Decision Timeline Approach for Air and Maritime Vulnerability Assessment

1. A Decision Timeline Approach to Assessing Air and Maritime Vulnerabilities Etienne Vincent Neil Carson NORAD Operational Research Team April 2012

2. Outline • Context • The Decision Timeline Approach to Modeling • Examples of Applications • Conclusion

3. DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis • A Centre of DRDC – the Science and Technology Agency of the Department of National Defence • Teams of Defence Scientists providing decision support and physically co-located with a wide spectrum of Department and Canadian Forces partners • Our team is at NORAD Headquarters, operating as advisors to the NORAD Deputy Commander (senior Canadian), conducting analyses in support of decision making throughout the Command

4. NORAD • North American Aerospace Defence Command • Bi-national Canada-United States • Headquartered at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs • Mission: • Aerospace Warning • Detection, validation and warning of attack by aircraft, missile, or space vehicles • Aerospace Control • Ensuring air sovereignty and defence • Maritime Warning (since 2006) • Shared understanding of activities conducted in maritime approaches, maritime areas and internal waterways

5. CAVEAT • So as not to reveal NORAD true analytical processes or vulnerabilities: • All the examples that follow are notional • They do not employ parameters representative of those used in actual NORAD or DRDC CORA studies • Nor are they directly illustrative of the analyses currently informing NORAD plans or operations

6. Example of a Surveillance Study Island to be Defended • Assumptions: • considered threat approaching coast at X knots • security force response requires up to Y hours along coast • This implies a requirement for surveillance extending XY nautical miles offshore to cue responders Surveillance Requirement

7. Example of a Surveillance Study • Current sensor coverage is overlaid on the requirement • There are surveillance gaps Sensor Coverage

8. Example of a Surveillance Study • Three additional sensors are required to fill the gap

9. Example of a Surveillance Study responder • But the requirement for surveillance extending XY miles offshore was really a worst case requirement for points where response takes longest • The true surveillance requirement varies along the coast, and is widest at that point furthest from the responding force’s alert site

10. Example of a Surveillance Study • When considering response and surveillance concurrently, it is found that a single additional sensor suffices

11. Necessity to Assess Mission Requirements Assessment of Current Capability (e.g. current sensor coverage) Assessment of Mission Requirements (e.g. coverage required given response posture) Gap Analysis Close the Gap

12. Example of a Surveillance Study zone that cannot accommodate a sensor • If constraints prevent fulfillment of the surveillance requirement with existing means, study conclusions will focus on the deployment of new technologies

13. Existing Capabilities before New Assessment of Current Capability (e.g. current sensor coverage) Assessment of Mission Requirements (e.g. coverage required given response posture) Gap Analysis Close Gap with Existing Capabilities (Redeployment, Revised Processes, etc.) Iterative Process Close Gap with New Capabilities (Acquisition, Research)

14. Example of a Basing Study • Assumptions: • response initiated within X hours, responder speed of Y knots • response requirement to each site of Z hours • This implies a requirement for basing within (Z – X)×Y nautical miles of the sites to be defended Site to be Defended Basing Requirements

15. Example of a Basing Study responder • The responding force’s current alert site only meets the response requirement to one of the sites to be defended • There is a response gap. Meeting the requirement requires either moving the site or additional sites

16. Example of a Basing Study worst-case warning • But the requirement for response within Z hours was arbitrary • If response is triggered by the sensors, the extent of sensor coverage drives response requirements worst-case warning worst-case warning

17. Example of a Basing Study • When considering response and surveillance concurrently, the existing base suffices Basing Requirements for Sensor-triggered Response

18. Necessity to Assess Mission Requirements Assessment of Current Capability (e.g. current response time) Assessment of Mission Requirements (e.g. response requirement given sensor triggers) Gap Analysis Close Gap with Existing Capabilities (Redeployment, Revised Processes, etc.)

