正理派知識論 Nyaya Epistemology

1. 正理派知識論Nyaya Epistemology 報告人: 王倩文

2. Purpose • Ratnakirti’s presentation of the Nyaya argument in his debate with the Naiyāyikas in the context of epistemology and justification. • Buddhist-Nyaya debate of the existence of Isvara, the kind of being / object whose existence can and cannot be established through inferential reasoning. • Philosophical language and style of Sanskrit epistemology • Buddhist and Nyaya theories of inferential reasoning.

3. Importance of Sanskrit epistemology • Concerned with sources of knowledge – how we know, what we know and w. what means to know. • Sources of knowledge- “instruments for warranted awareness” (pramāõa); • knowledge – “warranted awareness” (pramā). • Naiyāyikas and Buddhists disagree on the number of instruments for warranted awareness, and the proper interpretation of the terms “instrument”, “warrant”, and “awareness”. • Naiyāyikas’s bivalent epistemology

4. Sanskrit grammatical theory of Event-Makers • Naiyāyikas (and Buddhists) interpret the idea of instruments for warranted awareness in terms of the Sanskrit grammatical theory of “event-makers” (kāraka). • The grammatical theory provides a conceptual vocabulary for developing a general theory of “events” (kriyā) by describing six semantic relations (kāraka) between the nouns, event expressed by the main verb in the sentence. (*Especially important for Nyaya and Buddhist epistemology.) • Kartŗ (agent)* • Karman (patient)* • Karana (instrument)* • Sampradana (target, beneficiary) • Apadana (donor, source) • Adhikarana (place, location) • Warranted awareness as mental event denoted by the verb “to know” (pra + √mā)

5. Example • “Devadatta cuts the tree with an axe.” • The event is the action denoted by the verb “to cut”. • The cutting of the tree Consists of two subevents: • Vyāpāra-作用；功用An intermediary or “Functioning” event in the causal chain that begins with the agent’s effort (krti) and culminates in the final effect. • The event – the initial contact (saüyoga) of axe & tree. • The action- describes as 1. the effort (prayatna) motivated by a specific desire (icchā) of the agent, 2. that which instigates (pra + √yuj) the event. • The agent – the first member performing an action in the causal chain that culminates in the final event. Ie. Devadatta. • The instrument- cause per excellence (sadhakatama) of the event. It is closely associated w. a functioning event. It can be described as a cause whose function is just the intermediary event that culminates in the final effect. Ie. axe. • Phala 結果- A final, or “culminating” event. Ie. the cutting of the tree. The final effect of the action expressed by the verb. Tree as Karman (patient) of the event, since tree is the locus of this final effect.

6. Structure of a knowing event (pramā)-“Devadatta knows ‘p’ by means of ‘I’” • The conceptual framework of the theory of event-makers is applied to the mental event denoted by the verb “to know”. E.g. Devadatta knows “p” by means of “I”. Knowing-events also consists of 2 sub-events: • Intermediary or functioning event “e” (prameya)所量- associated w. instrument “I” (pramāõa) and is an intermediary in the causal chain that begins w. the action of an agent and culminates in the final effect of warranted awareness. Specific description depends on the nature of specific instruments whose functioning produce the “e” that culminate in the final effect “f”. • 4 instruments whose functioning could culminate in the final effect of warranted awareness: Inferential reasoning (anumāna), perception (pratyakùa), verbal testimony (śabda), and comparison (upamāna). • agent of “e” (pramātŗ)- Devadatta • Culminating event “f”- the warranted awareness (pramiti)(量知, 量果) that “p” is the object of the state of awareness. “p” is the locus of “f”, hence the patient (a person or thing that undergoes some action) of the event “e” (prameya).

8. Bivalent epistemology • Knowledge and justification / reflective-knowledge are treated separately. • Nyaya theory of knowledge- externalism (外在主義)and reliabilism(可靠論) • Externalist- the absence or presence of that state depends on facts / features that are not “internally available” to the person in question. • Reliabilism- whether a belief is justified is a function of the reliabilty of the processes through which that belief was produced. • Nyaya theory of justification- “Internalist foundationalism” (內在基礎主義) • Epistemic justification dependent on elements internal to the believer’s conscious states of mind in a way that makes them accessible to his conscious reflection. • Internalist- the condition of which justification believer has access to ( and is aware of) through apperception/introspection. • Foundationalism- justification not dependent on that of other beliefs.

