Secularisation and Religious Revival

1. Secularisation and Religious Revival Islam, Europe and the USA

2. SecularizationSteve BruceUniversity of Aberdeens.bruce@abdn.ac.uk

3. Secularization Decline in: 1. Social power of religious institutions; 2. popular (individual) involvement in religious institutions and activities; 3. plausibility of religious beliefs for individuals

4. Power of Religious Institutions; Impotence of churches re blasphemy, social mores (gambling, sexuality eg), political agendas, sabbatarianism; Absence of clerical representation in Scots Parliament and Welsh Assembly; House of Lords reform.

5. Popular Involvement in Religious Institutions and Activities

6. Christian Church Membership, GB 1900-1990 (%)

7. ENGLISH CHURCH ATTENDANCE

8. English Church Attendance 1979-98

9. Religious identity by age

10. Church of England Baptisms as % of live births

11. Plausibility of Religious Beliefs Some observers (Grace Davie eg and many church leaders) try to remain optimistic by arguing that we remain ‘really’ religious despite lack of involvement in religious activities and institutions. Test with British Social Attitudes data

13. Alternative Spiritualities Is there evidence that an alternative ‘New Age’ world is servicing enduring demand for some form of spirituality?

14. Evidence from Kendal Survey:Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead Found 95 practitioners of holistic spiritual activities: 63 different groups and 63 on a one-to-one basis. Total of 600 people were involved in typical week: 1.6 per cent of pop. of Kendal and environs. Most popular are physical therapy: massage, yoga, aromatherapy Practitioners think they are offering spirituality but 45% of customers and group members see it as mundane. Hence, about 0.9 per cent of the population is involved with holistic spiritual practices.

16. Bruce's Secularisation Theory • Differentiation leads to diversity of faiths • Society 'needs' to be tolerant to ensure social peace, so no one faith has a monopoly and there is space for secularism • 2 Kinds of secularisation: • Most activities (including politics and economics) are not controlled by the church; AND THIS CAUSES: • Most individuals cease to believe, and to attend church • Bruce's opponents (Stark et al.) argue the reverse, that diversity leads to competition and religious vitality (i.e. USA vs Europe)

17. The USA: A Countercase?

19. But Religion Losing Impact on Society

20. Secularisation? • Religion has lost impact on society • Nonbelieving population is rising • Religious are very compartmentalised and individualistic • Religious interest-group politics justifies its case in utilitarian language (i.e. impact on health of society) • BUT – there is a growth in conservative churches at the expense of liberal ones. A 'hollowing out' of the centre from left and right • ALSO – the religious right has become an electoral force in the political arena. So can we really say that religion has lost social force or that its concerns are with secular solutions • FINALLY – what about political Islam?

21. The Rise of Islamism • Popularity of traditional Islam on the rise in many Muslim societies since 1970s • After 1989, many resistance movements in Islamic countries look beyond socialism as a strategy and embrace Islam • 9/11 places issue strongly on the western agenda

22. The Rise of Political Islam • Mainly manifested in local politics and movements (Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, Chechnya, Moros in Phillipines) • Some transfer of ideas and organisation internationally. Especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose organisational skills led to branches in Palestine (as Hamas) and elsewhere • International emulation, even if not coordination • More recently, Islamism under Bin Laden also becomes an international movement based on international cells in many countries (including Europe) and warfare on many fronts

23. Root Causes Go Back Much Further • Root causes have less to do with international political developments • Need to look at domestic forces within Islamic societies in the 20th century • The role of socioeconomic change • The role of cultural evolution • Political dynamics and the relationship of Islamism to nationalism

24. Nationalism and Islam in Conflict • During the colonial period, religion reinforced nationalism since both had a common enemy. But Islamists had reservations • After independence, the secular nation-states (clients of one of superpowers) try to implement modernising reforms, c. 1950s, 1960s, 1970s • The post-colonial nation-states are now seen as the enemy. Nationalism as a western import. Loyalty to the nation as idolatry – worship of human works and this-worldly territory • Like the Protestants, Islamists challenge the established political order, hence repression

25. Nationalism and Islam in Conflict • Muslim Brotherhood helped launch Nasser in Egypt, but then he suppressed it and killed many • In Iran, the Shah continues a policy of repressing the influence of the clergy and opening up new spheres of life free of Islamic law (I.e. role of women) • Islamism becomes a vehicle for popular dissatisfaction – mainly in Arab-Muslim countries and Iran, but also Pakistan and Afghanistan • Rejection of nationalism (I.e. Egypt – Pharaonic/Hellenistic past; Iran – Sassanid/Zoroastrian past) • The question is why the rise of Islamism?

