L21-02-04-14-205

1. L21-02-04-14-205 • Paragraph 2, On the Soul, 1 Knowledge of it is the most desirable, BUT. . . • “But in every respect and in every way it is the most difficult of things to attain any conviction about it. For, since the inquiry is common to many other things too—I mean that concerning essence and what a thing is—it might perhaps be thought that there is one procedure in the case of all those things for which we wish to ascertain the essence, just as there is, demonstration, for the incidental properties; so that we ought to look for this procedure. But if there is not one common procedure for dealing with what a thing is, the undertaking will be still more difficult; for we shall have to establish what is the way to proceed in each case. And if it is evident whether this consists in demonstration or division or some other procedure, there will still be many puzzles and uncertainties as to what starting-points we must use in our inquiry; for different subjects, e.g. numbers and planes, have different first principles.

2. First principles, and last • One of the consequences of the wholesale adoption of the O-R Mimetic model is the presumption that knowledge of the original is knowledge of the one “TRUE” form, and one then looks for perfect one-to-one fit in the representation. • This predisposes the whole system (and its historical follow on) to suppose that “meaning” is a property (perfect correspondence, or complete coherence) instead of an attainment of intelligibility. Thus the assumption about the END is that when one solves a problem, or defines a term, the work is over. • That is only true when you are dead. • The real problem is how to go on. • Thus what we are going to be looking for is not an incidental development or discover, but the diagnosis of an entire syndrome, assuming that the only measure of success is finding the stopping point. • Looking way ahead, to Charles Sanders Peirce: it is a fundamental problem with Aristotlian logic and a theory of intelligibility that is completely incompetent to deal with a dynamic universe. Here’s his summary view: • Your metaphysics (theory of reality) is a reflection of the actual logic you employ; • Your logic reflects an ethical theory that you may not even recognize; • And the foundation of ethical theories is in every caseaesthetic. • Metaphysics • Logic Aesthetics

3. The soul as power The fundamental problem all along is the treatment of the power of life as if it were suitable to be treated by the same terms that apply to things. The brilliance of Aristotle’s approach to it lies in the fact that he sees the relation of potential to actuality as itself dynamic: it involves changes, and they have to be traced exactly. The entire problem is that the steps, the ART of nature, already presumed to be embedded in it, can only be discussed by way of metaphors.

4. If motion is what starts the process • From potential (already in matter) to actuality (what appears as form—and is treatable as soul), first, how did that potential get there; and second, exactly how does it come about that nature can follow this techne, this art, if only something starts it in motion? • From our point of view,these are the core questions for how science is possible, and how do we confirm that our account of it is even plausible, let along necessary or “true”?

5. Nature and motion For Aristotle to make good his claim that it is desire or thought (both involving the pursuit of the good), he must have a way to describe coming to be as that for the sake of which—not that for the benefit of which. The distinction here is that telos in the sense of that for the sake of which does not get involved in paradox and infinite regression as the supposition that you know the benefit in advance. For “that for the sake of which” is a process, each step of which is discrete, which in nature does not itself involve deliberation, just as in productive arts (like carpentry) the art does not deliberate. It is just the rules by which the construction proceeds. So the remaining puzzle is, how does any art come to be?

6. Physics XII is where A is going But how can he get there? If he presumes that the cosmos is eternal, and its substance is uncreated, the individual things must come to be by particular steps. And if it all hinges on the good, he still has Plato’s problem. We can only speak of the good by precise examination of things that are made, and to do so, we must have some notion of how ART is possible.

7. POETICS Poetics: The hard distinction is that the opening (the diaeresis, by sequential identification of the differentia, is not a diaeresis of things, but of arts. Each of the differentia identifies a particular art, from which follows the production of a particular product. As in other discussions, Aristotle alternates between the discussion of the product and the process, but what is critical is that the whole of the diaeresis defines the art.

8. The origin of an art • What this diaeresis provides is a hierarchical division of arts, but it is also a form of induction, by which the example of the development of arts to the actualization of one as a mental substance (tragedy) allows specific thought about its causes. • Aristotle, unlike Plato, does not try to make his case through a “plausible analogy with painting”, knowing that it isn’t plausible at all. He looks to the developmental process, by which the art came to be. The art, furthermore, can be inferred from its characteristics or typical products. • In this case, the example discussed after the preliminary methodological matters, is Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus or Oedipus Rex.

9. Opening of Aristotle’s Poetics [1447α][8] περὶποιητικῆςαὐτῆςτεκαὶτῶνεἰδῶναὐτῆς, ἥντιναδύναμινἕκαστονἔχει, καὶπῶςδεῖσυνίστασθαιτοὺςμύθους[10]εἰμέλλεικαλῶςἕξεινἡποίησις, ἔτιδὲἐκπόσωνκαὶποίωνἐστὶμορίων, ὁμοίωςδὲκαὶπερὶτῶνἄλλωνὅσατῆςαὐτῆςἐστιμεθόδου, λέγωμενἀρξάμενοικατὰφύσινπρῶτονἀπὸτῶνπρώτων. Concerning the making art itself, and each of those forms which have power or potentiality, and how the matter is to be put together as a whole if the making is to be good or pleasing and further, how many and what sort of parts are possible, and in like manner, concerning whatever else belongs to this way of inquiry, let us begin according to nature first from first principles. What is Poetics about?

10. The homology In Metaphysics, Aristotle examines in detail the differences (and relations) between things made by nature and made by art, where the intuitively obvious difference is that in the latter, the source of change lies with the artist—but specifically, in his knowledge of his art. The discussions in both Metaphysics and Poetics therefore display a parallel strategy: on the one hand, is the analogy of things made by mind and things made by nature—which leaves on the table the possibility that the things made by nature are also made by a divine mind. On the other hand, A sees that things made by nature have in their matter, the potential to develop into a particular form—whereas things made by mind, the form can be thought of as already in the soul. The art, then, DEVELOPS by nature. The Moebius strip. . .

11. The origin of poetry • Two causes: Imitation (source both of pleasure and of learning), and rhythm and meter. • Note, however, that the pleasure in imitating is when you are doing something, not learning from a picture that ‘this is so-and-so.’ • As these two conjoint causes produce products, they appear as improvisations, which become actualized as specific arts.