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Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Slightly Lossy Trapdoor Functions

Ensuring Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Public-Key Encryption to protect parties from various attacks, including adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. This scheme utilizes trapdoor functions and correlated inputs for robust encryption.

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Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Slightly Lossy Trapdoor Functions

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  1. Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Slightly Lossy Trapdoor Functions Petros Mol, Scott Yilek PKC 2010 UC, San Diego May 27, 2010

  2. Security for Public-Key Encryption server client insecure channel pk pk, sk Ideally: Protect against all possible attacks Modeling all possible attacks is hard (if possible at all) For PKE: Security against Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks ([Rackoff, Simon 91])

  3. Chosen-Ciphertext Security (PKE) Π=(KeyGen, Enc, Dec) pk (pk,sk) Keygen(1n) ci c*=Enc(pk,b) mi=Dec(sk , ci) $ b {0,1}

  4. Chosen-Ciphertext Security (PKE) Π=(KeyGen, Enc, Dec) ci ≠ c* (pk,sk) Keygen(1n) mi=Dec(sk , ci) pk, c* $ b {0,1}

  5. Chosen-Ciphertext Security (PKE) Π=(KeyGen, Enc, Dec) (pk,sk) Keygen(1n) b’ pk, c* $ b {0,1} Security against CCA attacks For all efficient adversaries |Pr [b’=b]-1/2| =negl(n)

  6. CCA-Secure Encryption (overview) [DDN 91] Enhanced TDPs [RS09] Correlatedinputs [CS 02] UHPS [CHK 04] IBE [PW08] LTDFs Generic Constructions 1998 2006 I I I I I I I 2008 2009 1991 2002 2004 Concrete Instantiations [CS98] DDH [CKS08] CDH [HK09] Factoring [BCHK 06] BCDH

  7. CCA-Secure Encryption (overview) [DDN 91] Enhanced TDPs [RS09] Correlatedinputs [CS 02] UHPS [CHK 04] IBE [PW08] LTDFs Generic Constructions 1998 2006 I I I I I I I 2002 2008 2009 1991 2004 Concrete Instantiations [CS98] DDH [CKS08] CDH [HK09] Factoring [BCHK 06] BCDH

  8. Lossy Trapdoor Functions [PW08] F =(G, F, F-1) (n,l)-lossy TDF {0,1}n F(sinj , .) . . Injectivemode (sinj , t) G(inj) F-1(t, .) F(sinj , .) : 1-1 computational requirement {0,1}n (sloss , ) G(loss) F(sloss ,.) Lossy mode F(sloss ,.) |Img(F(sloss ,.))|=2n-l F(sloss ,.)

  9. CCA-PKE from LTDFs & Correlated Inputs(generic constructions) [Peikert, Waters 08] CCA-secure PKE (n, n(1-o(1))) LTDFs All But One TDFs [Rosen, Segev 09] Correlated input OWFs (n, n(1-o(1))) LTDFs CCA-secure PKE This work (n, 1/poly(n)) LTDFs Correlated input OWFs CCA-secure PKE

  10. Rest of talk • OW under Correlated Inputs and the Rosen-Segev Construction • CCA-security from Slightly LTDFs • A Slightly LTDF based on Modular Squaring • Conclusions

  11. One-Wayness Under Correlated Inputs family of efficiently computable functions F =(G, F) [Def] (w-wise product) f1, f2,…,fw Gw • Generation: (x1, x2, … , xw) (f1(x1), f2(x2),…, fw(xw)) • Evaluation: • One-Wayness: Fone-way under Cw-correlated inputs if for all PPT adversaries A Pr[A(f1,…, fw, f1(x1),…, fw(xw))= (x1,..., xw)] : negligible where (x1,..., xw) ~ Cw

  12. Rosen-Segev Simplified construction • Components • F =(G, F, F-1): injective TDFs, OW under Cw-correlated inputs • Π = (Kg, Sign, Ver)one-time signature scheme • hhardcore predicate for F under Cw-correlated inputs The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) t1,0 t1,1 tw,0 tw,1 . . . sk KeyGen G . . . f1,0 f1,1 fw,0 fw,1 pk x = (x1,… , xw) Cw (VK, SK) Kg ; VK=VK1. . .VKw {0,1}w ; yi =fi,Vki (xi) Enc

