The notion of “the minimal self” and types of conscious experience

1. The notion of “the minimal self” and types of conscious experience Ryszard Auksztulewicz Studenckie Koło Kognitywistyczne Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza

2. Minimal self (Gallagher 2000) • Phenomenologically (in terms of how one experiences it): • Consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience • Unextended in time • Depends on brain processes and an ecologically embedded body • Unessential features of self stripped away, a basic, immediate, primitive 'something' that we are willing to call a self

3. Strawson's Mental Self (1997) (1) a thing (2) a mental thing (3) synchronically single (4) diachronically single (5) ontically distinct from all other things (6) a subject of experience (7) an agent (8) character / personality

4. The Self as an agent • Movement / action constituting the self Sense of ownership: The sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience= [actual state vs. predicted state] comparator Sense of agency: The sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action = [intended state vs. efference copy] comparator Minimal self

5. The self and consciousness • Feinberg: questions regarding the self identical to questions regarding consciousness • (1) unification, (2) subjectivity, (3) location • Marcel • non-reflexive consciousness = phenomenal experience; sensation • reflexive consciousness • awareness of our phenomenal experience = type of knowledge • awareness of self = not a different type of experience, but a matter of the object of its focus (suggesting attention)

6. Consciousness without self (?) - asomatognosia • asomatognosia: • right parietal lesion => patient A.R. denies the ownership of the contralateral limb • attributes the hand to his mother • screams when the hand is squeezed • patient F.B.(Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, Vallar, 2002) • attributes the hand to her niece • warned that 'the niece's hand' will be touched, reports tactile sensations • asomatognosia as a Capgras syndrome(= delusional misidentification syndrome)for body parts(Vié, in: Feinberg, 2005) • Capgras syndrome for persons (under-personalization) and places (inversed: Frégoli syndrome)

7. Consciousness without self (?) - schizophrenia • Delusions of control, intrusive thoughts and verbal hallucinations = sense of ownership without sense of agency • Problem: • is no sense of agency equal to no sense of minimal self? (agent vs. author) • Depersonalisation as a candidate for a consciouss sensation without the sense of minimal self

8. Between FPP and self-consciousness first-person perspective non-reflective self-awareness Minimal self sense of agency reflective self-consciousness narrative/conceptual self-consciousness

9. Conclusions • Sense of agency and ownership are heterogenous; it should be doubted that they stand for a homogenous self • Minimal self as a specification of FPP (from the phenomenon of consciousness to the act of consciousness) • Focus on operationalising / naturalising the sense of agency and ownership

10. References • Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14-21. • Strawson, G. (1997). The Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, 5/6, 405-428. • de Vignemont, F., Fourneret, P. (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 1-19. • Feinberg, T.E., Keenan, J.P. (2005). Where in the brain is the self? Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 661-678. • Marcel, A.J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In: Marcel, A.J., Bisiach E. (eds) Consciousness in contemporary science. Oxford Clarendon Press. pp. 121-158.