$100M seismic retrofit of Memphis VA hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Does this make s

1. USING WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T IN EARTHQUAKE HAZARD MITIGATION Mitigating risks from earthquakes or other natural disasters involves economic & policy issues as well as the scientific one of estimating the hazard and the engineering one of designing safe structures. $100M seismic retrofit of Memphis VA hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Does this make sense? How can we help society decide?

2. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: TRADEOFF Your department is about to build a new building. The more seismic safety you want, the more it will cost. You have to decide how much of the construction budget to put into safety. Spending more makes you better off in a future large earthquake. However, you’re worse off in the intervening years, because that money isn't available for office and lab space, equipment, etc. Deciding what to do involves cost-benefit analysis. You try to estimate the maximum shaking expected during the building's life, and the level of damage you will accept. You consider a range of scenarios involving different costs for safety and different benefits in damage reduction. You weigh these, accepting that your estimates for the future have considerable uncertainties, and somehow decide on a balance between cost and benefit.

3. THIS PROCESS, WHICH SOCIETY FACES IN PREPARING FOR EARTHQUAKES, ILLUSTRATES TWO PRINCIPLES: “There's no free lunch” Resources used for one goal aren’t available for another, also desirable, one. In the public sector there are direct tradeoffs. Funds spent strengthening schools aren’t available to hire teachers, upgrading hospitals may mean covering fewer uninsured (~$1 K/yr), stronger bridges may result in hiring fewer police and fire fighters (~$50 K/yr), etc... “There's no such thing as other people's money” Costs are ultimately borne by society as a whole. Imposing costs on the private sector affects everyone via reduced economic activity (a few % cost increase may decide whether a building isn’t built or build elsewhere), job loss (or reduced growth), and the resulting reduction in tax revenue and thus social services.

4. SCIENCE/ENGINEERING AND ECONOMIC/POLICY ISSUES ARE INTERRELATED: NO SHARP DIVISION BETWEEN THEM e.g., definition of “hazard” (number of years/probability over which to plan for maximum shaking) is economic/policy based Need to view these in holistic way to formulate sensible policy Challenge is to develop sensible policies that balance costs and benefits, given what we know and don't know about future earthquakes and their effects. Several approaches can help seismologists and engineers most usefully contribute.

5. RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE NO UNIQUE OR CORRECT STRATEGIES, SO SOCIETY HAS TO MAKE TOUGH CHOICES. Use what we know about earthquake hazards and recurrence to help society decide how much to accept in additional costs to reduce both the direct and indirect costs of future earthquakes. Need detailed analysis, which we don't have yet, of the costs and benefits of various policies. Strategy chosen shouldn't be a bureaucratic decision imposed from above, but one made openly through the democratic process on the community level - where costs and benefits of the policy accrue.

6. SHOULD BUILDINGS IN MEMPHIS MEET CALIFORNIA STANDARD? New building code IBC 2000, urged by FEMA, would raise to California level (~ UBC 4) Essentially no analysis of costs & benefits of new code Year Code J. Tomasello

7. INITIAL COST/BENEFIT ESTIMATES: MEMPHIS AREA I: Present value: FEMA estimate of annual earthquake loss $17 million/yr, part of which would be eliminated by new code, ~ 1% of annual construction costs ($2 B). II: Life-of-building: Use FEMA estimate to infer annual fractional loss in building value from earthquakes. If loss halved by new code, than over 50 yr code saves 1% of building value. If seismic mitigation cost increase for new buildings with IBC 2000 >> 1%, probably wouldn't make sense. Similar results likely from sophisticated study including variations in structures, increase in earthquake resistance with time as more structures meet code, interest rates, retrofits, disruption costs, etc.

8. 2) THOUGHTFULLY ADDRESS LIFE SAFETY U.S. earthquake risk primarily to property; annualized losses estimated at ~$4 billion. Also ~10 deaths/yr, averaged over larger numbers in major earthquakes. Annual fatalities roughly constant since 1800, presumably in part because population growth in hazardous areas offset by safer construction. Situation could likely be maintained or improved by strengthening building codes, so the issue is how to balance this benefit with alternative uses of resources (flu shots, defibrillators, highway upgrades, etc.) that might save more lives for less. Estimated cost to save life (in U.S.) varies in other applications: ~$50 K highway improvements ~$100 K medical screening ~$5 M auto tire pressure sensors Different strategies likely make sense in different areas within the U.S. and elsewhere, depending on earthquake risk, current building codes, and alternative demands for resources.

