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What can civil society do? Example: submarine connectivity for Bangladesh

What can civil society do? Example: submarine connectivity for Bangladesh. Rohan Samarajiva Association for Progressive Communication Seminar, 19 April 2006. Agenda. Example of a policy intervention by an ICT policy-regulation research & capacity building (uncivil?) organization

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What can civil society do? Example: submarine connectivity for Bangladesh

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  1. What can civil society do? Example: submarine connectivity for Bangladesh Rohan Samarajiva Association for Progressive Communication Seminar, 19 April 2006

  2. Agenda • Example of a policy intervention by an ICT policy-regulation research & capacity building (uncivil?) organization • Do not focus only on the obvious, like • More connections • Lower prices • E.g., better access regime for submarine cable  stronger competition  better all-around sector performance • Seize opportunities; leverage strengths

  3. SEA-ME-WE 4, Bangladesh’s 1st submarine cable; so close yet so far

  4. Opportunity • Cable operational in December 2005 • Bangladesh not ready • With connecting links • Access regime • Opportunity  accepted UNDP invitation to address ITES forum • Hartal day but 250-person room full to capacity • Minister & BTTB leadership present for entire session

  5. SAT-3/WASC/SAFE: new connectivity for West Africa from 2002

  6. 28,800 km Initial capacity 120 Gbps USD 670m cost Commissioned May 2002 15 countries; 17 landings 1st & only submarine cable for W. Africa ~20,000 km Initial capacity 160 Gbps (12.5% of design capacity) USD 500m cost Commissioning 13 Dec 2005 in Dubai 14 countries; 15 landings 1st & only submarine cable for B’desh SAT-3 in West Africa & SMW4 in Bangladesh compared

  7. Closed club consortium Only ½ circuit sales; now loosening up Closed club consortium, with greater flexibility Full circuit sales allowed Only consortium can sell IRUs for 2 yrs; members may sell after 2007 SAT-3/W Africa & SMW4/B’desh

  8. W. Africa ‘02 = Bangladesh ‘05

  9. SAT-3: cable does not necessarily mean connectivity

  10. What about capacity use? • IEEE author estimate = 3% at end 2003 • “Already beyond expectation” –Administrator of cable consortium • However, he also says: • “In many of these countries . . . backhaul network is quite not accessible or may not be fully in place or may not have the capacity to support international access”

  11. Case study: Nigeria (Dec 2003) • Main cable station completed in December 2001 • Started handling traffic in April 2003 (15 months later) • 13 STM-1s (155 Mbps) available (3 in reserve) • 78% of one STM-1 frame in use (connected to sole domestic fiber) by Shell Nigeria

  12. Case study: Nigeria • Socketworks (ITES firm) • No fiber; no SAT-3 • Uses satellite connection (64 kbps up/256 kbps down) to California server farm • USD 13,000 to install, including dish, modem, and router • Operational costs = USD 1,000/mo. • "The worst thing that happened to SAT-3/WASC was that the Nigerian people were represented by the most incompetent and most dysfunctional company in the world, NITEL”– Dr Aloy Chife, CEO, Socketworks

  13. And price? • In monopoly environments only ½ circuits are sold • Connectivity=½ circuit from, say, Europe + ½ circuit from African country • Actual price can be many times the cost of international ½ circuit • In June 2005, E1 ½ circuit from Europe was USD 6,000-8,500/mo. • ½ circuit from Telkom SA was USD 15,000-17,500/mo. • Total = USD 21,000-26,000/mo. (~70% to S African monopolist)

  14. Price, Africa compared to India (ITES leader; regional benchmark)

  15. But India is not standing still . . . • In 2004, India was in ½ circuit regime • VSNL took ~85% of revenue from Indian ½ circuits • But will move to full circuit regime with new capacity coming on stream • Tata Indicom 5.12 Tbit cable between India & Singapore in November 2004 • SMW4 and FLAG Falcon in December 2005 • TRAI has ordered cuts of 29% for E-1s, 64% for DS-3s, and 59% for STM-1s relative to IN-US Atlantic routeeffective September 2005

  16. New regulated prices in India

  17. Recommendations to Government of Bangladesh • Hive off the SMW4 consortium share & interface (including fiber to Cox’s Bazaar) from BTTB now; make it a stand-alone company • Design a management contract with strict performance incentives and bid it out transparently • Contractually mandate management to web-publish all capacity contracts • Don’t wait for three years and waste opportunities; do it now

  18. Recommendations • Declare the cable & associated facilities essential • BTRC to be directed to implement open-access regime • Leave satellites alone, like India • Encourage the landing of an additional cable (possibly connecting India/Singapore) to provide facilities based competition in future • Cable redundancy needed in addition to satellite • Also analysts expect downward pressure on IPLC prices in Pakistan and Sri Lanka where SMW4 will be 2nd cable (excluding obsolete SMW2)

  19. Follow up • Based on responses • Confidential memo to Minister at his request • Op-ed piece in Daily Star within 3-4 days • Seized the opportunity using comparative advantages • Research & media savvy • Now up to domestic actors to move process forward • Actors not fully lined up because opportunity arose suddenly

  20. Rohan Samarajiva www.lirneasia.net samarajiva@lirne.net +94 11 493 9992 (v) +94 11 494 0290 (f)

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