Anti-social behaviors

1. Anti-social behaviors Sophie Body-Gendrot

2. Is Europe caught by punitive populism ? • My argument is that 3 sets of actors the media, experts and political elites tend to give amplification to « urban risks » such as juvenile ASB, all kinds of disorders, making the formalization of insecurity a unified and unifying category. Lots of people refusing to become victimized stick to the security scheme. As global changes erode national control mechanisms, states exploit the punitive tendancies of public opinions (Melossi) as well as specific events. An old story. They apply the principle of precaution within their regalian domain in order to regain a new legitimacy. However Europe does not copycat the US due to historical, institutional, cultural and social differences

3. The US Security Project • Mid 1960s (Goldwater, Nixon, etc. addressing the « forgotten » American. • Media and deliberate construction (Willy Horton) • Security Market • Locking offenders out (incarceration rates) • Locking oneself in (gated cies, SUVs, metal etc.) • Less democratic, more fragmented, more suspicious society. • 9/11 the continuation of the security trend

4. What are the convergences ? Among explanations, social and cultural evolutions of the last forty years : More emancipated, more individualistic societies, but more concerned by their safety. ASB, « incivilities » accepted as part of modern life yet weak toleration of them. In response, States use « sticks » : pressure police forces : prosecutors : zero tolerance citizens : co-produce safety. In brief,.Overabundance of information concerning safety risks Amplified media coverage Advice of experts in the growing safety industry (CCTVs)) make quest for security a unifying concern.

5. Why do so few resist the temptation ? • Opportunitic uses (Blair, Merkel, Berlusconi) • In France, when Sarkozy Interior Minister (2002-07) • Crusade against crime • Omnibus Law on internal security (August 2002) anti-bullet jackets, weapons (taser, flash balls) bonuses for police forces • Culture of resuts imposed to police top down Omnibus Law on justice (September 2002) fighting juvenile delinquency with tougher measures • Police chiefs required to « communicate on results » to media and public opinion whenever possible (2003): cannabis users and undocumented foreigners as major targets (35% of cleared cases) • Nl Observatory of Delinquency meant to communicate statistics on assaults, rapes by juvenile delinquents etc.

6. Resistances to punitive populism Except for UK (a common law country) lots of commonalities in Europe Conservative corporate states such as France and Germany betray a commitment to welfare policies to buy social peace (“carrots”) . Inclusive societies debate about the causes of marginality and the issue of youths without futures. Try to fill moral vacuum caused by punitive trend. Social policies attempt to integrate excluded categories via universal benefits and measures of reinsertion (Second chance, “Hope” programs, Fadela Amara touring the country, etc). Institutional legitimization. if less so currently in Italy and the Netherlands more so in Scandinavian social-democratic states with generous social security policies.

7. A tough general rhetoric remains but an inertia, a relative autonomy of criminal justice systems • Example of Edvige file opposed by 86% of French forcing gvt to change • Due process, human rights, humanist concerns in courts. Mitigating circumstances. • Distinction between hard-core, repeated offenders and petty delinquents in terms of sentencing • 1945 edict in France still prevailing (Minister pregnant !). Filling and emptying prisons ! • Judges and prosecutors not elected • Public housing lobby at bay

8. More insulated multi-party systems Political elites more able to keep their distance from populist opinions despite media campaigns for victims. Compassion suspicion campaign (Soulez-Larivière/Eliacheff) Because no « imperative mandate », no recall process, little accountability (in France)

9. Conclusion • Changes relative to security are not simply constructed by political entrepreneurs, experts andthe media • Complex interactions • Stuart Scheingold warns us to be cautious in our judgment of politicians' behaviors. He admits that "national politicians....have strong incentives to politicize street crime. For them, it provides a unifying theme and thus a valence issue. While victimization is experienced differentially according to class, race, gender, and geography, the threat it poses to property and person evokes comparable fears throughout the society… Political leaders can, therefore, deploy the fear of crime to unify the public against the criminal”. Yet, Scheingold is prompt to add that "it is an interactive process combining elements of responsiveness with elements of manipulation. Politicians do not so much ‘expropriate our consciousness’ as take advantage of punitive predispositions about crime that are rooted in culture. The public engages and disengages from the politicization process for reasons that have at least as much to do with the place of crime in the culture as with the impact of criminal victimization in our lives" In other words, politicization is a reciprocal process, with political leaders taking as much the initiative as responding to the public. But politicization has only an indirect and unpredictable impact on policy. Power games begin long before demands surface and debates take place.