“Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom” :

1. “Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom”: Unintended Consequences of Rhetorical Liberalization in Russia Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) NUPI conference, Oslo, 28 August 2013

2. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Russia’s “modernization” under Medvedev’s presidency – a failed project? • Political liberalization (at least until December 2011) – rather minor changes of the status quo regime under the cover of loud liberal rhetoric (“freedom better than non-freedom” etc.); • However, this rhetorical liberalization (i.e., words without deeds) contributed to the wave of mass protests in 2011-2012; • Why it happens and what kind of lessons might be learned from this experience?

3. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... «Authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear, or economic prosperity» (Przeworski, 1991: 58); All these three components matters for survival of various authoritarian regimes, including those in Russia under Putin; … but rhetorical liberalization (especially under uncertain economic conditions) actually shaken the equilibrium: it produced misperceptions and mixed incentives for both elites and citizens; Lies alone doesn’t work without fear and economic prosperity – needs for regime’s «correction of errors» after Putin’s return

4. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Medvedev’s agenda of rhetorical liberalization: • Promises of improving law and order; • Advancement of science and technology, higher education, etc.; • Engagement of civil society (Kremlin’s dances with NGOs, Public Chamber, online and social media, expert councils, think-tanks, etc.); • Promises of gradual promotion of political reforms over time

5. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • … But the reality was rather different: • Major promises were either emasculated (police reform) or had very limited and controversial impact (Skolkovo) or were merely cosmetic (reduction of legal membership threshold for political parties from 50000 to 45000 members); • Constitutional changes (extension of presidential and parliamentary term limits to 6 and 5 years, respectively) - the most important reform implemented under Medvedev (a major gift for Putin?)

6. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Three major policy achievements, implemented by Medvedev as a president, are the following: • (1) reduction of the number of time zones in the country from eleven to nine; • (2) abolishment of daylight saving time in Russia; • (3) renaming militia into police; • … and that’s it ???

7. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Still, Medvedev’s agenda had some unintended consequences: • (1) inefficiency of Putin-Medvedev «tandem» (major problems with decision-making, unexpected and poorly prepared rotation of officials (especially of governors and city mayors), effects of 2008-09 economic crisis – rising demands for changes among elites and society-at-large); • (2) «virtual thaw»(rhetorical liberalization in spite of Potemkin village led tothe rise of disjuncture between the façade and political realities), low repressiveness of the regime, preservation of the status quo as the major goal

8. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Back to Przeworski’s argument – side effects of Medvedev’s agenda: • Economic prosperity has gone after 2008-2009 crisis; • Fears of dis-equilibration («return to the 1990s») were overcame, while fears of repressions did not emerge under «virtual thaw»; • Lies as the major (if not the only) tool of regime’s dominance cannot work effectively (the reasons of failure of «Surkov’s propaganda»)

9. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • The gradual rise of the opposition (coming out of «ghetto»)? • The emergence and politicization of the «new» social movements and public arenas as a potential recruitment pool for the opposition; • Generation change among opposition leaders and activists – more active in seeking some forms of «negative consensus» against status-quo; • Inefficiency of regime’s “counter-revolutionary” approach vis-à-vis the opposition (the use of kompromat instead of polonium)

10. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Medvedev-Putin «return substitution» of September 2011: • a poorly prepared demolishing of the Potemkin village: neither sticks, nor carrots? • personal discrediting of Medvedev: illusions lost • «trigger event» for anti-system mobilization («vote for anyone but United Russia»); • December 2011 elections – regime’s relative failure and the rise of mass protests

11. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Subsequent institutional changes – an «asymmetric response» of regime vis-à-vis mass protests or, rather, just authoritarian maneuvering? • Liberalization of legislation of political parties – lifting of membership rules, still many barriers; • Regional chief executives elections – the use of municipal «filter»; • Parliamentary election system reform(from proportional to mixed system) – reaction to decline of UR

12. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... Lessons from Russia’s experience of rhetorical liberalization under Medvedev: (1) major challenges to electoral authoritarian regimes are related with information problems, which led to underestimation of risks of rhetorical liberalization; (2) «voters are not fools»(V.O.Key Jr.) - «one can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but cannot fool all of the people all of the time» (Lincoln); (3) «tightening screws» (making alternatives to the status-quo unattractive/unavailable)is the major strategy of authoritarian regime survival: no more liberalization from above without major pressure from below

13. "Freedom is Better than Non-Freedom"... • Thanks for your attention! • Feedback is welcome (gelman@eu.spb.ru)