Work Package 1

1. WorkPackage 1 • Social, legal, anthropological and political approaches to theory of corruption • Partners: QoG, Hertie, EUI, UNIBG • Onedeliverable – month 24. • A state-of-the- art report on theories and harmonizedconceptsofcorruption

2. The objectivesof WP 1 • To analyse the landscape of different conceptualizations of corruption and related concepts such as clientelism, patronage, particularism, statecapture and patrimonialism. • To analyze the conceptualization of what is generally understood as the opposite to corruption such as good governance, universalism, impartiality, impersonal rule, rule of law and quality of government. • To relate existing definitions of corruption and the opposite to corruption to various approaches in modern political philosophy about social justice, human rights and political equality. • To describe the implications of various definitional/theoretical approaches considering their fruitfulness for empirical research and public policy. • To provide the project with a harmonized taxonomy of the various definitional strategies of the above mentioned concepts that will be related to their implications for research and policy.

3. Descriptionofwork • Engage a majority of project participants either as providing theoretical/conceptual input or in the critical dissemination of preliminary working papers. • Participants will provide overviews of “state of the art” of the various theoretical/conceptual approaches. • Participants will present their work at two workshops (months 6 and 20). • Participants in this WP will present their work at various international conferences and engage in discussions withpolicy-makers. • Participants will clarify theoretical contributions by categorizing them by their different levels of analysis, e.g. individual level vs. the collective, group level. • Participants will present a coherent theoretical framework for the empirical part of the project.

4. State ofTheory in Anti-Corruption The problem: Despitemorethanfifhteenyearsofincreased attention toissuesconcerningcorruption and related forms of bad governance… The results ”on the ground” as theyarebeingmeasured by various research groups and IO:s … ….. is in realitynil

5. Why no results • Toolittleefforts • Strong resistancetochange • Politicalobstacles • Conceptualconfusion • Theoreticalmissspecificationof the verynatureof the problem

6. The firstfailedhope:Marketizationwill do it! • "The encounter between neo-classical economics and developing societies served to reveal the institutional underpinnings of market economies. A clearly delineated system of property rights, a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior and moral hazard, a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation, social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts, the rule of law and clean government--these are social arrangements that economists usually take for granted, but which are conspicuous by their absence in poor countries.” • Dani Rodrik (1999).

7. The second failed hope: Democratization will do it! • There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance…. Governance that is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power. …Where power confers virtually unchecked opportunities for personal, factional, and party enrichment, it is difficult if not impossible to sustain democratic rules of the game. The democratic spirit of elections drowns in vote-buying, rigging, violence, or all three • Diamond, Larry. 2007. "A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy." Journal of Democracy 18:118-120.

8. ….. It is natural to view these problems as pathologies that can be cured with more medicine—that is, with democracy assistance. But the performance of many new democracies reveals a more troubling truth. Endemic corruption is not some flaw that can be corrected with a technical fix or a political push. It is the way that the system works, and it is deeply embedded in the norms and expectations of political and social life. Reducing it to less destructive levels—and keeping it there—requires revolutionary change in institutions (Diamond 2007)

19. Conclusions • In those ten major academichandbooks for research, with in summorethan 6000 pages, there is hardlyanythingaboutcorruption (not onesinglechapter or sectionof a chapter), an nothingabout anti-corruption. • As researchers, wearefacing an almostempty landscape • Which is verygoodnews for ANTICORRP!

20. Conceptualissues • Canwefind a common conceptualground for what is C and AC betweenour different discplines and approaches? • Is it possibletofind a universal definition ofcorruptionor do wehaveto live with relativism? • Whataretopros and cons for universalist/ relativist definitionalstrategy

21. Theoreticalissues The Principal-Agent Theory • Canwebuild on a theorythatpresumes a modelof agents thathavebeenthoroughlyrefuted by empirical (experimental) research • Howgood is a theorythat is built on a typeofagencythat is not, accordingto the theory, supposedtoexist (the not ”rent-seeking” principal)

22. Theoreticalissues II The public ethicstheory • Is it empiricallycorrecttosaythatpeople in severerlycorruptsetting lack an understandingthatcorruption is morallywrong • Do people in lowcorruptsettingsreallyhave a better normative orientation? • Is moral education a workingtoolagainstcorruption?

23. An Alternative: Reciprocity • Reciprocity as the basic human orientation is gettingincreased support in experimental research • Reciprocity is connectedtoother central conceptssuch as generalized trust, social capital, contingentconsent and efficient institutions • Reciprocity avoids the pitfallsof the two dominant theories • Reciprocity can serve as an integratingtheory for howcorruption is understood in ourvariousdiscplines and approaches

24. Reciprocity and corruption • “if people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption and abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions” (Fehr and Fischbacher2005).

25. Anticorruption as a Social Trap • Everyoneknowsthatif all respect the impartialityof institutions, all willwin • But – if people cannot trust that “almost everyone else” will respect the impartial institutions they will be destroyed because the end is contingent on honest cooperation by “almost everyone else” • Thus, dishonest behavior may be rational when people do not trust that others will also be honest. • Conclusion: Efficient cooperation for establishing impartial institutions will only come about if people trust that most other people will respect them • Lacking this trust, the social trap is for real. That is, we end up in a state of affairs that is worse for everyone, even though everyone know that they would profit from impartial institutions

26. Political theory: John Rawls on reciprocity • “For although men know that they share a common sense of justice and that each wants to adhere to existing arrangements, they may nevertheless lack full confidence in one another. They may suspect that some are not doing their part, and so they may be tempted not to do theirs. The general awareness of these temptations may eventually cause the scheme to break down. The suspicion that others are not honoring their duties and obligations is increased by the fact that, in absence of the authoritative interpretation and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find excuses for breaking them” (Rawls, 1971, p. 240)