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Session III: Prospects for Conventional Arms Control. Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group 8 November 2011 . Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula . What is to be done? (V.I. Lenin, 1902; Oh Young- hwan , 7 November 2011; Pinkston, 8 November 2011) Northern Limit Line
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Session III: Prospects for Conventional Arms Control Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group 8 November 2011
Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula • What is to be done? (V.I. Lenin, 1902; Oh Young-hwan, 7 November 2011; Pinkston, 8 November 2011) • Northern Limit Line • Chemical weapons disarmament as a confidence-building measure
Northern Limit Line • Korean War Armistice did not address maritime demarcation, but prohibits blockades • NLL drawn unilaterally by UNC Commander in August 1953 • Military utility in protecting 5 NW islands • ROK legal claims that NLL delimits ROK territorial waters weak • Probably most serious flash point
Yellow [West] Sea Peace Zone • Proposed in October 2007 inter-Korean communiqué • ROK opposition planning to revive proposal • Public opinion shifting against ruling GNP • Opposition victories in 2012 ROK elections could bring shift in North Korea policy • Plan is to change the zero-sum nature of demarcation line position to positive-sum joint management of West Sea area • Environmental protection; sustainable development; joint resource extraction; eco-tourism; expansion of Kaesŏng Industrial Complex; Haeju port development • Resolution of NLL issue
Yellow [West] Sea Peace Zone • Practical steps • Cease fire in disputed waters (between NLL and KPA’s MDL extended); but don’t compromise security of 5 NW islands • Scientific surveys and data sharing • Environmental maritime peace park? • Inter-Korean coast guard? • Patrol maritime demilitarized zone (role for NNSC? U.S. and China?) • Port security and container security (Haeju and Inch’ŏn; expand) • Customs cooperation • Establish joint fishery management • Separate fishing zone? • ROK technology and DPRK manpower?
CW Disarmament as an Inter-Korean CBM • DPRK has not signed CWC, but claims no CW arsenal; asserts ROK and U.S. threaten DPRK with CBW • ROK signed CWC in 1993, but later signed confidentiality agreement with OPCW • Began to destroy stockpile in 1999; finished in July 2008, becoming second member state to complete CW disarmament obligation; achievement mostly unnoticed • ROK inter-agency disagreement on disclosure
Benefits of Disclosure • ROK sets example that security can be achieved without WMD • Discredits DPRK assertions that ROK maintains CW, which justifies DPRK stockpile • KPA officers can be reminded that the use of CW violates international law, and that ROK is poses no WMD threat to DPRK • CBM to stimulate more arms control?