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Case Study, A Suspicious Package

Case Study, A Suspicious Package . Marshall Gray, CIH Director of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management US EPA, Office of Research and Development, RTP, NC. A (compressed) Friday…. ORD / NHEERL Headquarters and Reproductive Toxicology Division Animal Colony Contractors

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Case Study, A Suspicious Package

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  1. Case Study, A Suspicious Package Marshall Gray, CIH Director of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management US EPA, Office of Research and Development, RTP, NC

  2. A (compressed) Friday… • ORD / NHEERL Headquarters and Reproductive Toxicology Division • Animal Colony • Contractors • @ 100 personnel on normal day • “New” lab building

  3. A typical Friday, and You’re off when … • 11:30 Package opened in the office space • 11:40 Researcher contacted SHEM office, complaining of irritation to mouth, throat

  4. What Could it Be? What do you do with the sample? Do you evacuate? Who do we call?

  5. How well they follow directions … • Researcher (PhD Toxicologist) instructed to deliver package to a BSC in an adjacent lab, restrict entry, and visit clinic; • 11:50, SHEM personnel investigate; -- researcher brought package to a lab, but did not place in fume hood -- The package was without a warning label or sign.

  6. Some facts… • Researcher opened poster tube from UK • Within tube are 3 vials marked with biohazard labels • Researcher opens at least one vial • White powder released, causes skin irritation • Approximately 40 Building Occupants have orders in hand to professional conference on West Coast

  7. In Real Life … • Concerned for Anthrax or other biological agent • Ordered evacuation via PA system and had employees gather for briefing • Called CDC, State of NC • Discussed situation with employees – tried not to ID person who opened package • Temporarily held employees from travel • Risk assessment, risk assessment …

  8. Some More Challenges … • Lab animals in surgery • Lab colony to be fed • Personnel orders / credit cards, etc. in Building • Lab operations to be shut down

  9. Just the facts Friday… • Supposed to start with first responder • SBI calls FBI • FBI takes over as crime scene • EPA HQ calls, EPA CID Calls • Find your PAO!!

  10. This is For Real …

  11. Event Footage

  12. Crime Scene

  13. Caddie Shack…

  14. Decon

  15. Other facts / Challenges • Lab and office spaces were under positive pressure, relative to adjacent spaces • Lab Investigator left campus after clinic visit (to prepare for west coast travel) • Lab Investigator was suspect – every body feels guilty!! • Keep a clean office! • FBI concerned because of UK connection • Samples to State Public Health Lab • Do we quarantine? • Symptoms being displayed

  16. Lessons Learned • Emergency response plan and coordination among facilities managers and response personnel needed improvement – nothing in plan about biosafety • PA didn’t work well, people remained in building • The LEPC was well-versed in threat planning and response; therefore, increased involvement and knowledge of LEPC needed • Total cost of response $2k

  17. Epilogue • “White powdery” substance was a chemical desiccant to absorb spilled material from the inner container • Biohazardous substances were human specimens in route to UNC from various NC county coroners office • FBI turned case to postal inspector once “criminal intent” was dismissed • If it were real and in an office building …. Not a good prognosis.

  18. After Action / Lessons Learned • Management of contaminated personnel • Re-entering building, need to “lock down” • PA system evaluation • Ventilation balance • Plan review • Memo to all hands • Review of security procedures / X-ray • Reviewed training records / use as a reminder

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