9. Hence seismic mitigation costs in Memphis area - $20-200 M/yr (1-10% new construction cost) + any retrofits - could insure 20,000 - 200,000 people and save some lives that way Tricky tradeoff here

10. 3) EXPLICITLY DISCUSS UNCERTAINTIES We know a lot less than we'd like about earthquake recurrence and hazards. Although we hope to do better, we don't know if we can, given the complexity shown by long earthquake records and the growing suspicion that earthquake occurrence has a large random component. We don't know whether to view earthquake recurrence as time-dependent or independent, or even whether earthquakes are less likely in recently active areas (Swafford et al, Thurs. AM). Hopefully on some time scale, perhaps a few hundred years, we will have made and tested forecasts adequately to have reasonable confidence in them. Until then, we should explain what we know and what we don't. There's no harm in discussing the limits of what we know. Individuals and society make decisions given uncertainty: we buy life insurance and decide how much to spend on safety features in cars. Business and political leaders consider risks in deciding whether and how to invest. In fact, we help ourselves by explaining what we don't know, since we want public funds to learn more.

11. UNCERTAINTIES IN NMSZ HAZARD MAPS Areas of predicted significant hazard differ significantly, depending on poorly known parameters. Differences have major policy implications (e.g. Memphis & St. Louis). Uncertainties won’t be resolved for 100s-1000s years Uncertainties dominated by systematic errors (epistemic) and hence likely underestimated Newman et al., 2001

12. 4) AVOID BIASING HAZARD ESTIMATES Estimates biased toward high ("conservative") values distort policy decisions by favoring seismic safety over other resource uses. Don’t want poor education in earthquake-safe schools, or to turn away patients from earthquake-safe hospitals Need careful balance An analogy might be the tendency during the Cold War to overestimate Soviet military power, leaving the U.S. with enormous military strength but diverting resources from health, education, and other societal goals.

13. 5) HAZARD ASSESSMENTS AND MITIGATION POLICIES SHOULD UNDERGO DISINTERESTED PEER REVIEW Crucial economic and societal issues should fully explored before a decision. For example, arguments used to infer that the New Madrid zone is as hazardous as California should have been carefully analyzed, given their enormous cost implications. These result largely from redefining the hazard from the largest earthquake expected every 500 years to that expected every 2500 years.

14. EFFECT OF 2500 YEAR CRITERION - MUCH LONGER THAN ORDINARY BUILDING LIFE Considers maximum shaking at a geographic point over 500 or 2,500 yr (10% or 2% in 50 yr) while neglecting much shorter life of ordinary structures. Definition allows New Madrid hazard to be similar to that in California, although annual California hazard is much lower. By similar argument, in very long (three million hand) poker game. probability of at least one pair and royal flush are comparable - although in one hand, the probability of a pair is ~ 43%, whereas that of a royal flush is far less, ~ 1 / 100,000 Using this argument would lose money in ordinary duration game.

15. 6) TAKE TIME TO GET THINGS RIGHT Because major earthquakes in a given area are infrequent on human timescale, we generally have time to formulate strategy carefully (no need to rush to wrong answer) Time can also help on both the cost and benefit sides. As older buildings replaced by ones meeting newer standards, overall earthquake resistance increases. Similarly, even where retrofitting isn't cost-effective, higher standards for new ones may be. Technological advances can make additional mitigation cheaper and more cost-effective. If understanding of earthquake probabilities becomes sufficient to confidentially identify how probabilities vary with time, construction standards could be adjusted accordingly where appropriate.

16. 7) WE ARE NOT ALONE There's increasing interest in making mitigation policy more rationally for other hazards with considerable uncertainties. “The direct costs of federal environmental, health, and safety regulations are probably ~$200 billion annually, about the size of all federal domestic, nondefense discretionary spending. The benefits of those regulations are even less certain. Evidence suggests that some recent regulations would pass a benefit-cost test while others would not.” (Brookings Institution & American Enterprise Institute) Viewing seismology and engineering as part of a holistic approach to hazards mitigation will make our contributions more useful to society. This utility will grow as we learn more about earthquakes and their effects in different areas.