200 likes | 290 Views
r esilient procedure use. H alden Reactor Project, Norway. obey the principles without being bound by them. b ruce lee. r esilience is about…. the ability of a system to adapt to unforeseen, challenging situations (incl. but not limited to Fukushima-scale events)
E N D
resilient procedure use Halden Reactor Project, Norway
obey the principleswithout being bound by them bruce lee
resilience is about… • the ability of a system to adapt to unforeseen, challenging situations (incl. but not limited to Fukushima-scale events) • the ability to mobilize additional resourceswhen a system approaches its margin of maneuver • enabling smooth transfer of control
motivation • Balancing pre-planned responses and the ability to adapt to novel situations is not easy. These demands can be competing or contradictory. • Focusing solely on procedural adherence may undermine the crew’s ability to make autonomous assessments, to think ahead, and to keep a high-level overview of the situation(over-reliance on procedures). • Emergency response in complex scenarios requires reliability andresilience
motivation To respond to unanticipated situations that are not entirely covered by procedure, crews need • Cognitive capacity, expertise, questioning attitude • Understand procedure backgrounds and applicability • Monitor for anomalies, predict plant evolution • Avoid over-reliance on procedures Can we improve the ability to handle unexpected scenarios through staffing and support systems? • Shift technical advisor • Procedure overview tool • New large screen display with safety focus
resilient procedure use requiresbalancing of heads-downoperation heads-upoperation and How to support this? - Crew roles - Procedure support tools - Overview tools (e.g. LSD) - External support - Others?
experimental design • 5 Swedish and 5 US crews • (note: in Sweden there is no STA position) • 4 EOP scenarios with complications • For optimal recovery, crew may have to make knowledge based decisions. • 2 experimental factors (4 conditions) • STA available / not available (4/3 person crew) • Tools available / not available (Tools = procedure flowchart & large-screen display)
experimental design Experimental design First study to compare LSD with a no-LSD control group counterbalancedto avoid order effects counterbalancedto avoid order effects mostsupport leastsupport
scenarios • Multiple SG tube break • Interfacing system LOCA • LOCA outside containment (RHR system) • Loss of feedwater • Fire in cable compartment • With high-head SI pump breakdown • H.B. Robinson fire event Scenario has been coded into SACADA
measures • HRA-type performance measures • HFE success / failure, HFE performance time • PSFs, crew errors, aggregated crew stories • New measure of SA for ISV • New measure of teamwork competence and emergency competence • Eye tracking • Questionnaires
tools for improving situation overview:new large-screen display and STA flowchart
new large screen display: primary status ofimportantsafetysystems status of automatic systems, and other important alarms (e.g. RMS) PRZpressure/leveltrends;alarmlevels;trip points massbalance increasing/ decreasing SG pressure / level trends sub-cooling
procedure flowchart E-0 E-1 E-2 E-3 ECA-1.1 ECA-1.2 ECA-1.3 ES-1.2 FR-H.1 FR-P.1
Link to high-level summary > < Grouping of procedure steps Critical action steps > < Procedure /step transfers Key decision point > Link to background material > < Procedure transfers (clickable) Step number > < Short description of step links to full text
CSF status, link to decision tree > Foldout page, link to appendix >
contact Michael.Hildebrandt@hrp.no