19. Example of a Basing Study • If constraints prevent fulfillment of the response requirement using existing infrastructure, the study advocates new infrastructure or faster response platforms Potential Bases

20. Existing Capabilities before New Assessment of Current Capability (e.g. current sensor coverage) Assessment of Mission Requirements (e.g. coverage required given response posture) Gap Analysis Close Gap with Existing Capabilities (Redeployment, Revised Processes, etc.) Iterative Process Close Gap with New Capabilities (Acquisition, Research)

21. Example of a Study of Defences • A study considering enhancements to surveillance and response concurrently • Assess vulnerability through the modeling of defences against selected threats Threat axes

22. Example of a Study of Defences • The threat is detected at point A, and seeks to reach point B before the responding force. • If the responding forces can reach point B before the threat, the island is defended from that threat approach A B

23. Example of a Study of Defences defended • Applying the assessment to each modeled threat approach reveals current vulnerabilities • The island is 5/9 = 56% defended? vulnerable vulnerable defended

24. Example of a Study of Defences • 5/9 is only the proportion of investigated approaches that are defended; the other 4 are always vulnerable • The choice of approach is in the threat’s hands Threat’s perspective vulnerable

25. Example of a Study of Defences • Potential changes to the force posture (bases and sensors), or to operational procedures can now be assessed against the modeled threats • The best option is picked as that resulting in the highest proportion of coastline defended Potential Base Potential Sensor Site

26. Example of a Study of Defences • Study limitations • may miss a potential threat • may miss a potential solution (e.g. reducing C2 delays) • understanding defensive failures requires further investigation • results are a collection of anecdotes ?

27. Decision Timeline Approach • The problem is approached in reverse order • Step 1: For a point to be defended, calculate necessary response time response time

28. Decision Timeline Approach • Step 2: Along all potential threat axes of approach, project back the threat locations at the latest time when the response must be initiated • These points define a decision line around the points to be defended decision line threat location at latest response initiation threat axis

29. Decision Timeline Approach • Step 3: Surveillance and command and control delays can be added to the response time to result in the line at which the initial detection must occur to guarantee timely response decision line surveillance line

30. Decision Timeline Approach • When this is repeated for all points to be defended, and the individual decision/surveillance lines are merged, decision/surveillance lines for the entire area to be defended result decision line surveillance line

31. Decision Timeline Approach • Surveillance coverage can now be overlaid on the decision timeline to visually identify defensive gaps and potential solutions gap gap gap

32. Decision Timelines Application Examples • Border Security / Airborne Illicit Trade • Maritime Threats • Northern Sovereignty Operations • Airborne Terrorism (Operation Noble Eagle) • Cruise Missiles

33. Airborne Illicit Trade • Trafficking takes place using light or ultralight aircraft over U.S. southern borders • Modeling of interdiction is a straightforward application of the decision timeline approach

34. Airborne Illicit Trade

35. Maritime Threats • Trafficking, terrorism, other illicit activity, state actors • Longer timelines than for air threats • Many potential sources of warning; information sharing is a key aspect

36. Maritime Threats NortheastAsia route SoutheastAsia route Protecting Portland, OR Buffer Zone Intercept Underway I&W region for Asian great circleroutes Notice to Sail Warning Response Forcefrom San Diego

37. Maritime Threats Response Forcefrom Victoria, BC NortheastAsia route Southeast Asia route Protecting Portland, OR Buffer Zone Intercept I&W region moves closerto Portland andreduces area Underway Notice to Sail Warning

38. Maritime Threats detection, tracking, analysis conferencing planning, coordination transit buffer intercept, neutralize Land avoidance using Floyd-Warshall Algorithm

39. Maritime Threats detection, tracking, analysis conferencing planning, coordination transit buffer intercept, neutralize deployed responder

40. Northern Sovereignty Operations • Continued Russian bomber penetrations of the Canadian/U.S. Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) • National Policies require monitoring of this activity, including intercepts, toward enforcement of sovereignty claims

41. Northern Sovereignty Operations CADIZ Decision Point, Cold Lake Responder Decision Point, Inuvik Responder Date Line Desired Intercept Point Bear-H ADIZ

42. Modeling Air-refueled Response

43. Modeling Air-refueled Response

44. Operation Noble Eagle • Airborne terrorism • Recent examples (9/11, Tampa 2002, Austin 2010)

45. Operation Noble Eagle more than 60 min 45-60 min Response Time 30-45min 20-30 min less than 20min

46. Operation Noble Eagle more than 60 min 45-60 min Response Time 30-45min 20-30 min less than 20min

47. Operation Noble Eagle

48. Operation Noble Eagle

49. Cruise Missiles • NORAD was established in 1958 to counter threat from long-range nuclear-armed Soviet strategic bombers

50. Cruise Missile Vulnerability Assessment