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exam 2 review

exam 2 review. resource economics. nonrenewable vs. renewable maximize pv of net benefit renewable includes growth functions characterize efficient allocations compare to market allocations discuss policy to make market allocations more efficient. start with the price equation.

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exam 2 review

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  1. exam 2 review

  2. resource economics • nonrenewable vs. renewable • maximize pv of net benefit • renewable includes growth functions • characterize efficient allocations • compare to market allocations • discuss policy to make market allocations more efficient

  3. start with the price equation • efficiency pricing: Pt = MECt +MUCt • where • MEC: Marginal Extraction Cost • MUC: Marginal User Cost

  4. MUC and Q over time • efficient MUC rises, reflecting increasing scarcity • in response, Q extracted falls over time until reaching zero, when total MC = highest WTP (“choke price”) or reach backstop MC • efficiency requires smooth transition to exhaustion of resource

  5. constant MEC with no substitute

  6. energy: efficient vs. market outcomes energy: efficient vs. market outcomes vulnerability premium

  7. water efficient allocations:surface vs. groundwater • surface water • how to allocate a renewable supply among competing uses • intergenerational effects less important (future supplies depend on natural phenomenon, e.g. rain, rather than current allocation) • groundwater • withdrawing now affects future supply

  8. efficient allocation: surface water • balance btw users • marginal net benefit equal across users • handle variability • above-average and below-average flows must be accommodated

  9. efficient allocation: groundwater • if withdrawal > recharge, eventual exhaust resource • MEC rises over time as water table falls • pumping would stop: • no water left • MC pumping > benefit of water or MC of backstop resource (desalination) • price rises over time until choke price or switch point

  10. utilities pricing: inverted block & seasonal rates(potentially efficient)

  11. forests: biological harvest rule • MAI = cumulative volume end of decade / cumulative yrs of growth • harvest when MAI maximized

  12. biological harvesting decision

  13. economic harvesting rule • harvest at age that maximizes PV of net benefits • planting costs • borne immediately • no discounting • harvesting costs • time of harvest • discounted

  14. sample problem Age Volume (cubic ft) 11 700 21 1,000 31 3,000 when to harvest 41 6,000 using biological rule? 51 8,000 using economic rule? Price: $2 Planting cost: $1,000 Harvest cost: $0.50 Discount rate: 3%

  15. optimal harvest age • discounting shortens optimal harvest time • less tolerant of slow timber growth • comparing no harvest (increase in value of timber) to harvest (sell and invest) • high discount rates also destroy incentive to replant

  16. fisheries: biological vs. economic harvest • biology: “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) • yields maximum growth • largest catch that can be perpetually sustained • economics: maximize net benefit

  17. too much effort! policy responses • increase MC– require fishing farther from shore, use smaller nets, boats, or motors • but artificially increasing cost inefficient • total allowable catch – restrictions on effort or size of catch • monitoring, enforcement difficult, also creates race to catch • individual transferable quotas –quotas allocated, then trade • no race, allows most efficient fishers to buy rights from inefficient fishers

  18. sample problem • Costs fisher $20 to fish salmon • Salmon sells for $10 • Harvest rate given X fishers is S = 30X-2X2 • How many people will go fishing, how many salmon will be caught, and what are total profits under • Open access • Limited entry (how many fishers should be allowed to maximize profit?)

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