A Society-Centered Approach to the Politics of Trade

1. A Society-Centered Approach to the Politics of Trade READING ASSIGNMENT: Oatley – Chapter 4 Suggested (not required) further reading: Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4):1121-1137

2. Plan • Distributional consequences of trade • Stolper-Samuelson Theorem • Sector model (vs. Factor model) • Societal cleavages • The role of political institutions

3. Overview • Trade has distributional consequences • Trade policy is shaped by the government’s responses to the demands of different interest groups • Government responses to interest groups are shaped by POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

4. Factor incomes & class conflict • Simplest version: • labor v. capital • (workers v. owners of capital) • Recall from the last class: • countries have a comparative advantage in producing goods requiring their ABUNDANT FACTOR • There are • capital-abundant countries & • labor abundant countries Vs.

5. When the US opens up to trade, they move from producing at EaA to PtA. • So they shift from shoes to computers. • Who gains? • Capital • Who loses? • Labor

6. When the US opens up to trade, they move from producing at EaB to PtB. • So they shift from computers to shoes. • Who gains? • Labor • Who loses? • Capital

7. In the factor model, trade causes… • Income of the ABUNDANT factor to RISE • Income of the SCARCE factor to FALL

8. Take-away: Abundant factors win from globalization (intuition: supply & demand) In a closed economy (autarky), Papa Smurf is in high demand. And he has a lot of cheap labor. WINNERS FROM TRADE! LOSERS FROM TRADE! But imagine there’s another country out there with lots of “Papas” and only one regular smurf. If these countries trade, the supply of Papa-goods (for the 1st country) goes way up (and the price way down) Meantime, the demand for regular smurf-goods (worldwide) goes way up – and so does their price.

9. Labor abundant country • Absent trade • “Capital” is relatively scarce in a country like China, so the “rent” can be enormous • Labor is cheap, so wages are low • By opening up to trade • Capital “rents” will fall until they equal the (rising) rate of return in trading partner countries • Wages will rise until they equal the (falling) wage in trading partner countries

10. Capital abundant country • Absent trade • Capital is abundant, so returns are low • Labor is relatively scarce in a country like Switzerland, so wages can be enormous • By opening up to trade • Return to capital will rise until it equals the (dropping) rate in trading partner countries • Wages will drop until they equal the (rising) wage in trading partner countries

11. Stolper-Samuelson Theorem • Factor-price equalization • The tendency for trade to cause factor prices to converge • The scarce factor is a LOSER!

12. Are the doors big enough in the factor model?

13. Factor mobility • =The ease with which labor and capital can move from one industry to another • We have implicitly assumed that capital and labor are highly MOBILE • All capital is the same • (computers, car factories, etc…) • All labor is the same • (shoe-makers, furniture-makers, steel-workers, etc…) • But what if factors are highly SPECIFIC?

14. Sector Incomes & Industry Conflict • It’s really about computers, shoes, … your INDUSTRY or “sector” • Suppose “Factor Mobility” is low • Incomes of labor AND capital in the same SECTOR (industry) rise and fall together • Now, we do not completely abandon the factor model: • We still use the factor model to tell us which INDUSTRIES (or SECTORS) benefit from trade, however,… • LABOR & CAPITAL EMPLOYED IN INDUSTRIES THAT RELY INTENSIVELY ON SOCIETY’S ABUNDANT FACTOR **BOTH** GAIN FROM TRADE

15. Advanced industrial countries • Capital abundant, so… • Capital AND labor employed in capital-intensive industries both gainfrom trade • The export-oriented SECTOR • Capital AND labor employed in labor-intensive industries both losefrom trade • The import-competing SECTOR

16. Developing countries • Labor abundant, so… • Capital AND labor employed in _______-intensive industries both gainfrom trade • The export-oriented SECTOR • Capital AND labor employed in _______- intensive industries both losefrom trade • The import-competing SECTOR

17. Anti-globalization crowd • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtERbHhlOwA • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-WOikcNwsM&feature=related

18. What do we do about losers? • Protect them? • Tariffs, barriers to trade, subsidies • Compensate them? • Training? • Retirement packages? • Repress them? • Dictatorship – repression? • Democracy – tyranny of the majority? • The answer depends on their size, their political resources, and the political institutions

19. Size • The logic of collective action • Large-size, more “free-riding” – benefits are disbursed across a large group • Small size – benefits are concentrated!

20. The logic of collective action helps to understand… • Why producers *not* consumers dominate trade politics • Why US soda is flavored with “fructose” • Consumers are large & homogeneous group (questions?) • Why trade politics have a tendency towards protectionism • Why governments rarely liberalize trade unilaterally (last week’s PD!!) • Unilateral action helps consumers (who may not even notice) • Unilateral action hurts import-competing sector (“sucker’s payoff) • Bilateral action hurts import-competing sector BUT ALSO HELPS export-oriented sector! (L,L from PD yesterday) • And the winning side of the “suckers’ payoff”? • Protects import-competing sector & helps export-oriented sector (only consumers – who don’t notice – are hurt)

21. Institutions over time in the US • Congress passes Smoot-Hawley in 1930 • Single-member districts (narrow interests located in district/state) + logrolling in Congress  lots of protectionism • President – national interest? (Not really – ELECTORAL COLLEGE – Pennsylvania steel???) • Still, President can rise above logrolling • Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934): Congress delegates to the President the authority to reduce tariffs by as much as 50% in exchange for equivalent concessions from foreign governments • US Trade Representative (1962) – Responsible for trade policy (reports to President & Congress) – moved trade policy away from the State dept (short-run foreign policy goals) • Fast-track (1974)– President negotiates trade agreements that Congress can approve/disapprove by cannot amend or filibuster

22. To think about the influence of political institutions, let’s go back to the simple factor model

23. More fun with factors and institutions • Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81 (4):1121-1137. • 3 factors: land-labor-capital • Considers the land-labor ratio • High land-labor ratio  land-abundant, labor-scarce • Low land-labor ratio  labor-abundant, land-scarce • Define “advanced” economies as capital-abundant

24. Developing

25. Developing

26. Smoot-Hawley, Great Depression Developing

27. Let’s simplify and make some predictions of our own… • 2 factor model: • Capital & Labor • Suppose: • LABOR controls government under DEMOCRACY • CAPITAL controls government under AUTOCRACY

28. Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

29. Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

30. Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

31. Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

32. Back to 2 factors (ignoring collective action problem)

33. Take-homes • Factor model: • abundant factor wins, scarce loses • Sector model • both factors in an abundant-factor-sector win • both factors in a scarce-factor-sector lose • Stolper-Samuelson Theorem • What do we about losers? • Relative abundance/scarcity may shape political conflict • Political Institutions matter

34. Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!