National Security Policy Survey of the Literature STRATEGY & STRUCTURE

1. National Security Policy Survey of the LiteratureSTRATEGY & STRUCTURE Robert David Steele OSS CEO bear@oss.net Updated 19 August 2002

2. You have 150 books in the lecture handout. Will only cover 50 or so of them now. Complete text reviews for over 350 books are at OSS.Net, at Amazon, and in the red and green books Information Intelligence Emerging Threats Strategy & Structure Blowback, Dissent & International Relations US Politics, Leadership & the Future of Life Plan of the Brief

3. Relevant Readings on Strategy & Force Structure

4. Durants on Lessons of History • Geography matters • Inequality is natural • Famine, pestilence, and war are Nature’s way of balancing the population • Birth control or not has strategic implications • History is color-blind • Morality is strength

5. Luttwak on Levels of War • War (and friction) occurs at four multiple interacting levels: • Strategic, Operational • Tactical, Technical • MCIA model & test determined that threat changes depending on the level of analysis

6. Gray on Modern Strategy • Technology is not a substitute for strategy • War is about getting your way, not about combat • Time matters--use or lose • Over time strategic culture is more important than arms or money.

7. Brzezinski on Grand Strategy • Europe, Russia, and Eurasian “stans” are the hearth of 21st century opportunity and threat • Core new players are Turkey and Indonesia • Iran is more stable, and China less of a threat, that conventional wisdom says • Geopolitics more important than technology

8. Kagan & Kagan on Warning & Will • Will not have warning in time to build capabilities • Must be ready for world war challenge overnight • Power is irrelevant and ineffective without the will to act and use that power • Early intervention is cheaper and easier than war

9. Kupchan on Failure of Empire • Strategic cultures resist incoming information and suffer from “adjustment failure” • Foreign internal instability merits rapid intervention with strong economic incentives • Failure to intervene early will lead to emergence of aggressors that are difficult to defeat once out of the box.

10. Shultz et al on Complexity • “Most policymakers do not fully realize the dynamics of the world we live in.” (Graham Fuller) • History and culture are vital to security policy • Non-military operations are as important as military operations at all times

11. Cimbala on Friction • Friction is real and is destroying our ability to match ends with means • We don’t have a strategy; we don’t try to understand the strategies of others; we do not have unity of effort across the diplomatic-defense-justice continuum

12. Gordon on Rules of the Game • Peacetime breeds poor warriors, bad systems, and marginal doctrine • Technology is most dangerous when adopted under peacetime conditions as it will not stand the test of war and robs humans • C4 undermines doctrine

13. Simpson on Speed • C4I and Rotary Wing are vital to future flexibility--eyes on target and boots on the ground matter more • Secret C4I is largely counterproductive • Out of area operations are now the norm--must cast an equally wide intelligence net

14. Owens on System of Systems • Best manifesto for “system of systems” • Oblivious to the fact that predominance of relevant information is not available through the existing ISR system • Technophilia at its most dangerous

15. O’Hanlon on RMA • C4I is the only arena where technological advances are truly revolutionary • Existing and planned ISR systems are incapable against many forms of denial and cannot keep up with needs of our firepower systems

16. Revolutions Not Technical • Concepts, not technology, are revolutionary • Best revolutions are actually incremental and simple • Technology is not a substitute for strategy • Current & planned arsenal distantly related to real needs

17. O’Hanlon on Aid Spending • We spend half as much on aid as do most of the other developed countries • Foreign aid in its current form is not preventing conflicts • Best investment world-wide is in education of women, this cascades across issue areas

18. Oakley on Police Peace Operations • Failed states present us with a global problem that requires an international law enforcement reserve • UN police often cannot read or drive a car and do not have doctrine • Constabulary forces are different from small war forces

19. UN Envoy on Preventive Diplomacy • UN has no intelligence, weak memory, no accountability, and a culture of inefficiency and luxury • We rely too much on military intervention • Humanitarian assistance has negative unintended consequences

20. Halberstam on Fortitude • If you don’t react when others bomb your Embassies, they assume you are weak & vulnerable. • America is slow to anger--he has confidence that we will rise to the challenges of terrorism

21. Bowden on Manhunts • Timing is everything--we let the thugs amass billions before we go after them • We are weak in tactical intelligence against non-traditional (e.g. individual) targets, especially in cities • It can be done--but is almost impossible to do well if host state is in chaos

22. Warfare in the Third World • Subjective factors including pain threshhold determinant • Training absorbtion much more important that arms supplies • Third World combat is both unconventional and never ending…

23. Third World War • Spreading insecurity is directly related to protracted conflict among societal groups • Incompetent interventions make matters much worse • Violence can be predicted • Once begun, the violent will not listen to reason...

24. Clark on Modern War • White House does not listen to early warning • Army doesn’t do mountains, tries not to use Apaches etc. • Air Force doesn’t do strategic mobility, needs 24 hours to redirect TACAIR • Technology loses to weather, lacks intelligence

25. Smart Holistic Strategy • End state must be legitimate governments everywhere • Ultimate investment is educational, both at home and abroad • Must do inter-agency holistic planning, apply all the instruments of national power all the time

26. The Tunnels of Cu Chi • Never underestimate the enemy