Multilingualism and Optimal Language Policy in the EU

1. Multilingualism and Optimal Language Policy in the EU Jan Fidrmuc Brunel University

2. Stylized Facts • 6,912 living languages on Earth • Most countries linguistically diverse. • A few countries monolingual -- mostly small, remote and sparsely populated islands (e.g. Falkland islands, Saint Helena, Pitcairn), and. North Korea. • Most European countries linguistically diverse. • Most European countries: only a single official language.

4. Stylized Facts • 2% EU citizens multilingual • 39% speak at least one foreign language • 14% speak two or more foreign languages • Source: Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005. • Except English, French, German, Spanish and Russian, most languages only spoken in their own countries

8. English

9. French

10. German

11. Russian

12. Stylized Facts • Large differences across age cohorts • Only English seems to improve its relative standing over time

14. Stylized Facts: Attitudes • 67% Europeans think English is a useful language for one's personal development and career • 22-25% think so of German or French • 10% think no language is useful • The opinions on which languages children should learn are very similar • 2% think children should learn no foreign language

17. EU Multilingualism and Optimal Language Policy • Outline • Multilingualism in the EU • Simple model of linguistic-policy choice • Cost per language per person: average cost vs cost per disenfranchised person • Optimal sequence of official languages • Political economy of a linguistic reform

18. EU Multilingualism • EU in 1957: 6 members and 4 languages • EU in 2007: 27 members and 23 languages • Some official languages are spoken by many • German (85 mn), English (62 mn), French (61mn) • Some official languages are not • Maltese, Irish (0.4-0.6 mn) • Some non-official languages spoken by many • Catalan (4.1 mn), Russian (4.2), Turkish (2.2 mn), Arabic (1.6 mn)

20. EU Multilingualism: Implications • EU treaties, regulations and decisions must be translated into all official languages • Most documents are prepared in English (62%), French (26%) or German (3%) • Translation: 1.3 million pages per year (2002) • 2710 translators and additional 1900 other staff • Interpretation: 50-60 meetings per day with 1-60 interpreters per meeting • 962 interpreters, plus 200 other staff

22. EU Multilingualism: Implications • Long backlog of documents to be translated • Relay translations increasingly used • MEPs are asked to use simple sentences and to avoid making jokes

23. EU Multilingualism: Future Prospects • Official status requested for Catalan, Valencian, Galician and Basque. • Future enlargements: Croatian and Turkish. • Alternatives: • English only; • English, French and German only; • Esperanto; • English (for everyone except English native speakers) and French (for English native speakers); • Those whose languages are used should compensate the others; • Self financing.

24. EU Multilingualism • Language policy should facilitate communication effectivelyand efficiently • Most nation-states implement restrictive language policy: single language typical • EU: extensive multilingualism • This is effective but is it also efficient? • Costs and benefits need to be considered

25. Costs • EU25 at ‘full speed’: € 1,045 million per year (17% of the administrative budget) • Erroneous and/or confusing translations • MEPs are asked to use simple sentences and to avoid making jokes • Potential for disagreements about interpretation of legal documents • Delays in implementation of legal/regulatory decisions

26. Benefits: Preventing Linguistic Disenfranchisement • A person is linguistically disenfranchised (excluded) if the EU does not use a language that they understand • Not all languages are equal: some are more popular than others • Special Eurobaromenter 255: Europeans and their Languages, 2005 • Optimal language policy needs to reflect this

27. Model of Language Policy Choice • Union with n linguistic groups • Population of group j is Nj • Population of the union is N= Nj. • Public good  • Language-dependent • Provided in a core language • Subsequently translated into other languages. • Translation can be full or partial • j ranges between 0 and 1 • Utility from receiving  in one’s own language: U(j), U’(j)>0 and U’’(j)<0 • Translation is costly: Cj=cj, c>0

28. Model of Language Policy Choice • Individual utility from translation of  under self-financing • Optimal extent of translation, j, is chosen according to • Utility from translation of  under centralization • and optimal extent of translation, , is chosen according to

29. 1. If all groups are equally sized, full sharing is preferred by all (except the core-language group): Model of Language Policy Choice 2. Optimal extent of translation regime depends on group size: full sharing results in over-provision of translation for small groups and under-provision for large groups. 3. Groups of below-average size prefer full-sharing while above-average ones prefer self-financing.

30. Data on Language Proficiency • Eurobaromenter 54: Special survey on languages, 2000. • Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001. • Special Eurobaromenter 255: Europeans and their Languages, 2005 • Respondents asked about mother’s tongue and other languages that they speak well • Nationally representative surveys • we can extrapolate to get the number of speakers of different languages in EU countries

31. Not All Languages Equal

32. Disenfranchisement • People are disenfranchised if the EU does not use a language that they understand. • Only preventing disenfranchisement considered • National pride, patriotism and international recognition are ignored.

33. Disenfranchisement (EB 2000-01)

34. Disenfranchisement corrected for proficiency (EB 2005)

35. Cost per Language • Total cost: € 686 million in EU15, € 1,045 million in EU25. • Average cost per language per year: € 68.6 million in EU15 and € 55 million in EU25. • Average cost per person: € 1.8 in EU15 and € 2.30 in EU25. • There are important differences across languages.

36. Average Cost per Person/Language

37. Cost per Disenfranchised Person • Average cost misleading • Calculation assumes that all speakers of non-official languages are disenfranchised • Alternative: cost per language (€ 55 million) divided by the number of those who would be disenfranchised if their language was left out • Alternative scenarios: from English only to English-French-German • Static analysis, bargaining or sequencing not taken into account

38. Cost per Disenfranchised Person

39. Cost per Disenfranchised Person

40. Optimal Sets of Official Languages • Selecting the optimal set of official languages • How many? • Which ones? • The optimal set of official languages should maximize welfare (facilitate communication) and minimize cost • For every m (1m23), we find the set of m languages that minimizes disenfranchisement ( minimizes welfare loss)

41. Optimal Sets of Official Languages: All Respondents

42. Optimal Sets of Official Languages: Respondents under 30

43. Optimal Sets of Official Languages • Selecting the optimal m: • Marginal benefits  lowering disenfranchisement • Marginal costs  monetary and non-monetary • Costs and benefits not expressed in the same unit • 23 (or more) official languages inefficient • High costs and large negative externalities • 1-3 languages  excessive disenfranchisement • 63% with English only • 38% with English-French-German

44. Optimal Sets of Official Languages

45. Optimal Sets of Official Languages • 6 languages: good intermediate solution • Modest disenfranchisement: 16% • Adding further languages brings only limited gains • However, political constraints crucial

46. Political Economy of Language-policy Reform • At present, linguistic policies decided by unanimity • Small countries benefit from cross-subsidization of translation costs by large countries • Two possible scenarios for reform: • Reform designed so as to compensate losers • Decision-making rule changes  qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of unanimity

47. Political Economy of Language-policy Reform • Centralization: • Under-provision of translation for large countries • Over-provision for small countries • Majority of EU population would benefit from moving from centralization to self-financing • Majority of EU countries would oppose such reform • Reducing the number of official languages: similar case

48. Political Economy of Language-policy Reform

49. Language-policy Reform with Compensation of Losers • Decentralization: countries get control over funds earmarked for linguistic services • Giving countries discretion makes them internalize the costs of the linguistic regime • EU budget unchanged but funds spent in a way that maximizes aggregate welfare • Countries can keep the rents that they are currently enjoying  politically feasible

50. Language-policy Reform under QMV • Alternative QMV scenarios: • Nice Treaty (min 14 states, 255/345 votes, 62% of EU population) • Lisbon Treaty (55% states, 65% pop)