausted their plant sites • Mihama accident accelerated the needs further. • JANTI was established. One year earlier than Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, INC.(JAIF)

5. Difference to JNES JNES: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization … subsidized organization of METI • JNES: governmental body Regulation and inspection … according to the law. • JANTI: private society • Support to improve safety to manage … according to the nuclear technology rationale. • Request to improve regulatory practice based on plant data a Vigilance Committee

6. NUCIA since 1966NUClear Information Archives (A) Accident Information requested by the law (B) Safety Quality Information, events shared among utilities to improve Safety (C) Other Information, events not required but voluntary published As of March 31 2006

7. 27 Comparison of NPP shutdown period between U.S. and Japan 100- 4.7times equal

8. Transition of NPP Capacity Factor

9. Inspection System in Japan; past • “Annual inspection” : Traditional inspection method • Originally came from conventional power plant, back to 80 years ago • Systematic but focused on disassemble test • Successful achievement in nuclear power generation in 1980s-1990s… vice versa “undesirable load” • Strict QMS were added on the annual inspection Site exhaustion At present

10. Mihama accident • Rapture of large steam pipe. • FAC (Flow accelerated corrosion) of piping was not measured for 28 years because not on the list. • Fatality: 5 persons Serious injury: 6 persons • Site worker eyes stay on list, not on plant condition.

11. TEPCO scandal • the falsification of inspection data in the whole organization. • Rice culture: no individual but unite group is important. • Hiding for the group not shame problem. • irrational action out of the world fashion of glasnost. • The scandal was revealed by such a peculiar way as an anonymity from a foreigner, to fire 4 presidents from public office.

12. Conclusion • "Disclosure" is the one and only commitment made by the nuclear industry today. • Japanese culture exists some time in the root causes of recent incidents. • “Too-much is too-less” • Feedback from operating experiences is only tool to recover balance of system avoiding off-set.

13. Thank you !