Solvent Fire at Argonne National Laboratory - West

1. 11/15/2011 Solvent Fire at Argonne National Laboratory - West ORPS Report: CH-AA-ANLW-ANLW-2003-0004 Presented by: Jim Geringer Dary Newbry

3. Event Description (cont.) The 5-gallon container, funnel, the worker’s gloves and brush ignited. Worker dropped brush and shook off gloves. Worker left area, contacted nearby co-worker and actuated nearest fire alarm. No sprinkler activation occurred due to low heat output and short duration of fire.

4. Immediate Actions Plant Service Building evacuated Fire extinguished (by itself) after 1-3 minutes. Personnel examined for injury (slight singeing of worker’s hair) Paint Storage Room secured. Bulk solvent usage in operations prohibited pending event evaluation.

5. Background Information The 55-gallon drum is a RCRA Satellite Accumulation Area located in a paint storage room. Room had wet sprinkler fire suppression system, explosion proof fixtures, and grounding system for 55-gallon storage drum. The worker was wearing the appropriate PPE. Room was built in 1993 to current NFPA standards. NFPA 77 Recommended Practice on Static Electricity, standard was revised in 2000 to include changes regarding the use of plastic containers with flammable and combustible liquids.

9. Cause Determination Technical evaluations determined the cause was ignition of solvent vapors probably caused by a static discharge between the plastic bucket and the grounded funnel. The cause was determined through the process of elimination and from input from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Technical evaluations by SMEs reviewed the following: Fire Protection Chemistry Disciplines Electrical Disciplines Search of literature detailing fire events caused by static electricity

10. Results of Evaluations There was no chemical reaction that would cause the ignition. No other operations were in progress that would cause the ignition. Electrical and ventilation systems for the room were functioning properly and met current NFPA standards.

11. Description of Cause Direct cause was inadequate or defective design. NFPA 77 (2000 edition) contains additional limitations on the use of plastic containers that were not in NFPA 77 (1993 edition). ANL-W believes these additional requirements could have prevented the ignition. Root cause was management problem

12. Contributing Causes Defective or inadequate procedures. Error in selection of equipment or material. Training deficiency: inadequate curriculum content, and personnel were not informed of the potential static hazards with the use of plastic containers.

13. Corrective Actions Provide Hazard Specific Training to personnel. Evaluate paint storage room and spray booth activities against NFPA Code 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code and NFPA Code 77, and implement appropriate changes. Revise the ES&H Manual section and Plant Services procedure to include information from the most current NFPA Codes. Revise fire safety inspections to focus on NFPA compliance. Develop Lessons Learned from this event.

14. Typical Grounding SystemNFPA 77

15. Changes To Paint Locker

16. Close-up of Changes

17. Lessons Learned A program should be in place to ensure that the most recent revisions to federal codes and standards are reviewed periodically and changes are incorporated into the appropriate procedure. Scheduled safety inspections should include checks for compliance with the most current codes and regulations. Hazards Assessment is a function that must be routinely applied, even to situations that appear to be normal activities. Changes to NFPA must be reviewed against the existing systems and methods of operation that are in place.