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The Third Person Effect. Perceptual component (Third person perceptions; TPPs)The comparison other
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1. The Third Person Effect and Social Identity:Young Voters' Perceptions of Media Influencein the 2004 U.S. Presidential Campaign Cynthia Hoffnerand Raiza RehkoffDepartment of CommunicationGeorgia State UniversityUSA
2. The Third Person Effect Perceptual component (Third person perceptions; TPPs)
The comparison other – the “third person”
Social distance/Group membership
Assumptions/beliefs about the “other”
Type of media/Type of perceived effect
Negative vs. positive content
Social desirability of presumed effects
Behavioral component
Censorship
Other behavioral consequences rarely examined
e.g., earthquake preparations, mobility, voting intentions
3. Social Identity Theory/Self-Categorization Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999) Self-concept is linked to group memberships
People accentuate:
Similarity to in-group members
Differences with out-group members
This is enhanced when:
Social identity is salient
Social identification with the group is strong
Several researchers have used SIT/SCT to examine the Third Person Perception in political elections
Notably Duck, Hogg, and Terry (e.g., 1995, 1999)
This study builds on their work
4. The Context of the Current Study:The 2004 U.S. Presidential Election George W. Bush – Republican
versus
John Kerry -- Democrat
This paper focuses on the role of
political identity in the perceived
influence of several forms
of political media on oneself and
other groups, and the behavioral
consequences
5. Specifically, we examined: The role of social identity in TPPs
Party affiliation
perceived effects on in-group vs. out-group (as well as on “average voters”)
Strength of political identity (high vs. low)
The role of type of media
Forms of media that differ in presumed accuracy/bias:
Debates, news, “spin,” polls, comedians, candidates’ ads
The role of TPPs in behavioral outcomes
Censorship
Voting efficacy & voting intentions
6. In general, politically affiliated people should perceive larger TPPs for the out-group than the in-group
Enhanced for media more biased toward the “other” side
Reduced or reversed for media congruent with own group
These patterns should be stronger for those who identify more strongly with their political party
7. Additional Predictions for TPPs
For comparison others without a specified political affiliation (“average voters”):
May be seen as more likely to be influenced by political media than partisan voters
Hence largest TPPs for this group
In general, larger TPPs for media with less desirable effects
“Spin,” polls, comedians, campaign ads (as compared to debates & news)
8. Predictions for Behavioral Outcomes Censorship support and TPPs
Based on prior research and SIT/SCT, censorship support should be positively predicted by TPPs for the “average voter” and the out-group
Voting intentions/efficacy and TPPs
Only a few prior studies, evidence inconsistent
TPPs could:
Induce a sense of powerlessness and reduce voting intentions
Motivate people to vote in order to protect society/enact change
9. Method The original sample: N = 316; Limited to young adults (18-29), registered to vote, and self-identified as Republican or Democrat
Final sample: N = 187
Mean age: 20 years
53% Female
59% White, 27% African American
54% Democrats
Self-administered questionnaires
Within one week prior to the election (Oct 27 to Nov 1)
They also completed a post-test within one week after the election (data not yet analyzed)
10. Measures ** All ratings made on scales of 0 to 4
Third Person Perceptions
Rated perceived effects of 7 forms of media on voting decisions of:
Self, average voters, republicans, democrats
Ratings for rep & dem recoded as in-group & out-group based on respondents’ political party
TPP: Effect on other minus effect on self
The seven types of media
* Presidential debates * Comedians
* Campaign news * Bush ads
* The “spin” * Kerry ads
* Political polls
11. Measures
Political party affiliation: Republican or Democrat
Strength of political identity
10 items measured identification with political party (alpha = .91)
Perceived election knowledge: Two items (alpha = .82)
News exposure
TV news, print news
Censorship support
Support for government regulation of 5 types of political media
(alpha = .95)
Voting variables:
Perceived efficacy of voting (4 items ; alpha = .83)
Likelihood of voting
12. ResultsMean Third Person Perceptions for 7 Sources In general, larger TPPs for media typically seen as having
more bias/less desirable effects (comedians is the exception):
Media Three TPPs
Source Combined
Debates .31 a
News .61 ab
“Spin” .99 c
Polls 1.02 c
Comedians .51 ab
Bush ads .76 bc
Kerry ads .77 bc
13. ResultsThird Person Perceptions and Group Identity
Major Conclusions:
TPPs larger for “average voters” than for partisans, but only for Democrats
Exception: Bush ads
TPPs larger for out-group than in-group, but mainly for Republicans
For Democrats, there were larger TPPs for in-group for debates and comedians
For candidate’s ads:
Larger TPPs for in-group for own candidate’s ads
Larger TPPs for out-group for the other candidate’s ads
No effects for political identification (high, low)
14. ResultsMean TPPs for 7 Sources & 3 Comparison Groups Average In-group Out-group
Voters Voters Voters
Presidential Debates
Republicans .54 b .25 b .40 b
Democrats .37 b .41 b -.10 a
Campaign
News Coverage
Republicans .92 c .35 a .71 bc
Democrats .86 c .47 ab .38 ab
The “Spin”
Republicans 1.35 c .30 a 1.27 bc
Democrats 1.29 c .82 b .93 b
Political Polls
Republicans 1.23 c .72 a 1.14 bc
Democrats 1.26 c .89 ab .87 ab
Comedians
Republicans .92 c .27 ab .92 c
Democrats .66 bc .58 b -.15 a
Bush Ads
Republicans .47 b 1.02 c -.35 a
Democrats 1.24 c .52 b 1.44 c
Kerry Ads
Republicans 1.20 bc .13 a 1.58 c
Democrats .85 b .88 b -.03 a
15. ResultsPredicting Behavioral Outcomes Results for TPPs:
Higher censorship support = greater TPP for out-group, but not “average voters”
Voting efficacy not related to TPPs
Lower voting likelihood = greater TPP for “average voters” (p < .08)
Other findings:
Higher political identity = greater efficacy, more likely to vote
Republicans: higher voting efficacy
Democrats: more likely to vote
16. ResultsRegression Analyses Predicting Behavioral Outcomes Censorship Voting Voting
Support Efficacy Likelihood
1. Gender Pos (Female) --- Pos (Female)
Ethnicity Neg (White) --- ---
2. Political party --- Pos (Rep) Neg (Dem)
Political identity --- Pos Pos
3. TV news --- --- ---
Print news Neg --- [Pos]
4. Perceived
election
knowledge Neg --- Pos
5. Third person
perceptions:
Average --- --- [Neg]
In-group --- --- ---
Out-group Pos --- ---
17. Summary and Interpretations Findings confirm importance of social identity in the perceived influence of the media
Results generally consistent with SIT/SCT and prior research
Different patterns for the various forms of media (and for the two parties) extends prior research
TPPs appeared to be affected by perceptions of others’ political beliefs, as well as evaluations of various media types
Findings also show that social identity plays a role in the association between TPPs and censorship support
Little evidence that TPPs played a role in election outcomes
In future analyses we will consider:
Perceptions of media bias
Own political ideology vs. perceived ideology of other groups
Data obtained in a post-test within a week after the election