Monterey Institute Of International Studies

1. Monterey Institute Of International Studies NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARE by Jean du Preez Director International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program Center For Nonproliferation Studies 21 January 2003 1

2. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARE Course outline • Part I : Overview of the nuclear nonproliferation regime • Part II : The NPT • Overview of major developments in the NPT • Challenges to the regime • Will the regime survive? 2

3. WHAT IS NONPROLIFERATION? Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and their means of delivery* • Horizontal nuclear proliferation: spread of weapons to states not currently possessing nuclear weapons • Vertical nuclear proliferation: increase in number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons within a state already possessing them * Mostly applicable to nuclear weapons as biological and chemical weapons are banned 3

4. WHAT IS DISARMAMENT ? Total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, through the prohibition on development, production and use and destruction of all such weapons 4

5. WHY IS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION A PRIORITY? 5

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7. 30,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS Estimated 30 000 nuclear warheads worldwide • 5 NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, UK, USA) • 3 states outside the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan) • North Korea, Iraq, Iran • Others? Hiroshima: August 6, 1945 Nagasaki: August 9, 1945 7

8. NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Delivery systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons • Ballistic missiles • Cruise missiles • Artillery • Rockets • Submarines • Aircraft • Other 8

9. WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NON -PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT REGIME? Collective term for international initiatives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination 9

10. IAEA SAFEGUARDS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS EXPORT CONTROLS NWFZs NPT NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION & DISARMAMENT REGIME COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME CTBT ? United Nations Security Council & Disarmament machinery 10

11. THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Parties: 188 Non-parties: India, Israel, Pakistan • A cornerstone of global security • Embodies the international community's efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and its aspirations for global disarmament, while also facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards • Entails commitments by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states • Verification of compliance with nonproliferation undertakings through the application of safeguards was conferred on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 11

12. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) • Encourages & assists research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world • Establishes & administers safeguards designed to ensure that the use of nuclear energy is not used for military purposes • Applies safeguards to relevant activities at the request of Member States • Applies mandatory comprehensive safeguards in NNWS to the NPT & other international treaties 12

13. IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM Continual monitoring of nuclear material to ensure it is not used for military purposes • extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities • confidence‑building tools of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. • Why are safeguards important? • Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons • Foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy • Provide confidence and build trust 13

14. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS:3 key components Accountancy: reporting by states on the location of fissionable material under their control, on stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, on processig and reprocessing of nuclear materials, etc. Containment & Surveillance: techniques such as seals or video recording inside a facility Inspection: by IAEA inspectors, checking instrumetns and seals, verifying bookkeeping, confirming physical inventories of fuel or spent fuel 14

15. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY • Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion (true zero yield) • Verification regime includes an international monitoring system (IMS) composed of seismological, radionuclide (16 laboratories), hydro acoustic and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence building measures • Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. Conference of State Parties or Executive Council can bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations 15

16. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION • Adopted by UNGA 9/24/1996 • Signed by 165 State with 93 State Parties • Entry into force requires ratification of 44 specific States with nuclear power capacities: 41 have signed - only 31 ratified • Non-signatories include India, North Korea, and Pakistan • The US (led the effort to conclude a CTBT and first to sign) and China, among those that have signed but not ratified • U.S. Senate voted in 1999 not to ratify • Global verification regime • Worldwide network of 321 monitoring stations built & run by the host countries in cooperation with the (Provisional) Technical Secretariat (some 100 stations already transmit data to the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna via satellite-based global communications infrastructure) • On-site inspections and confidence-building measures • Administrated by a (Provisional) Technical Secretariat 16

17. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES Zangger Committee • Trigger list & conditions of supply Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) • Harmonization & strengthening of export control guidelines Membership limited to suppliers Voluntary export controls Exchange of information • Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) • Guidelines to control missile systems & technologies • Wassenaar Arrangement • Dual-use, all WMD 17

18. BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS • US-Russian strategic reduction treaties and agreements • SALT • INF • START I • START II • Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty • SORT • DPRK-ROK Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula • US-DPRK Agreed Framework • India-Pakistan Non-attack agreement • Lahore Declaration 18

19. START I & II • START II • limits strategic weapons for each party, with reductions to be implemented in two phases: • Phase I reduce total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250 • Phase II total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads may not exceed 3,000-3,500 • Both US and Russia have ratified • US declared withdrawal from ABM Treaty on 13 June followed by the Russian Federation announcement that it would withdrawal from the START II START I • limits the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the US and Russia to 1,600 each, warheads to 6,000 each, warheads mounted on ballistic missiles to 4,900 each, warheads mounted on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 each, and the total ballistic missile throw-weight for each party to 3,600 metric tons (t) • Bans the testing and development of certain types of ballistic missiles 19

20. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY • The US & Russia undertook to limit ABM systems, and not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of their countries or an individual region except as provided by the Treaty: • Deployed ABM systems were limited to two sites: one around the national capital with no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, and the other around ICBM silo launchers with no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, with the requirement that the two sites must be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers • President Bush announced the US withdrawal on 13 June 2002 thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty. The US is committed to developing, testing and deploying defenses against limited missile attacks. Construction of silos in Alaska to house missile defense interceptors will commence by 2004 20

21. SORT • A Joint Declaration was signed at the U.S.-Russian summit held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26, 2002 outlining the foundation of a new strategic relationship and claims that the era in which both countries “saw each other as an enemy or strategic threats has ended.” • The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty provides for reduction of strategic arsenals in both countries to 1,700-2,200 warheads from the current levels of 5,949 for the United States and 5,858 for Russia • Will remain in force until December 31, 2012 but is not binding • Both sides are free to define the composition and structure of their offensive forces within the imposed ceilings. 21

22. US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK (1994) • DPRK to halt operations and infrastructure development of its nuclear program in return for a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits from the United States • DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons grade reactors; allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze of its reactors; allow the implementation of its safeguards agreement under the NPT; allow the IAEA to resume ad hoc and routine inspections of facilities; come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA; remain a party to the NPT; take consistent steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and engage in North-South dialogue • In return for its obligations above, the DPRK will receive two light water reactors financed and supplied by an international consortium, by 2003; 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by October 1995 for heating and electricity production foregone due to the freeze of its graphite-moderated reactors, and 500,000 tons annually thereafter until the completion of the first LWR; and formal assurances from the United States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 22

23. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES • A NWFZ prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control, assistance in research on the development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession, of any nuclear explosive device within the zone of application by any contracting party. Peaceful applications and uses of nuclear energy, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, are allowed • The first NWFZ to affect a major inhabited region applies to Latin America, and was open for signature in 1967, prior to the signing of the NPT. The impetus for it was the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 23

24. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE TREATIES More than 110 states covered • Antarctic • Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco) • South Pacific (Rarotonga) • South Asia (Bangkok) • Africa (Pelindaba) • Mongolia • Central Asia (?) • Middle East (?) • South East Asia (?) 24

25. UN SECURITY COUNCIL Promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, including through disarmament and the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. 15 members: five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK USA; and 10 non-permanent members Nonproliferation accomplishments: • mandatory sanctions against Iraq • Counter-Terrorism Committee exchanges information on the possession of WMD by terrorist groups • responded to 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan -- denied NWS status • recognizing negative security assurances by the NWS in April 1995 • urged all States to pursue in good faith effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control • declared the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security • Organs established by the UNSC: • Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC): • a reinforced, ongoing monitoring and verification system to ensure Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions • Undertake the responsibilities of the former (UNSCOM) • Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): • Established for the purposes of eliminating Iraq’s capabilities vis-à-vis WMD and ballistic missiles 25

26. UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY • General Assembly First Committee • Conference on Disarmament • UN Disarmament Commission • Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters • UN Institute for Disarmament Research • UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 26

27. PART II THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) 27

28. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) • Opened for signature on June 12, 1968, signed by 62 states including 3 depositary governments (US, USSR, UK) • UN General Assembly approved NPT text on March 11, 1968 • Entered into force: 1970 • Extended indefinitely: 1995 28

29. THE NPT: A DEAL BETWEEN THE “HAVES” AND THE “HAVE-NOTS” • Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States): • may retain their nuclear arsenals; • may not transfer nuclear weapons to any one; • may not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or control nuclear weapons; and • commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith towards ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. • Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) – (defined as those states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967) • must not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons; • may research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and • must accept safeguards (audits and intrusive on-site monitoring) on all of their nuclear activities and materials to verify they are not being used for nuclear weapons. 29

30. NPT: A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT DEAL • NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them (Art I) • NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or acquire them (Art II) • NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards (Art III) • All parties to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Art IV) • All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Art VI) 30

31. NPT COMPLIANCE & VERIFICATION : IAEA ROLE NNWS Full scope safeguards : legal agreements required under Art III • Verification of declared records on nuclear material & facilities through inspections, surveillance and physical inspections Additional protocols (93+2): As a result of failures in Iraq & DPRK, voluntary measures + expansion of legal agreement with IAEA • Goal: to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities in addition to detecting diversion from peaceful to military use • Strengthen the Effectiveness & improving the efficiency of safeguards • Comprehensive picture of a State’s nuclear related activities, including imports and exports • Requires an expanded declaration • IAEA has authority to inspect any facility – declared or not 31

