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Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents

Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents. Feyzin, France, 1966. Flixhborough, UK, 1974. SEVESO, Italie, 1976. Mexico City, Mexique 1984. Bhopal, Inde 1984. Enseignements. Evaluation. Glossaire. Evaluation.

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Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents

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  1. Apprehend Industrial Risks from past accidents : 5 World-Known Major Accidents Feyzin, France, 1966 Flixhborough, UK, 1974 SEVESO, Italie, 1976 Mexico City, Mexique 1984 Bhopal, Inde 1984 Enseignements Evaluation Glossaire Evaluation IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  2. Understand the FEYZIN Accident (France) Home Page • Context : • Refinery with in particular: - 4 propane spheres of 1.200 m3 - 4 butane spheres of 2.000 m3 - two horizontal tanks (butane and propane) • Storage of LPG are located at 450 m of the refinery and 300 m from the first houses (dwellings) • Date of the accident : January 4, 1966 Course of the accident Lessons learnt from FEYZIN IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  3. 4. The stopper moves under the pressure 3. A stopper of ice prevents the liquid from leaving 5. The stopper exits and the LPG is rejected into the atmosphere 6. Valve A freezes in open position(effect of the expansion of gas),preventing its closing and the mitigation of the leakage 2. The operator opens the B valve and tries to control the flow 1. The Operator opens the A valve Next IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  4. 6. Dispersion of a propane cloud (h=1m) 7 A vehicle ignites the mixture of propane/air at 160 m from the leakage point 8. Fire goes up to the sphere Home Page Understand the BLEVEPenomena Lessons learnt from FEYZIN • The sphere at the origin of the leak is engulfed in flames • Whereas the firemen try to cool the nearby tanks, the sphere explodes (BLEVE) • A few moments later, a second sphere explodes causing the rupture of pipes connected to a third sphere in a draining process. • Three other tanks open without explosion IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  5. Ball of fire Pint R Projectiles GPL Understand the BLEVE Phenomena Home Page • Boiling Liquid Vapour Explosion • A BLEVE corresponds to the complete ruin of a pressurized tank containing a liquid stored at a higher temperature than its boiling point at the atmospheric pressure IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  6. Lessons learnt from FEYZIN • 18 persons died and 84 were wounded primarily at the time of the first BLEVE • On the whole, 11 tanks were destroyed • Projectiles were found within more than 800 m away from the initial location of the vessels Home Page THERE IS NO EASY OPERATIONS IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  7. Understand the FLIXBOROUGH Accident (UK) • Company NYPRO specialized in the synthesis of caprolactam, a component of Nylon • In the process, the caprolactam is synthesized from cyclohexane circulating in reactors at a temperature of 155°C • NYPRO only owns this site. Size relatively limited with a particularly hazardous process • NYPRO faces economic difficulties and has a sharp productivity approach Home Page Course of the accident Lessons s learnts from FLIXBOROUGH IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  8. 1 2 3 4 6 5 2. Decision to by-pass n°5 and link reactors 4 & 6 by a bended pipe 1. A leak starts on reactor 5 (27/03/1974) On 1/06/1974, the link gives away, under great mecanical stresss and is detached from the bellows, releasing large quantities ofcyclohexane Home Page Lessons learnt from FLIXBOROUGH IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  9. Lessons learnt from Flixborough Home Page No calculation concerning the resistance of the pipe was carried out No diagram of the by-pass was carried out No test of the system was carried out An explosion followed suit, causing broad damage and killing 28 people including 18 in the control room IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  10. Understand the SEVESO Accident • Context : • Company Icmesa Chemical Company specialized in particular in the production of 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (TCP) used in the manufacture of weedkillers and disinfectants • The TCP is synthesized in a reactor in 2 stages: - Hydrolysis of tetrachlorobenzene (TCB) with sodium hydroxide in presence of glycol ethylene (solvents) at a temperature of 180°C. - Acidification of the TCB by hydrochloric acid • At the end of the first stage, 50 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled and the temperature in the reactor is lowered with 50-60°C by addition of water Home Page Constraints related to the TCDD Course of the accident Lessons learnt from SEVESO IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  11. Constraints related to the use of TCDD • In the process, it is impossible to avoid the formation of TCDD (tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin) • TCDD: one of the most toxic substances • Exposure by ingestion, inhalation, or cutaneous contact • Effects: chloracnea, burns, damage to the kidneys, liver, nervous system... • Substance very stable, insoluble in water and resistant to high temperatures • In a normal operating system, the formation of TCDD is