26. Why the Rise?: Structural • Some, like Halliday and Gilles Kepel see the rise of Islamism as linked with rapid social change in particular countries: • Urbanisation • Disruption of traditional social roles (i.e. bazaari merchants, clerical students) • Anomie as rural villagers stream into the city and thus seek to recreate familiar social order • Analogy with Germany in the late 19th/early 20th c • Also - growing inequality due to industrialisation and role of oil in several countries • High birthrate and poor economy leads to young unemployed Muslim populations in several countries

27. Why the Rise: Cultural • Others (Zubaida, Goldberg) refer more to the idea that fundamentalist Islam reflects a form of cultural modernisation • This new stripped-down Islam is a modern, abstract force lending itself to populism and democracy • Anti-western orientation is popular with youth • Little evidence from looking at Islamist leadership and its socioeconomic background that Islamist movements are linked with economic grievances

28. Why the Rise: Cultural • Islamist programmes more often mention rejection of materialism than the reverse • Idea is for spiritual regeneration, not to ‘make melons cheaper’ • Leading cadres of Islamists tend to be western or secular-educated, often in science. They have ample opportunity and are not simply letting off material frustrations or rebelling against blocked career advancement

29. Why the Rise: Political • Cold War conflict led to build up of Islamists in Afghanistan or Iraq to defeat Communism • Many internationalist Islamist fighters like bin Laden cut their teeth as jihadis in Afghanistan • End of the Cold War weakens the Marxist alternative to American/Western liberal hegemony in Muslim states. So Islamism takes over from socialism as the main anti-establishment ideology • Assassination of Rabin, renewal of intifada, US support for Israel • First and Second Gulf Wars; Muslim-Arab humiliation

30. How Secularists Respond to Islamism • Bruce claims his theory assumes conditions like equality, liberalism which obtain in the West. The paradigm is less effective elsewhere • He argues that revivals occur during periods of rapid change and urbanisation, but long-term trend is toward religious decline • Religion can maintain its position if it acts in the role of nationalist against an oppressor in an ethnic conflict. Perhaps Islam benefits from its anti-West stance and the shari'a is more of a symbol of nationalism than something people want for spiritual reasons

31. Relationship to Nationalism Theory: Modernism • Instrumentalism of Gellner: spoke of blocked elite mobility during modern state-building as a cause • Modernism of Greenfeld/Brown/Snyder: speak of downward mobility, loss of social role for traditional religious elite, also anomie of the uprooted villagers, ressentiment as negative characteristics are given a positive twist • Nationalism allows for new role for downwardly-mobile elites and the recreation of village social orientations for urban villagers • Based on earlier models from Marxism and also mass-society theory (used to explain rise of fascism)

32. Relationship to Nationalism Theory: Ethnosymbolism • Ethnosymbolism of Smith: • religious and cultural traditions are reinterpreted by romantic intellectuals in order to recover the spiritual. • A romantic search for meaning amidst the alienated, profanity of modernity. Not about material or instrumental motives • Not a rejection of modernity, but a use of the ‘Golden Age’ of the past to advance a programme of cultural regeneration • Also a political aim: to free the people from foreign domination • Programme needs to ‘resonate’ with existing traditions

33. Is Islamism Nationalist or anti-Nationalist? • Zubaida claims that Islamism has many nationalist features • Anti-foreign; Ressentiment against western values; ‘transvaluation’ of Muslim backwardness • Shari'a more symbol than substance • Most Islamist movements operate with a national frame rather than internationally • Even the international ones focus on backing Muslims in mainly nationalist conflicts • Even Islamist regimes like Iran or Afghanistan quickly ressurrected the nation in order to mobilise for war (ie Iran-Iraq war)

34. Conclusion • Bruce claims that secularisation is occurring on both social and individual levels in the West • Others claim that the USA provides a countercase to secularisation, backed by the rise of Islam • Islam has experienced a resurgence on both the individual and social levels since the 1970s • Like the Reformation, Islamism has a populist thrust which upsets the existing political order • There are structural, cultural and political explanations for the resurgence of political Islam • Some argue that Islamism is more like nationalism than a spiritual movement. Hence it does not contradict the secularisation thesis