SPIDERS Energy Security JCTD Proposal

1. SPIDERSEnergy Security JCTD Proposal Dr. George Ka’iliwai, SES Mr. Ross RoleyUSPACOM Mr. Bear McConnell, SES BrigGen Mike Dana Dr. Bill WaugamanUSNORTHCOM This brief is: UNCLASSIFIED

2. USPACOM Overview • Largest of 10 Combatant Commands, 15 time zones • 1 of 6 Regional COCOMS (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM) • 36 countries, 6 largest armed forces, 3 largest economies

3. USNORTHCOM Overview • USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of focus (AOF) to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. • AOF is the United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.

4. Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Overview • The mission of a JCTD is to find, demonstrate, transition, and transfer the best operational concepts and technology solutions for transformational, joint, and coalition warfare. • Accelerates cutting-edge technologies to the Warfighter by: • Speeding the discovery, development, and delivery of technology and concepts for sustained military capabilities with emphasis on capabilities that are innovative, transformational and joint;• Partnering with Services, Agencies, and Coalition elements to provide the best capabilities to Joint and Coalition warfighters;• Seeking the very best technical and operational concept solutions from Defense, industry and academic sources;• Leveraging "try before you buy" demonstrations, exploiting "test to procure" initiatives, and forging partnerships to create new technology and operational concept solutions for warfighters; and • Combining improved business processes to operationalize innovation faster than ever.

5. The Situation “Critical national security and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the electric grid.” “The Department should take immediate actions to “island” the installations listed in Appendix G and increase the efficiency of critical equipment to reduce the burden for backup systems.” The Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Security, February 2008. “More Fight – Less Fuel”

6. The Situation “There have been numerous attacks on the operating systems of major critical infrastructure facilities, including power grids, around the world in recent years: Chinese and Russian spies have “penetrated the U.S. electrical grid” and left behind dormant but malicious software.” “Aurora threat revealed the possibility that sophisticated hackers could seriously damage the grid by destroying mechanisms downstream from the initial point of attack.” “DoD should pioneer the adoption of smart-grid technologies on its installations. These technologies would help the installations better manage their energy demand, increase efficiency, enable more effective use of renewable sources, and provide resilience against electrical disruptions.” Powering America’s Defense, Energy and the Risks to National Security, by the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board, May 2009

7. Coalition / Joint / Interagency Operational Problem The ability of today’s warfighter to command, control, deploy, and sustain forces is adversely impacted by a fragile, aging, and fossil fuel dependent electricity grid, posing a significant threat to national security. Inability to protect task critical assets from loss of power due to cyber attack Inability to integrate renewable and other distributed generation electricity to power task critical assets in times of emergency Inability to sustain critical operations during prolonged power outages Inability to manage installation electrical power and consumption efficiently, to reduce petroleum demand, carbon “bootprint,” and cost The modern military needs to evolve its power infrastructure. New threats demand new defenses

8. HECO Typical Daily System Load vs Capacity Peaking Units Maximum Efficiency During Peak Load 5% Excess Capacity at 5:00 PM 8% Excess Capacity at 8:00 AM Note: Graph does not reflect excess spinning reserve equal to largest turbine in service 23% Excess Capacity at 3:00 AM

9. SPIDERS – Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security

10. What Is It? Demonstrate: Cyber-security of electric grid Smart Grid Technologies & applications Islanded micro-grid Integration of distributed & intermittent renewable sources Demand-side management Redundant back-up power systems Results in: First complete DoD installation with a secure, smart micro-grid capable of islanding Template for DoD-wide installation energy security *From Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Security, Feb 2008 Reduce the “unacceptably high risk”* of extended electric grid outages by developing the capability to “island” installations while maintaining operational surety & security

11. What We Are Going To Do Cyber-security – Demonstrate defense in-depth against cyber-attack through the application of Virtual Secure Enclaves strategy to smart electric grid control Smart Grid Technologies & Applications - Incorporate technologies into the secure micro-gridto enable automated load balancing, two-way communication, smart-metering, and automatic system re-configuration Islanded Micro-grid – Convert an entire installation to micro-grid and enable generation balancing and intentional islanding for extended continuity of operations Integration of distributed & intermittent renewable sources – Ensure micro-grid stability through optimized use of renewables, energy storage, extend islanding operations, and reduce petroleum consumption and carbon footprint Demand-side management – Reduce load footprint by optimizing efficiency, provide dynamic load shedding, and manage “after-event” load to maintain critical assets Redundant back-up power systems – Ensure continuity of operations, provide an energy storage buffer for intermittent renewables, and enable seamless switchover from utility grid interconnection to intentional islanding Culminates in an integrated demonstration of all of the above and a template for a DoD-wide approach to ensure installation energy security

12. JCTD Elements and Example Technologies • Cyber-Security • Virtual Secure Enclave • Live Action Network • Secure Distributed Monitors • Situational Awareness • Smart Grid • Advanced Metering Infrastructure • Substation & Distribution Automation • Two-Way Communications & Control • Adaptive Relaying • Islanded Micro-grid • Load Control Systems • Islanding Control System • Energy Management System • Seamless Grid Synchronization Energy Secure Installation • Demand Side Management • Energy Efficiency Technologies • Dynamic Voltage Regulators • Smart Sockets • Automated Load Shedding • Renewable Integration • Photovoltaic • Wind • Biofuel • Backup Power • Vehicle-to-Grid • Fuel Cells • Batteries

13. Utility EMS Microgrid EMS Utility Communication Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Customer Utility SPIDERS Operational View OV-1