negligible (if T <180 °C) and the great majority is collected and incinerated on site • If T goes up, the production of TCDD can strongly increase Home Page Course of the accident SEVESO Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  12. Course of the SEVESO Accident • On July the 9th, 1976: the operation of synthesis begins • Following Stage 1, only 15 % of the glycol ethylene is distilled (instead of 50 %) • No addition of water to cool the temperature in the reactor • Operations are stopped for the weekend and the reactor is left without action to reduce the temperature of the mixture • An exothermic reaction takes place in the reactor and heats the mixture more and more • A few hours later, a rupture disc bursts, releasing a gas cloud containing a few kg of TCDD Home Page Constraints related to the TCDD SEVESO Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  13. Lessons learnt from SEVESO • Ten km² contaminated and several hundreds of people had to be evacuated • No immediate deaths associated to the TCDD but - Death of animals in the following days - Diseases catching several people - miscarriages • Extremely lasting and expensive decontamination plan Home Page IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  14. Understand the MEXICO CITY Accident (Mexico) • Terminal PEMEX is used for the storage and distribution of LPG • The LPG is conveyed by pipelines from three refineries • The storage capacity is 16.000 m3 with six spheres and 48 horizontal rolls • There are many dwellings near the production site Home Page Course of the accident Mexico City Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  15. Course of the MEXICO CITY Accident • On the 19/11/1984, the installation is in the course of filling, a 200 mm pipe breaks down releasing the flammable gas • The cloud : surface on the ground of approximately 200 X 150 m² and height 2 m • It ignites on a flare. This ignition causes the destruction of several houses • At 5:45, a first BLEVE occurs followed, one minute later, by the BLEVE of two spheres giving place to a 300 m diameter fireball • BLEVEs occurred in series (nearly 15 explosions in 1hour 1/2) Home Page Understand the BLEVEPhenomena Mexico City Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  16. Lessons learnt from MEXICO CITY • In a radius of 300 m, all the people were killed or wounded • More than 500 died, 7.000 wounded, 39.000 evacuated people and 6.000 people implied in the first-aid organizations. Only 4 tanks over the 48 present remained intact • Fragments were found at distances from of over several hundred meters. The most remote fragments was projected to 1.200 m of its place of emission Home Page Many people were killed or injured due to the presence of crowded places in the vicinity of the plant IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  17. Understand the BHOPAL Accident (India) • The company Union Carbide India Ltd is specialized in the manufacture of pesticides • Located in a dense urban environment • Following the strong competition of another company, the closing of the factory is considered by the American head office • The activity is held thanks to drastic economies • Qualification of the operators is lowered, the framing is reduced, work of maintenance reduced to bare essential. For its production, Union Carbide handles very dangerous products of which methyl isocyanate • Methyl isocyanate = gas very toxic by inhalation: • Effects : pulmonary oedemas. This gas can also set in the system to form cyanide • Following the refitting, several accidents occurred causing nearly 50 people poisoned among the workmen over one period one year Home Page Course of accident BHOPAL Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  18. 5. Opening of the valve ; discharge of gas to the atmosphere 4. Decision to send the gas to the flare Impossibility to light the flare Soda 3. Decision to start the soda treatment . The pump is faulty 2. The pressure increases in the tank a leak is detected around the tank 1. Water penetrates in a tank. An exothermic Reaction starts with the CMI Course of the BHOPAL Accident Home Page BHOPAL Assessment IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  19. Lessons learnt from BHOPAL • The leak happened in the early morning of the 3/12/1984 • At 2 km of the site, in 4 minutes, 150 died, 200 paralysed people, 600 people lose conscience, 5.000 people seriously affected. • In the end, nearly 2.000 died and 10.000 people were poisoned. Home Page The safety level of a plant strongly relies on a efficient safety organization IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  20. Drawing lessons from Major Accidents • Proximity of industrial activities and centres of population can be a real issue if it is not controlled • First victims = often the operators of the plant at the origin of the accident • Much can be learnt from industrial accidents and even the incidents. Need for managing the experience feedback to progress • The major industrial accidents often led to revisions of the regulation. Case of the SEVESO directive Home Page IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  21. Evaluation Home Page IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

  22. Glossaries Home Page INERIS Lexic : Insitut National de l’environnement Industriel et de Risques http://www.ineris.fr/outils/lexique.htm IGN-ENSG-L.Dalençon

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