9. Externalism- Causal Theory of Knowledge • The final effect / event and the instrument are distinct, relating to one another as effect and cause. • There are two types of epistemological properties external to (parataþ) the collection of generic causal factors (that bring about the cutting event, e.g. the agent, axe, swinging of the axe, tree, etc.) that are necessary for an awareness-event as such: • “epistemically special property” (guõa)- often instrument specific condition necessary for a knowing-event, e.g. For cutting-event: axe’s making proper contact w. the tree, have sharp enough blade. • “epistemically negative property” (doùa)- often an instrument specific property that lead to a nonknowing-event, e.g. agent’s “lack of skill in wielding an axe,” the axe’s “having a dull blade,” its “being swung w. insufficient velocity,” etc. • Both guõa and doùa are instrument specific, this opposes w. the instinsicist’s theory of knowledge - Knowing-events are awareness-events that do not have an epistemically negative property that interferes w. its causes and conditions among their generic causal factors.

10. Awareness vs. Knowledge • According to most Sanskrit philosophers, it is awareness-events (j¤āna) rather than beliefs that are the primary objects of epistemic analysis. • Knowledge is simply warranted awareness (pramā), that is, presenting-awareness in accordance w. its object (yathārthānubhava).

11. Awareness-event知 • Awareness-events / episodic states of awareness (j¤āna) are the primary objects of epistemic analysis (as oppose to belief-episodes). The Naiyāyikas posit two classes of awareness-events: • Presenting-awareness (anubhava 領受, 領納, 隨觸 p.25, ABKS I) • Memory (or re-presenting awareness) (sürti, 念, 憶持, 憶, 思, p.412 ABKS I) • For Naiyāyikas, the phrase “awareness-event” (j¤āna 知) refers to a broader range of mental events that includes: • Warranted awareness (pramā 量). See KTBh 127. • Memory (smrti)- Awareness-events in which the intentional object is one about which we were already aware, or as awareness-events produced from mental impressions alone (saüskāramātrajanya). • Dreams (svapnajnana)- classified as memory-awareness that is not in accordance w. its object (syathartha-smrti) (4-6) Presenting-awareness not in accordance w. its object (ayathārtha-anubhava) • Awareness produced through “suppositional reasoning” (tarka 思擇). • Mislocation (or misobservation) (viparyaya 顛倒) • Doubt (samsaya, 懷疑 , 猶豫不決)

12. Awareness-Event- Presenting-awarenessNyaya view of knowledge • Every awareness-event is intentional (arthapravaõa) that either accords with its object (yathārtha) or not (ayathārtha). • Object of an awareness-event is distinct from the awareness-event itself. • The phrase “accordance with its object” in context of presenting-awareness-events- describes an awareness-event (j¤āna) that is 1. not produced through suppositional reasoning (tarka) and is neither doubt (saüśaya) nor error (viparyaya). • Knowledge is warranted awareness (pramā), that is, presenting-awareness in accordance w. its object. object Awareness-event Yathārtha (in accordance to object) Ayathārtha (not in accordance to object)

13. Knowledge vs. awareness • A presenting-awareness-event- 1. in accordance w. object , 2. an awareness-event produced by functioning instrument. It is defined negatively as any awareness-event that is not a memory-episode. • A well functioning instrument- non-defective (free from any defects (aduùta)), accredited instrument (from 1 of the 4). • A knowing event- any awareness-event that is in accordance w. its object (yathārthānu-bhava) (the truth component) and is produced by a well-functioning instrument. • Knowledge- warranted awareness, that is, presenting-awareness-event that is in accordance w. its object, or equivalently, any awareness-event that is produced by a well functioning instrument. • Any awareness-event that is produced by a well-functioning instrument will be in accordance w. its object and will be a knowing-event. • A knowing event is any awareness-event that is in accordance w. its object (the truth component) and produced by a well-functioning instrument (the reliability component or reliabilism). • For Naiyayikas, since there cannot be a state of awareness-event that is produced by a well-functioning instrument and not in accordance w. its object, any awareness-event that is produced by a well-functioning instrument entails that awareness be in accordance w. its object.

14. Noticed vs. Unnoticed awareness-events • Awareness-events may be noticed or unnoticed. • Noticed awareness-event: awareness-events that do not escape our notice. • Unnoticed awareness-event: mental events that we are aware of only in the sense that we have them. They are mental happenings that may escape our notice. Even though they are never noticed, they play a causal role in the production of other awareness-episodes. There are two types: • w. non-conceptual content (nirvikalpaka, A0) • w. conceptual content (savikalpaka, Ac) • Both unnoticed and noticed belief-episodes (accords w. or w/o objects) can be candidates for being knowledge-episodes.

15. Conceptual vs. Non-conceptual of unnoticed awareness-event

16. Verbal expression of unnoticed awareness-events w. conceptual content (savikalpaka, A0) • A triad made up of a subject locus, a property, and a relation that connects the property to the subject locus. • The verbal expression of A0: “That (the subject component) is (the relation component) F (the property component),” e.g. “That is a pot.” -> non-occurrent belief-episodes. • Although noticeable, they often pass unnoticed. They are not self-luminous or self-intimating. Hence another awareness-event are necessary; the ones that are noticed, are in virtue of becoming the object (content) of illuminating-awareness (Ai)- a 2nd order apperceptive awareness-event (anuvyavasāya). • The verbal expression of Ai : “I am aware that that “the subject component) is (the relation component) F (the property component),” e.g. “I notice that that is a pot.” -> occurrent belief-episodes.