32. THE NPT : A SECURITY ASSURANCE Positive Security Assurances • Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would require immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255, 1968) Negative Security Assurances • NWS will not threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties • All NWS have made several formal pledges not to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties • UNSC formalized NWS commitments in resolution 984 of 1995 • NWS required to undertake legal obligations not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties • The US and other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobby for the indefinite extension of the treaty. • 1995 Review & Extension Conference incorporated negative security assurances in the P&O which was vital to securing the indefinite extension of the treaty 32

33. NWS & IAEA SAFEGUARDS NWS • Concern that NNWS are at a commercial disadvantage because of safeguards • NWS have also concluded agreements with the IAEA to put their non-military nuclear facilities under safeguards • Trilateral Agreement: US, Russian Federation & IAEA 33

34. THE NPT : AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS • Idea the result of fear by the superpowers (US & Soviet Union) that other industrialized nations would develop nuclear weapons – following 1st French test in 1960 • 1961 ”Irish resolution” in the UN GA • 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis • Negotiated in the late ’60s in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (forerunner of the CD) • Adopted by the UN GA on 12 June 1968 – 62 States signed • Entered into force on 5 March 1970 upon ratification of 3 depository states (US, UK, Soviet Union) & 40 other states – France & China only joined in 1992 34

35. NPT REVIEW CONFERENCES • Review conference 5 years after entry into force and additional review conferences at 5 year intervals (Art VIII) • Conference after 25 years to determine the duration of the Treaty (Art X) • Only the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conference adopted Final Documents due to lack of consensus on key nonproliferation & disarmament 35

36. NPT INDEFINATE EXTENSION 1995 Review & Extension Conference extended the treaty indefinitely as part of a package deal: • Strengthened review process • Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, including a Program of Action for implementing Art VI • Resolution on the Middle East No Final Document was adopted – differences between NNWS & NWS over the implementation of Art VI (nuclear disarmament) 36

37. 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE • Adopted a final Document following agreement on “13 practical steps” towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals • Result of negotiations between “New Agenda” countries (Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa & Sweden) and the NWS • NWS made an “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmament 37

38. 13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS i. early entry into force of the CTBT ii. moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions pending CTBT iii. treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons within five years iv. CD nuclear disarmament body v. irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and reduction vi. unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals vii. entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III while preserving and strengthening the ABM viii. completion and implementation of the US/Russia/IAEA Trilateral Initiative 38

39. 13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS ix. Steps by all NWS: • efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally • increased transparency regarding nuclear capabilities • reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons • measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons • diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies • engagement of all NWS in the process of elimination of nuclear weapons x. all NWS to place fissile material under international verification (IAEA) xi. Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control (notice de-link with step 6) xii. Regular reports on the implementation of Art VI and Program of Action in P&O xiii. development of verification capabilities to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements 39

40. NPT 2002 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR 2005 REVCON Chairman’s Factual Summary Important new issues: • Tactical nuclear weapons • Disarmament education • Material security/terrorism Disagreements: • reporting • Article 6 implementation 40

41. NPT : A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARE? • Not universal – 3 states with nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan & Israel) remain outside • Non-compliance – Iraq & DPRK (Art II), US & other NWS (Art VI) • Lack of progress towards elimination of nuclear arsenals – abrogation of the 13 “practical steps” & P&O program of action • No progress in CD on FMT, PAROS, nuclear disarmament • Nuclear terrorism – international mechanisms (export controls, IAEA Safeguards & treaties) vs. unilateral action • Defense doctrines by the US (other NWS?) threaten security assurances given to NNWS – new kinds of nuclear weapons (“bunker busters”) & pre-emptive strike policy • Safeguards & peaceful uses of nuclear energy – slow implementation of Additional Protocol • Relevancy of multilateral approach (NPT, IAEA, UNSC) in a unipolar world 41

42. WILL THE REGIME SURVIVE? • How relevant and viable is the NPT in the current international security climate? • Is real progress possible towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons? • What are the possible consequences of North Korea’s withdrawal? • What will be the impact on other members of the “axis of evil” given US policy of pre-emptive strike? • Will nuclear capable NNWS continue to believe that their security lies within the NPT, or will they too acquire NWS? 42

43. CONCLUSION • Security cannot be achieved through the continued reliance on nuclear weapons, but only through international cooperation in developing and maintaining effective, binding, and verifiable multilateral agreements such as embodied in the NPT and the CTBT • Vertical and horizontal proliferation should be given equal priority • Fulfillment of NWS commitments is integral to maintaining the NPT itself - if NNWS are to be convinced of the continuing value of not pursuing nuclear weapons and staying within the NPT, they will need to be convinced that the NNWS are taking active steps towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals and decreasing rather than increasing the changes of these weapons being used • If the NWS fail to adequately address these concerns, the nuclear nonproliferation regime may be unraveling by the time the 2005 NPT Review Conference convenes - litmus test for undertakings given in 1995 and 2000 43