14. Year One Deliverables Circuit Level Micro-Grid Demonstration Incorporate existing renewables, diesel generators and energy storage Add fuel cell to backup local circuit Test micro-grid on an essential asset that has redundant power to simulate mission critical functions Test VSE Cyber-Security Strategy on Testbed Simulation of Utility Electric Grid Management System Initial Camp Smith Activities Install Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Implement demand-side management Offsite simulation of Camp Smith’s secure, smart micro-grid Initial Ft Carson Activities Shared distributed grid tied backup generation Demonstrate micro-grid in command area Begin incorporation of PV renewable generation

15. How We Will Do It STAIRWAY TO ENERGY SECURE INSTALLATIONS • TRANSITION • Template for DoD-wide implementation • CONOPS • TTPs • Training Plans • DoD Adds Specs to GSA Schedule • Transition to Commercial Sector • Transition Cyber-Security to Federal Sector and Utilities • CAMP SMITH ENERGY ISLAND • Entire Installation Smart Micro-Grid • Islanded Installation • High Penetration of Renewables • Demand-Side Management • Redundant Backup Power • Makana Pahili Hurricane Exercise • FT CARSON MICRO-GRID • Large Scale Renewables • Vehicle-to-Grid • Smart Micro-Grid • Critical Assets • CONUS Homeland Defense Demo • COOP Exercise • CIRCUIT LEVEL DEMONSTRATION • Renewables • Storage • Energy Management VIRTUAL SECURE ENCLAVE CYBER-SECURITY

16. U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Northern Command DOE (5 labs) OSD Power Surety Task Force Military Services Defense Energy Support Center Utilities States of Hawaii and Colorado Partners

17. Backup Slides

18. SPIDERS Cost Plan

19. SPIDERS Funding

20. SPIDERS Schedule FY11, 12, 13 Acquisition FY11Q2 Smart Grid (SG) FY11Q4 Cyber Security (CS) Tech Demo FY11Q4 SG Tech Demo at Sandia National Lab (SNL)? FY12Q1 Evaluate SG Tech Demo FY12Q1 CS Tech Demo at SNL FY12Q2 Evaluate CS Tech Demo Installation FY11Q2 – FY12Q2 Install SG modules (ie renewables, relays, etc) FY12Q2 SG Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) FY12Q3 Evaluate SG LOE FY12Q3 CS Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) FY12Q4 Evaluate SG LOE Integration FY12Q4 Integration of SG and CS FY13Q2 Final Operational Utility Assessment (OUA) Evaluation and Transition FY13Q3 Evaluate SG and CS as a system FY13Q4+ Transition to DOD and industry

21. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Mission: Use defensible smart microgrid to reduce vulnerability to energy supply disruptions, energy price volatility, unusual load increases, and heavy carbon bootprint. Operational requirements: Maintain 100% of critical load for over 72 hours in event of loss of grid power Integrate intermittent renewable energy day-to-day as well as in loss of grid power Perform centralized and/or automatic distributed demand-side shedding of load power for efficiency and incidents Cybersecurity through virtual secure enclave of the smart grid components System requirements: Automatic sensing and load balancing for efficiency, renewable integration, and incidents Accommodate a seamless real time test and evaluation capability Interoperability and non-interference with current utility, facility, and command infrastructure and communications systems User interface, monitoring, and control permission levels March 31, 2009

22. System View 1 Live Action - Network View

23. Acquisition and Contracting Strategy A MOA will be established between PACOM and DOE for National Lab JCTD Support A MIPR will be sent to DOE and funds obligated on DOE contract Existing Navy contracts with Cubic Corp and Referentia will be employed and funding added to provide JCTD personnel for cyber and an energy support. A MIPR will be sent to DOE for use of Idaho National Labs SCADA test bed for cyber defense of smart grids experimentation Power purchase agreements will be established between COCOMs or the Solar/wind power provider and utilities A competitive RFP will be used to purchase the smart grid equipment (advanced meters, energy management system, etc) March 31, 2009

24. Virtual Secure Enclave Concept Virtual Secure Enclave (VSE) experimentation campaign goal is to mitigate identified vulnerabilities to critical communications systems Access to Blue, Green, or both Enclaves Access to Green Enclave Access to Blue Enclave Host Network VSE Client Node VSE Client Node Transport Layer Unprotected Services Cyber Adversary Virtual Protected Network (VPN) Tunnels Blue VSE Services Node Green VSE Services Node Cross Domain System

25. Electric Grid Development Early Urban Utilities; Like stand alone buildings Grid interconnections to allow power to flow between utilities Smart Grid adds in comms & intelligence Smart Grid as a ‘Human Body’ circulatory nervous skeletal • Digital Information and Controls Technology • Dynamic Optimization • Distributed Generation • Renewables Integration • Real Time, Automated, Interactive Control Technology • Integrate “Smart” Appliances • Advanced Distributed Storage • Infrastructure Standards • Timely feedback to consumers • Control options Source: Human body analogy: MIT and SAP Smart Grid attributes: NIST

26. Today’s Electric Grid • Centralized • One-way power flow • Regulated Monopoly • Generation • Distribution • Inflexible demand • Aging Infrastructure • Manual operations • Increasing renewables • Lacks interoperability

27. Electric Grid Regions and Interconnects Canada High Voltage DC Interconnect Mexico

28. Northeast Blackout of 2003 • 14 August 2003 starting at 3:41 PM EDT • 55 Million People • New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ontario and parts of Massachusetts • Approx 48 Hours • Cause: • Overgrown tree branches near Eastlake, Ohio impacted High Voltage lines during high power demand period. Source: Natural Resources Canada - Canada-U.S. Power System Outage Task Force Interim Report