  13. Rosen-Segev Simplified construction • Components • F =(G, F, F-1): injective TDFs, OW under Cw-correlated inputs • Π = (Kg, Sign, Ver)one-time signature scheme • hhardcore predicate for F under Cw-correlated inputs The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) t1,0 t1,1 tw,0 tw,1 . . . sk KeyGen G . . . f1,0 f1,1 fw,0 fw,1 pk x = (x1,… , xw) Cw (VK, SK) Kg ; VK=VK1. . .VKw{0,1}w ; yi =fi,Vki (xi) Enc

  14. Rosen-Segev Simplified construction • Components • F =(G, F, F-1): injective TDFs, OW under Cw-correlated inputs • Π = (Kg, Sign, Ver)one-time signature scheme • hhardcore predicate for F under Cw-correlated inputs The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) t1,0 t1,1 tw,0 tw,1 . . . sk KeyGen G . . . f1,0 f1,1 fw,0 fw,1 pk x = (x1,… , xw) Cw (VK, SK) Kg ; VK=VK1. . .VKw{0,1}w ; yi =fi,Vki (xi) Enc c1 = b h(f1,Vk1, … , fw,Vkw , x) (VK, y1, … , yw, c1, c2 ) c2 =Sign(SK, y1, … , yw, c1 ) 14

  15. Rosen-Segev Simplified construction • For CCA proof : 2 requirements from Cw • Hardness assumption: F should be OW under Cw • almost perfect simulation of decryption:(x1,…, xw)reconstructable from any xi x1=x2=. . .=xw : w-repetition distribution Cw Instantiation ([RS09]) (n, n(1-1/w))-lossy TDFs OW under w-repetition

  16. Rosen-Segev Generalized construction Additional Component ECC: ΣkΣw with distance d The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) . . . . . . t1,0 t1,|Σ|-1 . . . tw,0 tw,|Σ|-1 sk KeyGen pk . . . . . . f1,0 f1,|Σ|-1 . . . fw,0 fw,|Σ|-1 (VK, SK) Kg , VKΣk; ECC(VK) = σ1. . .σw Σw x = (x1,… , xw) Cw yi =fi,σi (xi) Enc 16

  17. Rosen-Segev Generalized construction Additional Component ECC: ΣkΣw with distance d The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) . . . . . . t1,0 t1,|Σ|-1 . . . tw,0 tw,|Σ|-1 sk KeyGen pk . . . . . . f1,0 f1,|Σ|-1 . . . fw,0 fw,|Σ|-1 (VK, SK) Kg , VKΣk; ECC(VK) = σ1. . .σwΣw x = (x1,… , xw) Cw yi =fi,σi (xi) Enc 17

  18. Rosen-Segev Generalized construction Additional Component ECC: ΣkΣw with distance d The Construction: E= (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) . . . . . . t1,0 t1,|Σ|-1 . . . tw,0 tw,|Σ|-1 sk KeyGen pk . . . . . . f1,0 f1,|Σ|-1 . . . fw,0 fw,|Σ|-1 (VK, SK) Kg , VKΣk; ECC(VK) = σ1. . .σwΣw x = (x1,… , xw) Cw yi =fi,σi (xi) Enc (VK, y1, … , yw, c1, c2 ) c1 = b h(f1,σ1, … , fw,σw , x) c2 =Sign(SK, y1, … , yw, c1 ) 18

  19. Rosen-Segev Generalized construction • Required properties for Cw • Hardness assumption: F should be OW under Cw • almost perfect simulation of decryption:(x1,…, xw)reconstructable from any d distinct xi distance of the ECC Focus of this work How much lossiness is required from Floss= (G, F, F-1) in order for Fw to be OW under Cw?