17. Reflective Knowledge • While warranted awareness has to do w. knowledge, iterative awareness has to do w. reflective-knowledge, both unnoticed and noticed. • Verbalized content of unnoticed reflective knowing-events is expressible as “My awareness ‘That is F’ (subject component) is (the relation component) warranted (the property component),” e.g., “My awareness ‘That is a pot’ is warranted. • Verbalized content of noticed reflective knowing-events is expressible as “I am aware that ‘That is F’ is warranted,” e.g., “I notice that ‘That is a pot’ is warranted.”

18. Justification • Only when legitimate doubt is raised by oneself or another about whether an awareness-event is warranted, justification is needed to remove it. Removing this doubt entitles one to claim that the 1st order awareness is a knowing event and that the instrument that produced it is well-functioning. Justification is necessary for us to know that a particular awareness-event is warranted. • For the Naiyāyikas, “justification” is not a necessary condition for a 1st order awareness event (A0) to be warranted. Rather, justification is closely tied to reflective-knowledge, the 2nd order awareness-event (Ar) that provides us w. an epistemic perspective on the 1st order awareness-event by specifying and satisfying criteria to determine whether an instrument of awareness is well-functioning by defining an instrument’s “certification conditions”. A certified instrument is one that has been shown by an agent to be well-functioning. An agent that has certified an instrument is “justified”. • It is the presence of special properties among the causes and conditions that lead to an awareness-event that make it a knowledge-event, and the presence of negative properties that lead to it not being a knowing-event. These properties are evidential role in that through an awareness of their presence that one is able to determine whether an instrument is well-functioning and whether the awareness-event produced by it is warranted.

19. Justification • Nyaya’s certification of the instrument used to produce the awareness that Isvara exists. • How does Nyaya describe the instrument of an inferentially produced knowing-event (anu + √mā) ? What are the certified condiitons for this instrument? Epistemological positive property Knowing-event Awareness-event Epistemological negative property • Certification process that detects presence of epst. + or – properties • Determines whether instrument was well-functioning • - Determines whether awareness-event produced by it is warranted.

20. Inferential Reasoning • Naiyāyikas identify the instrument of an inferentially produced knowing-event (anu + √mā, 比量) w. “special consideration of the reason property” (liṅgaparāmarśa, 取相) • “reason property” (liṅga相) • “special consideration” (parāmarśa 取, 能取), also called the “third awareness” (tṛtīyaj¤āna 第三智/知) - a source of knowledge that account for inferential reasoning of epistemically special properties. The event is usually analyzed in terms of three distinct awareness-episodes of the reason property; only the third awareness of the reason property is taken to be the instrument of an inferentially produced knowing-event.

21. Inferential Reasoning Example: Inference of fire on a mountain from the presence of smoke. • Event- an inferential produced knowing-event whose culminating effect is the inferential awareness (anumiti) that there is fire on the mountain. • Reason property (hetu, 相)- smoke or the awareness of smoke. • Instrument of the event- the special consideration, or third awareness , of the reason property. (i) First awareness 第一知: The awareness of smoke in the kitchen is the first of the three awareness-episodes of smoke. E.g. Devadatta repeatedly see that wherever there is smoke there is fire; smoke is pervaded by fire. (ii) Second awareness 第二知: Sometime later, Devadatta wonders whether there is fire when seeing smoke on a nearby mountain. (iii) Third awareness第三知: Devadatta develops the awareness that smoke on the mountain is pervaded by fire. The awareness of smoke (which is the 3rd awareness of it) immediately results in the awareness that there is fire on the mountain.

22. Single vs. Two Component Interpretation of Instrument - Modified Naiyayikas’ argument: “special consideration of the reason property” can be reinterpreted in accordance to the two component view such that an Instrument of inferential awareness is a cause (the reason property) whose functioning (special consideration) directly produces culminating effect (warranted inferential awareness).

23. Inferential awareness for oneself vs. others • Svārthānumāna- Inferential awareness for oneself • Since inference is internal to the agent, it is said to have the nature of awareness (j¤ānāt-maka) • Parārthānumāna- Inferential awareness for others • Since instrument is being used to convince someone else of what has already been inferred by oneself, inference needs to be made explicit to others. Therefore it is linguistic in nature (śabdātmaka). • The inference is described as a compound sentence (mahāvākya) consisting of five parts (pa¤cāvayava), which is the form of which Naiyayikas andRatnakirti adopt topresent their inferential arguments.