  20. Talk Outline • OW under Correlated Inputs and the Rosen-Segev Construction • CCA-security from Slightly LTDFs • A Slightly LTDF based on Modular Squaring • Conclusions

  21. Sligthly LTDFs CCA • F = (n,l)-lossy TDF with domain {0,1}n • (x1,..., xw) ~ Cw with H∞(x1,..., xw) = μ > w.(n-l) + ω(log n) [Lemma] F =(G, F, F-1)family of (n,l)-lossy TDFs,then Fwis OW under any distributionCwprovided (f1(x1), f2(x2),…, fw(xw)) takes at most2w(n-l) values 2ω(logn)many preimages f1, f2,…,fw Gloss ≈ unique preimage f1, f2,…,fw Ginj (f1(x1), f2(x2),…, fw(xw)) H∞(Cw) = μ≥ w(n-l) + ω(log n)

  22. (d,w)-subset reconstructable distribution … … … xi1 xid xi2 Property: All w elements can be reconstructed by any d distinctxi’s . . . x1 x2 xw-1 xw Efficient Sampling:(d,w)-threshold secret sharing scheme Entropy: If xi {0,1}n , then H∞(x1,..., xw) ≈ d.n

  23. Achieving High Entropy ECC(VK1) VK1 ECC k … … w VK2 ECC(VK2) ECC … Desired property: IfVK1≠ VK2, thenECC(VK1), ECC(VK2) “far apart” … k Reed Solomon Codes: d=w-k+1 (meet Singleton bound)

  24. Putting the Pieces Together Illustration: CCA-Security from (n,1)-lossy TDFs • ECC:[w, k, d=w-k+1]Reed-Solomon • Input Distribution: (d, w)-subset reconstructable distribution • k=nε, w=nθ, where θ> 1+ ε. d=w-k+1 [Lemma] F =(G, F, F-1)family of (n,l)-lossy TDFs,then Fwis OW under any distributionCwprovided Entropy:d.n > (w-k).n = w.(n-kn/w) >w.(n-1) + ω(log n) H∞(Cw) = μ≥ w(n-l) + ω(log n) (n,1)-lossy TDFs imply CCA-security

  25. Summary: CCA from correlated inputs *Construction instantiated with Reed-Solomon codes and high min-entropy input distribution.

  26. From LTDFs to CCA-Security (generically) amount of lossiness (bits) [PW08, RS09] DDH n(1-o(1)) I cn LWE I RSA function Φ-hiding loge I mod squaring QR 1 I 1/poly(n) I hardness assumption

  27. From LTDFs to CCA-Security (generically) amount of lossiness (bits) DDH n(1-o(1)) I cn LWE I RSA function Φ-hiding loge I mod squaring QR 1 I 1/poly(n) I hardness assumption this work

  28. Talk Outline • OW under Correlated Inputs and the Rosen-Segev Construction • CCA-security from Slightly LTDFs • A Slightly LTDF based on Modular Squaring • Conclusions

  29. Slightly LTDF from 2vs3Primes Hardness Assumption: 2vs3Primes 3Primesn p ,q, r : primes N’ =pqr ; |N’|=n 2Primesn p , q: primes N= pq ; |N|=n c N ≈ N’ The construction F • Sample injective:N 2Primesn+1 ;sinj=N ; t=(p,q) • Sample lossy:N 3Primesn+1 ;sloss=N • Evaluate:F: {0,1}n ZN • F(N , x) =(x2 mod N, (x>N/2) , (JN(x)=1))

  30. Slightly LTDF from 2vs3Primes [Theorem]Under the 2vs3Primes assumption, F is a family of (n,¼)-lossy TDFs. • Indistinguishability Immediate from 2vs3Primes assumption ( y= x2 mod N, b1= (x>N/2) , b2= (JN(x)=1)) • Invertibility x z x , -x z , -z x y b1 b2 t=(p,q)

  31. Slightly LTDF from 2vs3Primes • Lossiness(N= pqr) ( y= x2 mod N, b1= (x>N/2) , b2= (JN(x)=1)) ZN {0,1}n 8-to-1 gcd(x,N)=1 and x<N/2 ≤ φ(N)/4 gcd(x,N)>1 and x<N/2 ≤ (N-φ(N))/2 ≤ 2n-N/2 x ≥ N/2 |Img({0,1}n)|≤ 2n-1/4

  32. Talk Outline • OW under Correlated Inputs and the Rosen-Segev Construction • CCA-security from Slightly LTDFs • A Slightly LTDF based on Modular Squaring • Conclusions

  33. Conclusions Summary • Slightly LTDFs are powerful. • Black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE from LTDFs with minimal lossiness. • Construction of a slightly LTDF from 2vs3PRIMES Open Problems • CCA-security from new hardness assumptions (via slightly lossyTDFs) • Is small lossiness enough for BB construction of other primitives (for example CRHF) ?

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